The war with Iran is also drawing in Russia and Ukraine. At this stage, their involvement is indirect, through expertise, intelligence, and military-technological advice, with an emphasis on operational experience with suicide drones. But the trend is clear.
According to publications and assessments by Western intelligence, Russia is assisting Iran in three practical ways. The first is the sharing of intelligence about US assets across the Middle East, most likely based on satellite imagery. The second is technological and operational guidance on improving the employment of drones—those same Shaheds that Russia purchased from Iran and upgraded for the purposes of its war in Ukraine—and even supplying them to Iran itself, apparently in limited quantities, as Ukrainian President Zelenskyy claims. This claim has been supported by Russian components found at impact sites in Gulf states. The third is logistical and diplomatic assistance, as reflected in a Russian operation to evacuate more than one hundred Iranian diplomats from Lebanon, amid questions as to whether some of them were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
At the same time, Russia is publicly refraining from taking steps that would be interpreted as direct military participation and is trying not to cross the threshold that would lead to direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, Russia’s political positioning is sharp and unmistakable. Moscow has harshly criticized the Israeli–American campaign and, on March 14, publicly condemned Israeli strikes near the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where Russian experts are also employed. At the same time, the Kremlin is benefiting economically from the conflict: The spike in oil prices and the temporary weakening of US sanctions are improving the condition of Russia’s budget, which is facing a deficit of tens of billions of dollars.
Ukraine, in contrast, finds itself on the other side of the conflict. Kyiv is actively sharing with the United States and the Arab Gulf states the experience it has accumulated in combating those same Iranian drones. Accordingly, Ukraine has sent expert teams to the region to assist in organizing and calibrating defense arrays against the Shaheds, including advice on interception tactics and technologies. In practice, Ukraine is one of the few countries with real combat experience in coping with mass attacks by suicide drones, and that experience has proven especially valuable in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, Israel’s prime minister has requested a rare conversation with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, which is expected to take place at the beginning of the week. Iran has already responded at the political level: Members of the Iranian parliament have accused Kyiv of assisting Israel, on which basis Ukraine could be regarded as a “legitimate target.”
Beyond that, the very scale of the war in the region poses a risk for Kyiv: The more US forces and their allies use interceptor missiles to defend bases and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, the greater the likelihood that these rare systems will become harder for Ukraine to obtain.
From Israel’s perspective, it is important to internalize the linkages between our war and Russia and Ukraine. The most prominent aspect, although not the only one, is the willingness of both countries to bring their extensive combat experience in unmanned technologies—those same Shahed drones—to the Middle Eastern theater, with Russia coming to Iran’s aid, while Ukraine is effectively becoming part of the camp confronting Iranian capabilities.
The war with Iran is also drawing in Russia and Ukraine. At this stage, their involvement is indirect, through expertise, intelligence, and military-technological advice, with an emphasis on operational experience with suicide drones. But the trend is clear.
According to publications and assessments by Western intelligence, Russia is assisting Iran in three practical ways. The first is the sharing of intelligence about US assets across the Middle East, most likely based on satellite imagery. The second is technological and operational guidance on improving the employment of drones—those same Shaheds that Russia purchased from Iran and upgraded for the purposes of its war in Ukraine—and even supplying them to Iran itself, apparently in limited quantities, as Ukrainian President Zelenskyy claims. This claim has been supported by Russian components found at impact sites in Gulf states. The third is logistical and diplomatic assistance, as reflected in a Russian operation to evacuate more than one hundred Iranian diplomats from Lebanon, amid questions as to whether some of them were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
At the same time, Russia is publicly refraining from taking steps that would be interpreted as direct military participation and is trying not to cross the threshold that would lead to direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, Russia’s political positioning is sharp and unmistakable. Moscow has harshly criticized the Israeli–American campaign and, on March 14, publicly condemned Israeli strikes near the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where Russian experts are also employed. At the same time, the Kremlin is benefiting economically from the conflict: The spike in oil prices and the temporary weakening of US sanctions are improving the condition of Russia’s budget, which is facing a deficit of tens of billions of dollars.
Ukraine, in contrast, finds itself on the other side of the conflict. Kyiv is actively sharing with the United States and the Arab Gulf states the experience it has accumulated in combating those same Iranian drones. Accordingly, Ukraine has sent expert teams to the region to assist in organizing and calibrating defense arrays against the Shaheds, including advice on interception tactics and technologies. In practice, Ukraine is one of the few countries with real combat experience in coping with mass attacks by suicide drones, and that experience has proven especially valuable in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, Israel’s prime minister has requested a rare conversation with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, which is expected to take place at the beginning of the week. Iran has already responded at the political level: Members of the Iranian parliament have accused Kyiv of assisting Israel, on which basis Ukraine could be regarded as a “legitimate target.”
Beyond that, the very scale of the war in the region poses a risk for Kyiv: The more US forces and their allies use interceptor missiles to defend bases and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, the greater the likelihood that these rare systems will become harder for Ukraine to obtain.
From Israel’s perspective, it is important to internalize the linkages between our war and Russia and Ukraine. The most prominent aspect, although not the only one, is the willingness of both countries to bring their extensive combat experience in unmanned technologies—those same Shahed drones—to the Middle Eastern theater, with Russia coming to Iran’s aid, while Ukraine is effectively becoming part of the camp confronting Iranian capabilities.