Publications

Key Findings:

• Trust in the IDF and the incoming chief of staff continue to rise. Public trust in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continues to rise: 76% of respondents express a high level of trust (to a great extent or quite a lot) in the IDF, up from 73% in March and 66% in February. When divided by sector, 86% of the Jewish public report high trust in the IDF, compared to only 35% among the Arab public. Incoming Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir also enjoys an increase in trust, with 54% of the public expressing a high level of confidence in him. However, 15% remain undecided or unsure about their level of trust in the new chief of staff. Trust in the IDF spokesperson has remained stable at 59% compared to the previous month, while trust in the Air Force held steady at 71%.
• The public expresses very low levels of trust in the Israeli government, the prime minister, and the minister of defense. Only 24% of the public indicates a high level of trust in the government (to a great extent or quite a lot), while 76% reports little or no trust in the government. As for trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, only 29% of the respondents report a high level of trust (34% among Jews and only 8% among Arabs).
• A majority of 53% of the public expresses a high level of trust in the Israel Security Agency or Shin Bet (59% among Jews, compared to 27% among Arabs). However, trust in Ronen Bar, the recently dismissed Shin Bet director, has dropped significantly to 38% (15% to a great extent, 23% to a fair extent), compared to 44% in March. A majority of 55% now reports having low trust in Bar (24% to a small extent, 31% no trust).
• Despite the public tensions, 52% of the public believes there is effective cooperation between the political and military echelons (9% is certain there is effective cooperation and 44% thinks that there is). In contrast, 42% of the public believes that there is no effective cooperation between the political and military echelons (34% thinks there is none, and 8% is certain it does not exist).

Key Findings:

• The majority of the public (56%) believes the continued fighting is primarily politically motivated. This view is more prevalent among the Arab public (77%) compared to the Jewish public (51%). At the same time, 45% of the public believes that the IDF’s current course of action is not advancing the collapse of the Hamas regime or the return of the hostages, while 28% thinks that the current course of action promotes both, and 16% believes that it only promotes the collapse of Hamas.
• A strong majority of the public (69%) supports ending the war in exchange for an agreement to return all the hostages, while only 23% opposes such a deal. Among the Arab public, support for the agreement stands at 82%, compared to 64% among the Jewish public. At the same time, nearly 74% of the overall public believes that the government has no plan for ending the war.
• The preferred solution for the “day after” the war in Gaza is technocratic rule without Hamas. A majority of 45% of the total public supports the Egyptian plan, which proposes the establishment of a technocratic rule in Gaza (without Hamas), with the backing of an international/Arab force to stabilize and reconstruct the Strip. In contrast, 20% supports the return of Jewish settlement in Gaza, 16% favors a prolonged Israeli military government, and 11% believes that it is right to transfer control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority.
• A total of 62% of the public believes that victory in Gaza will only be achieved after all the hostages are returned. In contrast, 18% define victory as the annexation of Gaza, the application of Israeli sovereignty in the Strip, and the return of Jewish settlement. Another 10% sees victory in Gaza as transferring power to a moderate Palestinian entity other than Hamas.
• Overall, 60% of the public estimates that the IDF will win the war in Gaza. Specifically, 68% among Jewish Israelis and 28% among Arab Israelis believe that the IDF will win the war in Gaza. Meanwhile, about a third of the public believes that the IDF probably or certainly will not win (26% among Jews and 58% among Arabs).
• A majority of the public (53%) believes that the IDF does not have a systematic plan for achieving the war’s goals, while only 39% thinks that such a plan exists. The public is also divided regarding the IDF’s ability to achieve the goals of the war in Gaza. Half of the respondents believe that the goals will not be achieved at all or will be achieved only to a small extent (43% of Jews and 76% of Arabs). Another 45% think that the goals will be achieved in full or to a considerable extent—with a large difference between Jews (53%) and Arabs (15%). Despite this, only a third of the public is highly or very highly satisfied with the operational achievements in Gaza.

Key Findings:

• The public is divided over the legitimacy of a letter signed by active reserve soldiers calling to end the war in exchange for returning all the hostages. Some 48% of the respondents believe that this is a legitimate position, while 45% consider it an illegitimate action. In contrast, 58% believe that it is inappropriate to refuse to participate in the war due to concern about harming the hostages.
• The motivation to support reserve service among the Jewish sector remains steady. A majority of respondents (58%) say they would encourage a family member who previously served in the combat reserves during the war to respond to another call-up. Opposition to continued service stands at 27%, a figure that has also remained relatively stable.
• At the same time, there is growing concern about the potential consequences of passing a law that grants broad exemptions from military service to the ultra-Orthodox. A majority of the public (72%) believes that such a law would undermine motivation for combat service, with 46% saying that the impact would be very serious. In contrast, only 11% thinks that the exemption would cause no harm at all, and 14% believes it would cause only minor harm.

Key Findings:

• The public is divided over the legitimacy of a letter signed by active reserve soldiers calling to end the war in exchange for returning all the hostages. Some 48% of the respondents believe that this is a legitimate position, while 45% consider it an illegitimate action. In contrast, 58% believe that it is inappropriate to refuse to participate in the war due to concern about harming the hostages.
• The motivation to support reserve service among the Jewish sector remains steady. A majority of respondents (58%) say they would encourage a family member who previously served in the combat reserves during the war to respond to another call-up. Opposition to continued service stands at 27%, a figure that has also remained relatively stable.
• At the same time, there is growing concern about the potential consequences of passing a law that grants broad exemptions from military service to the ultra-Orthodox. A majority of the public (72%) believes that such a law would undermine motivation for combat service, with 46% saying that the impact would be very serious. In contrast, only 11% thinks that the exemption would cause no harm at all, and 14% believes it would cause only minor harm.

Key Findings:

• A majority of the public (64%) expresses optimism about Israeli society’s ability to recover and grow from the current crisis. (17% is very optimistic and 47% is quite optimistic)—consistent with findings from March. In contrast, 32% of the public is pessimistic—26% is fairly pessimistic and 6% is very pessimistic.
• Some 33% of the public reports a high or very high sense of security, an increase from 25% in March. Another 42% reports a medium level of security, while 24% claims a low or very low sense of security, compared to 33% in March. Among the Arab public, the sense of insecurity is particularly high, with 44% reporting low or very low security levels.