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Recently published testimonies by Iranian clerics reflect their mounting concern with the ongoing erosion of their public status among the general population. In a September 14, 2018 interview with Khabar Online, cleric Hojjat-ul-Islam Nasser Naqavian, known for his critical views of the Iranian governmental system, warned that clerics were gradually losing their status. In the background of Naqavian’s interview is the controversy that erupted after protests in mid-August by clerics in the main religious seminary in Qom over the economic situation and the spread of corruption evolved into a bitter demonstration against President Rouhani. Voices in the demonstration denounced the President, and one sign warned that his fate could be the same as that of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who died in January 2017 under circumstances that are not entirely clear. According to Naqavian, clerics had once provided support for citizens, who relied on them, trusted them, and consulted with them regarding even the most sensitive personal issues. However, involvement in political affairs has been detrimental to clerics’ public status, and many citizens today are even unwilling to greet them in the street. The growing gap between the ruling regime and the Iranian citizenry, he maintained, poses a dilemma for clerics, as it forces them to choose between the regime, in which they play a major role, and everyday citizens, who continue to suffer the injustices of the regime. Naqavian also emphasized that there is nothing wrong with religious figures adopting a political position or a critical view. When they do so, however, it must be directed toward the various political factions as opposed to one faction alone, such as the moderate reformist faction.

Around the same time as this interview, a number of Iranian websites published an editorial written by Mehrab Sadeqnia , a lecturer at the religious seminary of Qom, on the growing public hostility toward clerics. Sadeqnia wrote that he typically refrains from walking outside in Tehran in traditional clerical garb in order to avoid the hostile responses of people on the street. When he recently had to travel to Tehran by subway in religious garb, he encountered hatred from civilians, who dealt him hostile looks and in some cases addressed him with derogatory comments – e.g., as when “a young man approached me and said angrily: Leave us in peace. You’ve destroyed our religion.” Sadeqnia described his unsettling experience during the trip, in which no passenger offered him a seat on the train, despite his advanced age. “I tried to hide the pain I felt in my knees, but it was impossible. Among the looks I received I discerned some who would have been happy to see me fall.”

The eroding status of Iranian clerics is not a new phenomenon. In recent years, Iranian clerics and newspapers, primarily from the reformist camp and the pragmatic wing of the conservative camp, have warned of a growing sense of alienation among the general population toward religious figures. They argue that until the Islamic Revolution, clerics were associated with the popular struggle for social justice and against political oppression, and that this was a significant factor in the support they received from the people. Today, clerics are associated with the Islamic regime; instead of criticizing the authorities and supervising governmental action, clerics have become the executors of regime policy. Their relatively favorable economic status and their tendency not to associate with the laity distances them from the people, who no longer regard them as representatives of religion but rather as representatives of the ruling regime.

In October 2017, reformist cleric Mohammad Ali Abtahi complained about the negative influence of the religious establishment’s politicization since the revolution. In a reality in which senior positions in the Iranian establishment – including the Supreme Leader, the president, and the head of the judicial authority – are held by clerics, he noted, many citizens hold the religious establishment responsible for the current economic crisis and the growing corruption, and regard them as the root of the problem. In an exceptional critique published in September 2017, the editor of Jomhuri-ye Eslami, a cleric himself, maintained that clerics have deviated from their traditional roles in the mosques and the religious seminaries and are now dealing with political, economic, and military issues, which are not their rightful affairs, and in doing so, damage their public image.

As the status of clerics erodes, the public continues to distance itself from religion. This is manifested, for example, in a failure to maintain the Islamic dress code and absence from the mosques. An article published in September 2017 by an Iranian news website called attention to the poor attendance in the mosques, which it linked to the mounting trend of alienation within the general public from clerics, who prefer administrative posts in the public sector to contact with faithful members of the public. Clerics today are also largely perceived as irrelevant, primarily by members of the young generation. The uncompromising position of conservative clerics, for example, in their opposition to public musical performances and their insistence on the Islamic dress code, distances them from young adults, who argue that their extremist approach is inconsistent with the modern way of life and reflects the inclination to deal with minor issues instead of the population’s true hardships. Increasing civilian distance from religion has not been lost on the senior leaders of the religious establishment. In his Friday sermon on the eve of the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in 2014, in the city of Mashhad, preacher Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Alamolhoda warned that culturally, Iranian society was worse off today than prior to the revolution, and complained that young people preferred watching movies and satellite television and listening to music over engaging with issues of religion.

While not a new phenomenon, the increasing attention to the issue in the Iranian media reflects its dimensions and the growing awareness throughout the religious establishment of its possible implications. Almost forty years after the Islamic Revolution, religion’s impact on Iranian society is on the decline and the public’s confidence in the religious establishment has eroded. The intensifying economic crisis of recent months, the authorities’ ongoing failure to provide solutions for the economic and social hardships of the country’s citizens, and the manifestations of corruption in the public and government spheres augment the frustration among citizens. Looking for people to blame, they find them among the religious establishment, which is associated with the regime and perceived largely as responsible for its failings. As a result, not only does the status of clerics continue to erode in Iran, but religion is gradually losing its attraction.

At this stage, establishment clerics still enjoy hegemony as a result of their controlling positions that are not publicly elected in the political institutions. Still, the ongoing erosion of their status could prove detrimental to the very legitimacy of the regime and pose a significant challenge to it. The intensifying criticism of clerics could make it difficult for the Islamic Revolution to ensure the continuity of the “rule of jurisprudence” and could affect the image of the regime, especially in the future, after the death of current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.