Publications

Preface

For more than a decade, the focus of attention on Iran has been its nuclear program.  A new stage in the developments related to the nuclear issue came in the summer of 2015, when agreement was reached between the six leading world powers and Iran on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). For those that viewed the JCPOA favorably, it was welcomed as a deal that postponed the need to continue dealing intensively with Iran’s nuclear activity for several years in the hope that by the time the main restrictions expire, the Iranian regime would be more moderate. They held this view despite serious concerns that Iran might violate the agreement at some stage, and even more, the risk that the regime would not undergo a significant change. This latter scenario poses a particular risk, since once the restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program are lifted, Iran will be able to break out to a nuclear weapon based on the vast and advanced uranium enrichment program it retains under the agreement. United States President Donald Trump, who entered office in January 2017, adopted a radically different approach to the nuclear agreement. He threatened to withdraw from the JCPOA, which he regards as an extremely problematic agreement that does not serve US national security interests. As a first stage, he has demanded that the agreement be strengthened and that its main faults be rectified. Trump’s position raises a question about the future of the agreement, and has drawn Iranian counter-responses. The challenge that Trump poses to Iran is not limited to the nuclear question. The President and his administration have portrayed Iran as a major threat, not only to the United States, but to its allies as well. According to Trump’s approach, the threat that Iran poses emanates from the fact that it is striving for nuclear weapons, but is also fueled by its advanced missile program, its intervention and subversion in neighboring countries, the strategic threat that it poses to Israel, and its deep involvement in terrorism. Against this background, the President has declared his administration’s goals vis-à-vis Iran: cancel or change the dangerous elements of the nuclear agreement; impose restrictions on Iran’s missile program; and limit Tehran’s regional influence and intervention in neighboring countries. For its part, Iran fears that Trump aims to overthrow the regime. In addition to continued nuclear activity in spheres not restricted by the agreement, such as research and development on advanced centrifuges and Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile project, Iran continues its efforts to strengthen its hold and influence in the heart of the Middle East – mainly in Syria, but also in Iraq and Yemen. Iran’s activities are centered on active involvement in Syria through military forces – primarily Hezbollah and other non-Iranian Shiite militias, as well as a few Iranian ground troops. This intervention is designed first and foremost to rescue the Assad regime from its difficult plight, but also to build a stronghold for long term influence in Syria, reinforce Iran’s influence in Iraq and Lebanon, and extend the threat and strengthen its deterrence toward Israel from the direction of the Golan Heights, through Hezbollah and other Shiite militias. To this end, Iran plans to leave these forces in Syria for an extended period of time, in cooperation with Russia. Iran also seeks to deepen its grip in Syria through extensive involvement in the state’s reconstruction and large scale investments in the economy. At the same time, it is not yet certain whether Iran will be able to leave its forces in Syria over the long term. Iran must also take into account that placing Iranian/Shiite forces in Syria in the proximity of the border with Israel is liable to expose it to attacks and strikes by Israel.

These reservations notwithstanding, Iran has emerged strengthened from its intervention in the Arab states. The position of the Syrian regime has greatly improved, even if it must still cope with difficult problems. Iran has bolstered its influence in Syria and Iraq, and is an important element in shaping the future order in these states. Its regional cooperation with Russia has become closer, and will tighten even more in the coming years with the signing of a major arms deal now on the agenda. Russian aid to Iran in nuclear power plant construction is also likely to increase, and the economic ties between them will be strengthened. The decline of the Islamic State’s capabilities, following the severe setbacks in Syria and Iraq, is important and useful for Iran, which regarded the organization as a significant threat to its security and interests.

Iran’s regional influence has also grown because the Arab world is mired in severe internal problems, and there is no regional actor currently capable of standing up to Iran and balancing its influence. Syria depends on Iran, and Iraq is under Iranian influence; neither of these states has substantial military capabilities. Egypt is fully absorbed in stabilizing the el-Sisi regime, and is bogged down in economic problems and the war on terrorism in its territory. In effect, Egypt has not led the Arab world for many years. Saudi Arabia has tried to challenge Iran in recent years, especially under the rule of King Salman, and at times it appears that the two countries are nearing conflict. But Saudi Arabia’s efforts have been mainly limited to curtailing Iran’s intervention in Yemen and Bahrain, where Saudi Arabia has been fairly assertive due to its sensitivity to what is happening in those states; by contrast, its influence in key countries such as Syria and Iraq has remained quite limited. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has failed in both its efforts to overthrow the Assad regime and to undermine the dominant position of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Together with its achievements in the regional arena, the regime in Iran faces difficult challenges on the domestic front, due to the profound processes of change in Iranian society and the structural failures in the Iranian economy. In late 2017, in a development that took place after the articles in this collection were completed, there were demonstrations in over 70 cities in Iran. The major motivation behind the protests was economic distress and unemployment; the demonstrations likely resulted from disappointment following expectations of a substantial improvement in the economic situation due to the lifting of sanctions in the framework of the nuclear deal. The demonstrators’ demands, however, rapidly moved into the political sphere, with statements against the regime’s leaders and demands for change in the nature of the regime. These were echoed by demands to halt Iran’s intervention in Syria and other countries, in favor of investing resources within Iran instead. The protests, however, did not gain enough momentum, and have so far failed to achieve their aim. There were fewer protestors than in the demonstrations that occurred in Iran in June 2009, caused by widespread belief that the results of the presidential elections that year were rigged. This time, the regime succeeded in suppressing the demonstrations within a short time. Two factors contributed to the failure of the protests. The first was that from the outset the regime formed special security forces, headed by the Revolutionary Guards, whose main task was defending the regime. These forces were trained and equipped to act with determination and violence against any unrest against the regime, including opening fire and carrying out mass arrests. Thirty fatalities and hundreds or thousands of arrests were enough this time to convince the protestors to halt their demonstrations. The second factor had to do with the absence in the demonstrations of a central leadership, which kept the disturbances in the realm of spontaneous outbreaks in various cities with no coordination or guiding hand. Despite the decline of the demonstrations, this is not necessarily the end of the story. Millions of Iranians are still disappointed with the character of the revolutionary regime, and seek to move it in a liberal and moderate direction. They demand a more open political system, an uprooting of the prevalent corruption, less interference in private life by the regime and the religious establishment, and most of all, an improvement in the economic situation and the problem of unemployment. These masses will wait for a more suitable opportunity to try to alter the nature of the regime; perhaps after Khamenei leaves the scene, the regime will be weaker, and power struggles and fissures will leave room for more moderate forces. This collection contains essays analyzing the state of Iran’s nuclear program and the deterrent relationship between the United States and Iran since the nuclear agreement was presented; Iran’s relations with specific Middle East states; and dominant political and social issues within Iran, and their influence on Iran’s foreign policy. These trends and developments constitute a changing strategic environment for Iran, which necessarily affects Iran’s geopolitical stature. We would like to extend our sincere thanks to the authors who contributed to this volume, following their participation in a conference at INSS in cooperation with the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies of Tel Aviv University in March 2017. Special thanks go to Dr. Anat Kurz, Director of Research at INSS, for her contribution in preparing this volume for publication, and to Dr. Judith Rosen for her editing of the English version. Thanks also to Moshe Grundman, Director of Publications at INSS.

Meir Litvak, Emily B. Landau, and Ephraim Kam

Tel Aviv, February 2018

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Contents

Changes Following the Nuclear Agreement

Iran after the Nuclear Agreement: A Status Report

Ephraim Asculai

In the Aftermath of the JCPOA: Restoring Balance in the US-Iran Deterrent Relationship
Emily B. Landau

Iran-Russia-Syria: A Threefold Cord is not Quickly Broken
Ephraim Kam

Iran’s Enhanced Regional Posture

Iran in Iraq: An Area of Strategic Influence
Meir Litvak

Turkey and Iran: Two Regional Powers and the Relations Pendulum
Gallia Lindenstrauss

The Influence of Internal Processes on Iran’s Foreign Policy

Internal Political Struggles in Iran and their Impact on Foreign Policy
Meir Litvak

The Effect of Economic and Social Processes on Iranian Foreign Policy
Raz Zimmt