Publications

This essay confronts two main problems in cyber defense: the attribution issue (who is attacking?) and the threshold issue (is it worth all-out war?). Starting with a war-game scenario, an analytical framework based on the Tallinn Manual is suggested to delineate cases for wars and areas of crises. The prosecution of cyber crises is then proposed through two “reduction in asymmetrical information” strategies. The threshold issue can be alleviated with a better understanding of observable and simulated effects on the defending networked nation modeled as a system, drawing on the initialconcept proposed by Col. John Warden. The attribution issue must be solved through excellence in elucidation methods and internationally supported coercive investigation, inspired by Thomas Schelling’s compellence. The growing preeminence of the digital domain in our modern societies could make these strategies among the building blocks of a new doctrine for military and political stability in the twenty-first century.