Swords of Iron Survey Results - February 2025 | INSS
go to header go to content go to footer go to search
INSS logo The Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic, Innovative, Policy-Oriented Research, go to the home page
INSS
Tel Aviv University logo - beyond an external website, opens on a new page
  • Contact
  • עברית
  • Support Us
  • Research
    • Topics
      • Israel and the Global Powers
        • Israel-United States Relations
        • Glazer Israel-China Policy Center
        • Russia
        • Europe
      • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
        • Iran
        • Lebanon and Hezbollah
        • Syria
        • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
        • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
      • Conflict to Agreements
        • Israeli-Palestinian Relations
        • Hamas and the Gaza Strip
        • Peace Agreements and Normalization in the Middle East
        • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
        • Turkey
        • Egypt
        • Jordan
      • Israel’s National Security Policy
        • Military and Strategic Affairs
        • Societal Resilience and the Israeli Society
        • Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel
        • Climate, Infrastructure and Energy
        • Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict
      • Cross-Arena Research
        • Data Analytics Center
        • Law and National Security
        • Advanced Technologies and National Security
        • Cognitive Warfare
        • Economics and National Security
    • Projects
      • Preventing the Slide into a One-State Reality
      • Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States
      • Perceptions about Jews and Israel in the Arab-Muslim World and Their Impact on the West
  • Publications
    • -
      • All Publications
      • INSS Insight
      • Policy Papers
      • Special Publication
      • Strategic Assessment
      • Technology Platform
      • Memoranda
      • Posts
      • Books
      • Archive
  • Database
    • Surveys
    • Spotlight
    • Maps
    • Real-Time Tracker
  • Events
  • Team
  • About
    • Vision and Mission
    • History
    • Research Disciplines
    • Board of Directors
    • Fellowship and Prizes
    • Internships
    • Newsletter
  • Media
    • Communications
      • Articles
      • Quotes
      • Radio and TV
    • Video gallery
    • Press Releases
  • Podcast
  • Newsletter
New
Search in site
  • Research
    • Topics
    • Israel and the Global Powers
    • Israel-United States Relations
    • Glazer Israel-China Policy Center
    • Russia
    • Europe
    • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
    • Iran
    • Lebanon and Hezbollah
    • Syria
    • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
    • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
    • Conflict to Agreements
    • Israeli-Palestinian Relations
    • Hamas and the Gaza Strip
    • Peace Agreements and Normalization in the Middle East
    • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
    • Turkey
    • Egypt
    • Jordan
    • Israel’s National Security Policy
    • Military and Strategic Affairs
    • Societal Resilience and the Israeli Society
    • Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel
    • Climate, Infrastructure and Energy
    • Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict
    • Cross-Arena Research
    • Data Analytics Center
    • Law and National Security
    • Advanced Technologies and National Security
    • Cognitive Warfare
    • Economics and National Security
    • Projects
    • Preventing the Slide into a One-State Reality
    • Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States
    • Perceptions about Jews and Israel in the Arab-Muslim World and Their Impact on the West
  • Publications
    • All Publications
    • INSS Insight
    • Policy Papers
    • Special Publication
    • Strategic Assessment
    • Technology Platform
    • Memoranda
    • Posts
    • Books
    • Archive
  • Database
    • Surveys
    • Spotlight
    • Maps
    • Real-Time Tracker
  • Events
  • Team
  • About
    • Vision and Mission
    • History
    • Research Disciplines
    • Board of Directors
    • Fellowship and Prizes
    • Internships
  • Media
    • Communications
      • Articles
      • Quotes
      • Radio and TV
    • Video gallery
    • Press Releases
  • Podcast
  • Newsletter
  • Contact
  • עברית
  • Support Us
bool(false)

Publications

Home Publications Surveys - Data Analytics Center Swords of Iron Survey Results - February 2025

Swords of Iron Survey Results - February 2025

Survey, March 3, 2025

עברית
Mora Deitch
Abir Gitlin
Idit Shafran Gittleman
Rebecca Meller

Table of Contents:

Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the Institute for National Security Studies has been regularly conducting public opinion surveys to assess attitudes toward key national security issues, national resilience, and public trust.[1]

Click here to download the complete survey data | Click here to view the trends among the Jewish public  | Click here to view the trends among the Arab public

Trust in Individuals and Institutions

Key Findings:

  • Trust in the IDF: Approximately 66% of the public express high or fairly high levels of trust in the IDF. This rate is similar to the January’s results, reflecting a slight decline compared to the 2024 average but remains higher than trust in the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and the government. By sector, 76% of the Jewish public has a high level of trust in the IDF, compared to only 26% of the Arab public.
  • Declining trust in the outgoing chief of staff: The level of trust in outgoing Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi has declined to 37% (42% among Jews and 18% among Arabs), continuing a downward trend since October 2024. His successor, incoming Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, holds a similar level of trust among Jews (42%) but only 9% among Arabs, resulting in an overall trust rating of about 35%. Trust in the IDF spokesperson has also fallen to 55% (63% among Jews, 23% among Arabs).
  • Low level of trust in the government: Public trust in the Israeli government, the prime minister, and the defense minister remains consistently low. Only 21% of the public (25% among Jews, 7% among Arabs) express a high degree of trust in the government. Similarly, trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains low at 27% overall (32% among Jews, 7% among Arabs), as does trust in Minister of Defense Israel Katz (24% overall; 28% among Jews, 8% among Arabs).
  • Trust in the Israel Security Agency: A majority of 56% express a high degree of trust in the ISA, with higher levels among Jews (64%) than Arabs (26%).
  • Support for a state commission of inquiry into the events of October 7: A majority (58%) of the public supports establishing a state commission of inquiry appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, with backing from 57% of the Jewish public and 64% of the Arab public. Another 25% of the public prefers a parliamentary inquiry appointed by the Knesset, an option more popular among Jews (29%) than Arabs (10%). Opposition to any inquiry is minimal (3%).
  • Lack of trust in the IDF’s internal investigations: A majority of the public lacks trust in the IDF’s ability to properly investigate and learn lessons from the events of October 7. The distrust has grown since January, with 56% now expressing low or very low levels of trust, compared to 51.5% in January.
  • Priorities of the new chief of staff: Ahead of Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir’s assumption of office, respondents were asked to rank the urgency of seven key tasks. The data highlights clear priorities, alongside significant gaps between Jews and Arabs in their views on the urgency of various issues:

    • Eliminating Hamas: Eliminating Hamas is considered the top priority by 43% of the public. However, the gap between the sectors is apparent with 50% of the Jewish public seeing it as the first priority, compared to only 15% of the Arab public.
    • Restoring public trust: Restoring public trust is considered the most urgent task by 20% of the public, but there is a considerable gap between sectors: 38% of Arabs ranked this as the first priority compared to 15% of Jews.
    • Strengthening defense on the northern border: A majority (54%) of the public ranks strengthening the defense of the northern border among the top three priorities, with minimal differences between the sectors (67% of Jews, 56% of Arabs).
    • Preparing for a possible attack on Iran: This task is considered less urgent, only 8% of the public ranks this as their top priority (9% of Jews, 6% of Arabs). A majority (61%) does not place it among their top three priorities.
    • Completing the current operation in the West Bank: Considered a moderate priority, 42% of the public places it in their top three (47% of Jews, 27% of Arabs).
    • Strengthening military discipline: This task ranks the lowest priority, with 27% of the public placing it in 7th and last place (33% of Jews, 2% of Arabs).
    • Addressing personnel issues, such as reserve and career soldier shortages: This task is also considered a low priority, with 29% of the public ranking it in 7th and last place (33% of Jews, 15% of Arabs).

The Gaza Front

Key Findings:

  • Slight increase in confidence in the IDF’s victory: A majority of 59% of the public (66% of Jews, 31% of Arabs) believes that the IDF can win in Gaza, a slight increase from 55% in January, although still below 65% in December. However, only 29% (34% of Jews, 11% of Arabs) is certain of victory, while 26% (20% of Jews, 47% of Arabs) believes the IDF will not win.
  • Slight increase in confidence in achieving the war’s objectives: A total of 45% of the public (50% of Jews, 22% of Arabs) believes that the war’s objectives will be largely or fully achieved, up from 41% in January, although still below 52% in December. Meanwhile, 47% believes the objectives will only be partially achieved or not at all (42% of Jews, 66% of Arabs).
  • Satisfaction with military achievements in Gaza: A total of 40% of the public (47% of Jews, 14% of Arabs) are highly satisfied with the IDF’s military achievements in Gaza, although this marks a slight decline from 44.5% in January. Meanwhile, 19% (14% of Jews, 35% of Arabs) express dissatisfaction, up from 17% in the previous month.
  • Growing support for a hostage deal: A majority (74%) of the public (71% of Jews, 85% of Arabs), supports a deal to returning the hostages, an increase from 67% in January. Only 13% opposes a hostage deal (14% of Jews, 7% of Arabs), while 14% remains undecided.
  • Divided opinions over the continuation of the hostage agreement: While there is strong support for securing the release of all the hostages, the public is divided on the likelihood of the agreement achieving this goal. Only 40% (37% of Jews and 55% of Arabs) strongly believes the agreement will advance to the next stage, while 46% (50% of Jews and 31% of Arabs) thinks that the chances are low.
  • Returning the hostages as the key condition for victory: A majority (61%) of the public (62% of Jews, 57% of Arabs) believes that returning all the hostages is the key condition for achieving victory. Another 19% (22% of Jews, 8% of Arabs) believes annexing Gaza and re-establishing Jewish settlements there is necessary for victory, while 8% thinks it requires appointing a moderate, non-Hamas Palestinian authority.
  • Greater support for ending the war: A total of 42% of the public (33% of Jews, 78% of Arabs), supports ending the war and pursuing diplomatic arrangements. Another 26% (31% of Jews, 4% of Arabs) favors encouraging Palestinian emigration from Gaza, while 24% (28% of Jews, 4% of Arabs) supports resuming full-scale combat in Gaza.

The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Key Findings:

  • Slight decrease in support for a two-state solution: Support for a two-state solution has slightly declined to 34% of the general public, down from 38% in September 2024. Among the Jewish public, only 25% favors a two-state solution, a decline from 31% in September, while support among the Arab public has increased from 62% to 69%. The gap between sectors is particularly evident in the level of strong support—40% of Arabs strongly support a two-state solution, compared to only 4% of Jews. Conversely, 42% of Jews strongly oppose it, compared to just 5% of Arabs.
  • Divided views on preferred political arrangements with the Palestinians: The Israeli public is divided on the preferred political arrangement with the Palestinians, with sharp differences between sectors. Overall, 31% of the public (19% of Jews, 80% of Arabs) favors a permanent agreement. The Jewish public particularly leans toward unilateral options—35% favors disengagement from the Palestinians while maintaining security control, and 31% supports Israel’s annexation of Judea and Samaria. In contrast, these options receive minimal support among Arabs, with only 12% favoring disengagement and just 2% supporting annexation. Additionally, only 14% of the general public supports maintaining the status quo, with slightly higher support among Jews (16%) compared to Arabs (7%). The data highlights the sectoral divide between those who favor a broad political settlement and those who support strengthening Israeli control over the territory.

The Northern Front (Lebanon)

Key Findings:

  • Declining confidence in security: Public trust in the ability to provide security for the northern communities has weakened. Currently, only 34% of the public believes that residents can return to the northern communities, marking a sharp decline from 42% in January. The data reveals a growing sense of insecurity among the Jewish public, while the Arab public feels that security has slightly improved. Only 32% of the Jewish public believe that the northern communities can be protected, down from 40% in January, in contrast to 45% of the Arab public, which has slightly decreased from 50% in January. At the same time, a growing share of the public (48%) believes that returning to the north is not possible, up from 40.5% in January. Specifically, a total of 52% of the Jewish public believes that returning to the north is impossible, up from 45% in January, while among the Arab public, this figure has also risen, reaching 34% compared to 23% in January.

The Iranian Threat

Key Findings:

    • Preference for military action against Iran: The Israeli public prefers military action as the primary strategy to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities. A total of 39% supports an Israeli military strike with US backing, with a clear sectoral divide: 46% of Jews favor this option, compared to only 12% of Arabs. Additionally, 22% (25% of Jews, 8% of Arabs) prefers regime change in Iran as the main approach. In contrast, only 13% of the public (10% of Jews, 25% of Arabs) supports a diplomatic solution, such as a new US-led nuclear agreement, highlighting sharp sectoral differences. Another 18% (12% of Jews, 42% of Arabs) is uncertain about the most effective approach, with nearly half of the Arab public expressing considerable uncertainty on this issue.
    • Preference for military action if no nuclear agreement is reached with Iran: In the absence of a new nuclear agreement with Iran, a total of 47% of the public (53% of Jews, 23% of Arabs) supports an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in coordination with the United States. Another 28% (33% of Jews, 9% of Arabs) supports a unilateral Israeli strike without American backing, reflecting a greater willingness among Jews to act independently. Conversely, only 12% of the public (4% of Jews, 45% of Arabs) thinks that Israel should avoid any military strike, with nearly half the Arab public supporting this option—underscoring a sharp sectoral divide.

International Arena

Key Findings:

  • Divided views on Israel’s international isolation: The Israeli public is divided on whether Israel can remain secure and prosperous despite international isolation. Only 31% of the public (34% of Jews, 20% of Arabs) agrees to a great or very great extent that Israel can thrive despite isolation, while 59% disagrees to varying degrees (58% of Jews, 65% of Arabs). Strong support for this notion is minimal, with only 9% (10% of Jews, 5% of Arabs) firmly agreeing.

The Draft Law and Motivation for Reserve Service

Key Findings:

  • Steady support for reserve service: A majority (54%) of the Jewish public would encourage a family member who had already served in combat reserves during the war to report for another call-up, a slight decline from 56% in December. Opposition to encouraging further reserve service remains steady at 22% in February, compared to 21% in December. These figures suggest that support for the reserves remains high, despite the prolonged fighting and ongoing strain on the reserves system.
  • Concerns that ultra-Orthodox exemptions would harm motivation to serve: A majority (67%) of the Jewish public believes that a law granting exemptions to the ultra-Orthodox from IDF service would harm motivation to serve. A total of 41% say it would significantly harm motivation, while 26% believe it would have a moderate impact. In contrast, only 28% believe a law would have little or no impact (14% for each option). Among the Arab public, opinions are more moderate: 55% believes such a law would harm motivation (31% says significantly, 24% to some extent). However, uncertainty is much higher among the Arabs (24%) compared to just 4% among Jews, suggesting a greater sense of detachment from the issue.

The Resilience of Israeli Society

Key Findings:

  • Increased public optimism regarding Israel’s recovery: A majority (68%) of the public expresses a high or fairly high level of optimism about Israel’s ability to recover and grow, with 18% feeling “very optimistic” and 50% “fairly optimistic.” This marks a significant increase from 60% in January. Conversely, pessimism has declined to 26%, with 21% feeling “fairly pessimistic” and 5% “very pessimistic.” This is down from 32% in January.
  • Persistent concerns about social conditions after the war: A majority (55%) of the public is concerned about the social situation in Israel, similar to 63.5% in January. A total of 34% feels “very concerned” and 31% feels “fairly concerned.” Only 11% is not concerned, with 5% saying they are “not concerned at all” and 6% reporting “slight concern.”
  • Personal security levels remain stable, but sectoral gaps persist: A total of 29% of the general public reports having a high or very high sense of personal security (25% “high,” 4% “very high”), a slight decrease from 30% in January. Another 45% describes a “moderate” sense of security, slightly down from 47% in January, while 25% reports having a “low” or “very low” sense of security (18% “low” and 7% “very low”), having slightly increased from 21% in January.
  • Slight increase in social solidarity compared to January: A total of 33% of the public believes that social solidarity has strengthened to a great or fairly great extent, up from 28% in January. In contrast, 32% feels that solidarity has declined (22% says it has “somewhat declined,” 10% says it has “declined significantly”), a decrease from 37% in January. About a third (23%) believes there has been no change in social solidarity, similar to the previous month.

________________________

[1] The survey was conducted from February 17–20, 2025, under the direction of the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies. The fieldwork was carried out by iPanel and included online interviews with 801 Jewish respondents and 137 Arab respondents, forming a representative sample of the adult Israeli population aged 18 and above. Weighting was applied to ensure a balanced ratio between sectors. The maximum sampling error for the full sample is ±3.2% at a 95% confidence level.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series Database
TopicsData Analytics CenterSwords of Iron WarSocietal Resilience and the Israeli Society
עברית

Events

All events
The 18th Annual International Conference
25 February, 2025
08:15 - 16:00
Photo: Ronen Topelberg

Related Publications

All publications
Ramadan 2025: Rise in Worshippers Amid a Decline in Violence
11/05/25
Swords of Iron Survey Results - April 2025
08/05/25
United Nations General Assembly Votes - Israel-Hamas War
06/05/25

Stay up to date

Registration was successful! Thanks.
  • Research

    • Topics
      • Israel and the Global Powers
      • Israel-United States Relations
      • Glazer Israel-China Policy Center
      • Russia
      • Europe
      • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
      • Iran
      • Lebanon and Hezbollah
      • Syria
      • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
      • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
      • Conflict to Agreements
      • Israeli-Palestinian Relations
      • Hamas and the Gaza Strip
      • Peace Agreements and Normalization in the Middle East
      • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
      • Turkey
      • Egypt
      • Jordan
      • Israel’s National Security Policy
      • Military and Strategic Affairs
      • Societal Resilience and the Israeli Society
      • Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel
      • Climate, Infrastructure and Energy
      • Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict
      • Cross-Arena Research
      • Data Analytics Center
      • Law and National Security
      • Advanced Technologies and National Security
      • Cognitive Warfare
      • Economics and National Secutiry
    • Projects
      • Preventing the Slide into a One-State Reality
      • Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States
      • Perceptions about Jews and Israel in the Arab-Muslim World and Their Impact on the West
  • Publications

    • All Publications
    • INSS Insight
    • Policy Papers
    • Special Publication
    • Strategic Assessment
    • Technology Platform
    • Memoranda
    • Database
    • Posts
    • Books
    • Archive
  • About

    • Vision and Mission
    • History
    • Research Disciplines
    • Board of Directors
    • Fellowship and Prizes
    • Internships
    • Support
  • Media

    • Communications
    • Articles
    • Quotes
    • Radio and TV
    • Video Gallery
    • Press Release
    • Podcast
  • Home

  • Events

  • Database

  • Team

  • Contact

  • Newsletter

  • עברית

INSS logo The Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic, Innovative, Policy-Oriented Research, go to the home page
40 Haim Levanon St. Tel Aviv, 6997556 Israel | Tel: 03-640-0400 | Fax: 03-744-7590 | Email: info@inss.org.il
Developed by Daat A Realcommerce company.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.