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 On August 8, 2017, President Hassan Rouhani, who some 12 weeks earlier was reelected for a second term, presented his government for approval by the Iranian parliament (Majlis). In forming the government, the President had to balance between opposing political forces that exerted significant pressure. Like his first government, his proposed second government consists primarily of highly educated technocrats. In political terms, most of the proposed ministers are identified with the pragmatic camp, even if they do not hold strong reformist positions. The government does not include any women or representatives of Sunni ethnic-linguistic minorities (Kurds, Baluchis, or Arabs).

About half the ministers in the outgoing government are expected to retain their posts, including Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif; Interior Minister, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, who is considered close to the Speaker of the Majlis, Ali Larijani; and the Minister of Intelligence, the  conservative cleric Mahmoud Alavi. Leaving Zarif in place reflects the President's wish to ensure continuity in foreign policy, based on the aim of improving ties with the international community following the nuclear agreement, and reducing the tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Arab world. However, Iranian media reported on structural changes expected in the Foreign Ministry, including the introduction of an economic division that would work to improve economic ties between Iran and the international community, and a political division, which would be responsible for conducting ties with the United States and Europe. In any case, no significant changes are expected in Iranian foreign policy, since the Supreme Leader has most of the authority to shape foreign policy and the Revolutionary Guards play a central role in conducting Iran's regional policy.

On the other hand, leaving the Interior and Intelligence Ministers in place derives mainly from political constraints. Both these ministries are considered highly sensitive in terms of politics and security, and therefore these ministerial appointments must be coordinated with the Supreme Leader. The reformists wanted the President to remove the two ministers, who are associated with the conservative camp, and replace them with individuals with a more reformist outlook. However, the President decided to leave the Minister of the Interior in place, mainly to preserve ties with Larijani, which is essential for the proper functioning of the government, for approval of his ministerial appointments, and for approval of the state budget. Rouhani's decision to retain the Minister of Intelligence was apparently intended to avoid conflict with the Supreme Leader.

Among the ministers designated for replacement are the Ministers of Education, Justice, Islamic Guidance, Defense, Economy, Communications, Energy, and Industry. The senior economic positions have been filled by the President with technocrats who are identified with a neo-liberal economic position and support a free market economy, privatization, and reduced government involvement in the economy. The changes expected in most of the economic ministries indicate the President's determination to promote economic reforms, including privatization and reduced governmental and semi-governmental involvement in the economy, particularly by the Revolutionary Guards. However, the realization of far reaching structural economic reforms is expected to arouse opposition, mainly from the Revolutionary Guards, who control a large part of the economy and are wary of anything that harms their interests. The President's success therefore depends on his ability to secure the support of the Supreme Leader.

For the post of Minister of Communications, the President proposed Mohammad Javad Jahromi, who is expected to replace Mahmoud Vaezi, appointed head of the President's Office. If the 36-year old Jahromi is approved, he will become the first Iranian minister born after the Islamic Revolution. His inclusion in the government drew criticism due to the position he held as director in charge of surveillance in the Ministry of Intelligence under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The appointment of 57-year old Mohammad Shariatmadari as Minister of Industry and Trade in place of 72-year old Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh is intended in part as a response to the demand for younger people in the government. Nevertheless, the average of the proposed government ministers is the highest since the Islamic Revolution.

The position of Justice Minister, which like the Ministers of the Interior and Intelligence is considered very sensitive, has been assigned to Alireza Avaei, a senior official in the Justice Ministry. In spite of his conservative views, his appointment represents a partial response to demands of reformists who wanted the removal of the serving Justice Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi because of his involvement in the mass executions of political prisoners in 1988 and the "chain murders" of Iranian intellectuals in the 1990s. The role of Minister for Islamic Guidance is expected to be given to Seyyed Abbas Salehi, currently the Deputy Minister for Islamic Guidance. He will replace Seyyed Reza Salehi Amiri, who assumed office last year when the previous minister, Ali Jannati, was forced to resign under pressure from the conservative religious establishment due to the relatively liberal reforms that he sought to introduce into the government's cultural policy.

The proposed Minister of Defense, Amir Hatami, was formerly a senior commander in the regular army, and serves as the deputy to the current Minister of Defense, Hossein Dehghan. If Hatami is approved, this will be the first time since 1989 that the Minister of Defense has been chosen from the ranks of the regular army and not from the Revolutionary Guards. The appointment reflects the tension between President Rouhani and the Revolutionary Guards, which was present throughout the presidential elections and recently developed into open confrontation.

The composition of the government reflects President Rouhani's wish to balance between the demands of opposing forces in the Iranian political system. His reformist supporters have raised a number of demands, above all the inclusion of ministers with clearly reformist attitudes, particularly in ministries that are relevant to the promotion of civilian and cultural reforms (Interior, Education, Islamic Guidance, Intelligence, Justice, and Higher Education), as well as the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities. They claimed that Rouhani owed his sweeping electoral victory to them, and warned that avoiding their demands would be considered a betrayal of the 24 million Iranians who voted for him. However, the President decided to ignore most of their reformist demands: he avoided reformist candidates for what are considered sensitive ministries, and did not include any women or ethnic minorities in the government.

Before the formation of the government, women's rights activists exerted heavy pressure on the President, including an extensive campaign on social networks, with a demand to appoint at least three women ministers. However, the President preferred to avoid antagonizing the conservative religious establishment on this matter, and was content to appoint two female deputy presidents – positions that do not require the approval of the Majlis. Rouhani also avoided including representatives of ethnic minorities in the government – a decision that aroused severe criticism, particularly in view of the high rates of support for Rouhani in the last elections from peripheral regions populated largely by ethnic minorities, such as Baluchistan and Kurdistan. The bitterness felt by the minorities was bolstered by the fact that the spiritual leader of the Sunnis in Iran, Molavi Abdol Hamid, was not invited to participate in the President's August 5 inauguration in the Iranian parliament.

The President's disregard for the demands of the reformists reflects to a large extent their political weakness. To them, Rouhani is considered the lesser evil. Their willingness to accept the government's composition in spite of their clear disappointment reflects their recognition that if Rouhani fails, the hardliners could be strengthened. This approach was expressed by Prof. Sadeq Zibakalam from the University of Tehran who is identified with supporters of the President. In an interview with the reformist paper E'temad, the senior political commentator said that although the proposed government does not meet reformist expectations, it is better than any that could have been formed by Rouhani's conservative opponents in the election. Therefore the reformists have no choice but to continue to support the President, while criticizing his government's conduct.

As well as pressures from the reformists, the President also had to consider the demands of the conservative camp and the office of the Supreme Leader. In recent years the President has cooperated with politicians identified with the pragmatic wing of the conservative camp, such as Larijani, Khamenei's senior adviser on foreign affairs Ali-Akbar Velayati, and another adviser to the leader and former speaker of the Majlis, Ali-Akbar Nateq Nouri. Support of groups in the conservative camp is essential to the President, not only for the regular function of his government but also in the event that he decides to take part in the expected succession struggle for the leadership of Iran. Khamenei's views were likewise an important consideration in the process of forming the government. Before the presentation of the government, his office issued a special statement stressing that the Supreme Leader does not interfere in the selection of ministers, except for the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence. However, the office pointed out that the Leader shows "special sensitivity" to the Ministries of Education, Islamic Guidance, and Sciences, due to their importance for the values of the Islamic Revolution.

Rouhani's proposed government provides the first concrete evidence of his intentions, his priorities, and the limits of his power. Its composition reflects his wish to avoid open conflict with the religious establishment led by Khamenei and his intention to put dealing with the economic crisis at the top of the government's priorities, even at the expense of civilian reforms. His ability to promote reforms such as the release of political prisoners, promoting the institutions of civil society, and relaxing Islamic restrictions and media censorship is in any case restricted by the ongoing conservative control of non-elected government institutions, the judicial authority, and security and law enforcement mechanisms. Although the composition of the government reinforces the disappointment of many sectors that supported Rouhani in the elections, including the reformists, women, youth, and minorities, public support for Rouhani and his government is to a large extent dependent on his actual policies and achievements, and his government's success in realizing its promises, particularly in the economic sphere. In the next few weeks, the Majlis is expected to discuss the ministerial appointments proposed by the President and approve them. Rouhani's broad support in the current Majlis, his good relations with its speaker, and his care to maintain balance and avoid controversial appointments should facilitate the approval process. At the same time, past experience suggests that it will be hard for the President to gain the support of the Majlis for all his proposed ministers. In that event he will be required to propose substitutes for the rejected candidates.