Over the past two weeks, the US Army has begun evacuating its military forces from two central bases in Syria: the al-Shaddadi base in al-Hasakah in the northeast, and the al-Tanf base, located at the tri-border area of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. It’s interesting to note that the process has been conducted under the radar, quietly and relatively quickly—and it’s unclear to what extent Israel was informed in advance.
The full withdrawal of all US forces is expected to be completed within the next two months. The immediate impact on the military balance appears relatively limited, as the move affects approximately 1,000 people, mainly advisers, training personnel, and support working with local forces. However, the withdrawal of the forces, particularly from the al-Tanf base, fits into a broader trend of reducing the US military presence in the arena since 2024. Trump had already sought to remove US forces from Syria during his previous term in 2018, to the discontent of his advisers, which led to the resignation of his first secretary of defense, but ultimately, he was persuaded to reverse course.
It appears that alongside Trump’s focus on hotter arenas, the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime and the change in the American approach toward Syria led to an understanding that the conditions for withdrawal had ripened. The US military entered Syria at the end of 2014 as part of the international coalition to fight ISIS, but it also played an important role in limiting the spread of Iran’s presence during Assad’s regime. It is possible that from the American perspective, this need has diminished given the Iranian withdrawal from the arena. As for ISIS, the threat still exists, but Syria’s joining the international coalition against it and the transfer of the management of the remaining ISIS camps in the country (some of which were evacuated to Iraq) to Syrian security forces has also enabled the evacuation of US forces.
In addition, the American move reflects a conceptual shift from prolonged ground deployment in secondary arenas to flexible regional deterrence based on air, naval, and intelligence capabilities. Instead of dispersing small forces across multiple arenas, Washington is concentrating on focal points it views as having higher strategic importance in addressing direct state threats and protecting freedom of navigation, regional allies, and American assets.
The message to regional actors is twofold: The United States is reducing its involvement in managing sub-state threats and transferring greater responsibility to local partners, while also preserving and even strengthening its ability to act militarily against state adversaries, foremost among them Iran. This does not necessarily signal a strategic vacuum but rather a reorganization of the American presence in favor of operational flexibility and deterrence over a prolonged ground presence.
In Jerusalem, the American presence continues to be viewed as an important component in safeguarding Israeli interests in the arena, and there is hope for its continuation—even if in a different format. From the Syrian perspective, however, this development is positive. Symbolically, the move reinforces the confidence that the American president shows in al-Sharaa and in his policy direction. Practically, it enables al-Sharaa to consolidate control and sovereignty by reducing part of the foreign military presence that has operated in Syria over the past decade. That said, the path to stabilizing the state and removing the remaining foreign actors from its territory is still long.