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Home Publications Memoranda The Annapolis Process: A Missed Opportunity for a Two-State Solution?

The Annapolis Process: A Missed Opportunity for a Two-State Solution?

Memorandum No. 212, May 4, 2021

עברית
Udi Dekel
Lia Moran-Gilad

This memorandum describes the context and background of the Annapolis process of 2007—2008 for a permanent status agreement between the State of Israel and the representatives of the Palestinians—the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. The authors, who held key positions in planning, organizing, and conducting the negotiation meetings, describe the interactions and events in public and behind the scenes, in a concerted effort to depict the “golden path” between the competing interests and opposing positions of the parties to reach a stable and viable settlement.


The details presented here and the portrayal of the positions in the negotiation rooms constitute the complex shared and separate reality of Israel and the Palestinians. As one delves into the details and examines the attitudes and positions of the parties and their degree of flexibility, the great weight that the parties attached to their narratives and to the ethos entrenched over the years becomes increasingly apparent, as well as the growing obstacles that prevent a settlement and bridging of the gaps.


To reach an arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians—a fateful decision for the prosperity and fortitude of the State of Israel as Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral—the Palestinian side also needed to agree. In the years since the Annapolis process, the gaps between the two sides have grown and become increasingly entrenched, while chances at achieving a permanent, comprehensive, and stable settlement have receded. The authors conclude here that the Israeli leadership should seriously and honestly consider an agreed-upon separation from the Palestinians as well as take independent steps, without impeding any future diplomatic process. In any future negotiations, the State of Israel should approach the negotiation table having learned from the previous rounds of negotiations, including recognition of both the obstacles and factors that will facilitate progress and the formulation of agreements.


Table of Contents:

1280px-thumbnail
In February 2009, during the final days of his government, Prime Minister Olmert invited us—the members of the Israeli Peace Negotiation Team with the Palestinians in the 2007–2008 round (referred to as the Annapolis process)—for a briefing at the Ministry of Defense at HaKirya1 in Tel Aviv (see Figure 1). Olmert praised the work of the team, starting with the background research and laying the foundations for negotiations to our managing discussions with the Palestinians. According to Olmert, all the work done during the intensive year of negotiations had been worthwhile and would help achieve an overall settlement with the Palestinians in the future. Olmert complimented the planning process done in preparation for the negotiations, which emphasized the main challenge facing the negotiations: the transition from agreement to implementation.
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אוסף-פרטי
Udi Dekel, the managing director of the Institute for National Security Studies, has vast experience in the fields of intelligence, international military cooperation, and strategic planning. He headed the Israeli team to the negotiations with the Palestinians in the Annapolis process, prior to which he filled many senior IDF positions, including head of the Foreign Relations Division and, in the Air Force, commander of the Foreign Relations Unit and head of the Research Division. His last IDF post was head of Strategic Planning. Following the Second Lebanon War, Brig. Gen. (res.) Dekel headed the Israel–UN–Lebanon committee. In addition, he served on the 2006 commission to update Israel’s security concept.

Dr. Lia Moran-Gilad is an expert in security and foreign policy. She holds a PhD in international relations from the Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Lia held several key positions in the Prime Minister’s Office and Defense Ministry, such as chief of staff and senior advisor to the Head of the National Security Council (NSC), and senior advisor to the Head of Crossing Point Authority. Lia was a core member of the Peace Negotiation Team and responsible for data management and coordination of committee work during the Annapolis process. Currently she is a Research Group leader at the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute.

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20071127-2_p112707cg-0111-515h
Many years have passed since the Annapolis process, the last sustained attempt to arrive at a permanent settlement with the Palestinians based on the principle of two-states-for-two-peoples. The Annapolis process, which began in late 2007 at the Annapolis Summit, and continued during 2008, did not achieve an agreement. This can be attributed to a number of factors: The allegations against Prime Minister Olmert, which led to his announcement that he would not be running in the elections planned for 2009, making it difficult to move the process forward; the inability of the Palestinian leadership to take fateful decisions as well as their hesitation to bear the responsibility
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20071127-2_p112707cg-0207-515h
Since the historic breakthrough in relations between Israel and the Palestinians with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, there have been essentially four rounds of final-status negotiations: Camp David in 2000; President Clinton’s parameters in late 2000; the Annapolis process in 2007–2008; and the initiative of US Secretary of State John Kerry during the Obama administration from 2013 to 2014—all of which failed. Different claims for the failure of the final-status negotiations range from the poor organization of the negotiations to the sides’ lack of readiness to agree on the final status. Nonetheless, there is consensus that the reasons preventing progress toward an overall agreement included, namely, the unbridgeable gaps between the positions of the two sides on the core issues of the conflict and the asymmetry in the goals of the negotiations. The attempts to sidestep the gaps by various negotiating approaches did not achieve results either. This situation led to the outbreak of violence from the Palestinian side and Israel’s reaction to it, resulting in successive rounds of conflict, prolonged stagnation of the peace process, and the erosion of hope on both sides that an agreement can be achieved
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ZZZZZZZZ
In late 2008, after eight months of intensive negotiations, which included about 300 meetings among senior officials and the professional committees, the points of agreement and disagreement on the various issues were presented to the American team—David Walsh and Elliot Abrams—who in turn summarized the negotiations for the new US administration under President Obama.
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VVVVV
The peace process, in one form or another, accompanied Ehud Olmert throughout his professional life, from the time he was mayor of Jerusalem from 1993 to 2003 (during which Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon served as prime ministers) and then when Olmert was prime minister from 2006 to 2009. Olmert formulated an approach, as he described it in a briefing held at the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research on July 23, 2012, that Israel should come to the negotiations with an attitude of respect for the Palestinian side and without being arrogant or patronizing. In the briefing, he explained that “We have implanted in our DNA the idea that we are ‘lords of the manor.’ But, without some basic humility there will not be any negotiations.” Olmert’s approach was that in any negotiations, the most important thing was to identify the problems that were “make or break,” which would determine whether or not an agreement was reached. As a result of this view, Olmert held numerous meetings with Mahmoud Abbas—usually tête-à-tête—and invested a great deal of effort in building up personal trust.
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STATE-DEPARTMENT
The American involvement in the Annapolis process was led by US Secretary of State Rice, who supported bilateral negotiations without active US involvement in the discussions. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Rice made sure to hold periodic meetings on the status of the negotiations, attended either by Secretary of State Rice herself or her assistants, David Walsh from the State Department and Elliot Abrams of the National Security Council. During the status meetings, the secretary of state pushed for progress to be made and sometimes would suggest creative solutions for overcoming obstacles. Primarily, the US advocated the solution of two-states-for-two peoples, and from what was said at the status discussions, we can infer the specific positions of the secretary of state on the core issues and the sought-after solution.
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2019-07-18T000000Z_159708314_RC174592DAE0_RTRMADP_3_ISRAEL-NETANYAHU
The Likud government led by Prime Minister Netanyahu came to power in 2009. In formulating policy toward the Palestinians, the fact that Prime Minister Olmert had proposed a very generous package to the Palestinians on the core issues and had not received a response—neither positive nor negative—influenced the Netanyahu government. The new government felt that this was further proof that the Palestinians did not desire an overall peace treaty, which included recognizing Israel as the Jewish homeland. Netanyahu’s government was concerned that Olmert’s proposals would serve as the opening positions in any renewal of the negotiations, proposals that the Likud party and most of the coalition parties did not support. Indeed, the Palestinian side did demand that the starting positions for renewed negotiations should be the Israeli positions presented in Olmert’s proposal, but without viewing them as a single package. This was in contrast to the Palestinian positions on the core issues, which did not deviate from their initial opening positions. Therefore, it was clear that the effort by President Obama to renew the negotiations by means of his special envoy, Senator George Mitchell, was doomed to failure. Mitchell felt that the differences in the positions as presented by the sides in the Annapolis process should be identified so that they could focus on bridging the gaps on the key issues— refugees, Jerusalem, borders and security, two homelands, the future of Gaza, and the end of claims.
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20071127-2_p112707cg-0625-515h
The background preparations and the documentation of meetings occurred on the negotiating team level only and summaries were not distributed, apart from those sent to Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni. The heads of the negotiating teams were privy to the material only within the confines of the negotiating unit itself. The two sides did not give any interviews to the press and were careful not to reveal any content from the discussions. The Palestinians also had a clear interest in maintaining secrecy, to avoid exposing themselves to domestic criticism or having to deal with Hamas. In our estimation, the low level of public expectation on both sides led a lack of interest in the talks, a situation that made it much easier to keep quiet about the negotiations and avoid external pressure on the negotiators.
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2016-03-09T120000Z_408576587_GF10000339762_RTRMADP_3_ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS-BIDEN-scaled
The return of a democratic administration in the United States, led by President Joe Biden, increases the chance of restarting the peace process, with the Palestinians realizing that time is not on their side and the growing feeling of isolation as a result of the trend of normalization between Israel and the Arab states.
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20071127-2_p112707cg-0088-515h
One cannot argue with the bottom line that despite the genuine intentions and the powerful desire to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni did not find the magic formula to achieve that goal. In our own discussions while writing this memorandum, we tried to understand what the motivation of the leadership and the public in Israel should be in creating two separate and fully sovereign states.
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The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
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