Over the past two weeks, clashes have erupted between Syrian security forces and the Kurds led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). What began as military friction initiated by the Kurds quickly turned into a strategic opportunity for the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa to reclaim extensive territories and apply heavy pressure on the Kurds to implement the understandings set out in the March 2025 agreement. After taking control of the Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyya neighborhoods in Aleppo, and later also Deir Hafer, regime forces succeeded in establishing full control over Deir ez-Zor province as well as neighborhoods in Raqqa—one of the main cities in northeastern Syria.
In fact, this marks the Syrian regime’s most significant takeover of territory since the fall of Assad. In this move, more than 40% of the areas previously controlled by the Kurds—including Syria’s central oil and gas fields—passed into its hands. The rapid pace of the military advance and its relatively non-violent character were enabled in part by a shift in the loyalties of the local population: Sunni Arab tribes chose to break away from SDF control, align with regime forces, and assist in transferring the territories to al-Sharaa’s forces. Contributing factors also included the support al-Sharaa has been receiving from the United States and the absence of significant international opposition to the move.
On the dramatic evening of January 18, al-Sharaa announced a ceasefire and stated that the sides are expected to sign a new agreement. The agreement includes, among other things, integrating all institutions in northeastern Syria under Damascus’s rule, the full transfer of oil and gas fields to the government, transferring control of border crossings, and integrating SDF personnel into the Syrian army as individuals—not as organic units, as the Kurds demanded. The regime also pledged to appoint agreed-upon Kurdish representatives to state institutions.
These events illustrate al-Sharaa’s determination to reunify Syria and thwart any attempt to advance a decentralizing or federal model. If the agreement is indeed implemented, al-Sharaa’s domestic standing will be strengthened, while the aspiration for autonomy among other minorities—foremost the Druze—will grow more distant.
Israel, which views the Kurds as a positive actor with shared interests, chose this time to act with restraint. After recently returning to the negotiating table with Damascus, Israel refrained from direct intervention and limited itself to expressing public support for the Kurds—a step intended to avoid entanglement in Syria’s internal affairs and a confrontation with the United States. At the same time, Israel should use its channels of communication, both with Damascus and with Washington, to clarify its expectations regarding the safeguarding of Kurdish security and promoting their integration into state institutions and the security system. Such a move could contribute to stabilizing Syria, diversifying its centers of power, and balancing Sunni dominance—an outcome of strategic importance for Israel as well.
Over the past two weeks, clashes have erupted between Syrian security forces and the Kurds led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). What began as military friction initiated by the Kurds quickly turned into a strategic opportunity for the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa to reclaim extensive territories and apply heavy pressure on the Kurds to implement the understandings set out in the March 2025 agreement. After taking control of the Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyya neighborhoods in Aleppo, and later also Deir Hafer, regime forces succeeded in establishing full control over Deir ez-Zor province as well as neighborhoods in Raqqa—one of the main cities in northeastern Syria.
In fact, this marks the Syrian regime’s most significant takeover of territory since the fall of Assad. In this move, more than 40% of the areas previously controlled by the Kurds—including Syria’s central oil and gas fields—passed into its hands. The rapid pace of the military advance and its relatively non-violent character were enabled in part by a shift in the loyalties of the local population: Sunni Arab tribes chose to break away from SDF control, align with regime forces, and assist in transferring the territories to al-Sharaa’s forces. Contributing factors also included the support al-Sharaa has been receiving from the United States and the absence of significant international opposition to the move.
On the dramatic evening of January 18, al-Sharaa announced a ceasefire and stated that the sides are expected to sign a new agreement. The agreement includes, among other things, integrating all institutions in northeastern Syria under Damascus’s rule, the full transfer of oil and gas fields to the government, transferring control of border crossings, and integrating SDF personnel into the Syrian army as individuals—not as organic units, as the Kurds demanded. The regime also pledged to appoint agreed-upon Kurdish representatives to state institutions.
These events illustrate al-Sharaa’s determination to reunify Syria and thwart any attempt to advance a decentralizing or federal model. If the agreement is indeed implemented, al-Sharaa’s domestic standing will be strengthened, while the aspiration for autonomy among other minorities—foremost the Druze—will grow more distant.
Israel, which views the Kurds as a positive actor with shared interests, chose this time to act with restraint. After recently returning to the negotiating table with Damascus, Israel refrained from direct intervention and limited itself to expressing public support for the Kurds—a step intended to avoid entanglement in Syria’s internal affairs and a confrontation with the United States. At the same time, Israel should use its channels of communication, both with Damascus and with Washington, to clarify its expectations regarding the safeguarding of Kurdish security and promoting their integration into state institutions and the security system. Such a move could contribute to stabilizing Syria, diversifying its centers of power, and balancing Sunni dominance—an outcome of strategic importance for Israel as well.