The surprise attack launched by Hamas against Israel and the outbreak of the war in Gaza were a catalyst for other elements in the resistance axis to join the attempt to create a multi-arena confrontation with Israel. This was the case with Hezbollah from Lebanon and Iran's proxies from Iraq and Yemen. In Syria, on the other hand, beyond isolated shootings (attributed to Palestinian elements) and except for statements of support for the Palestinians, for now it seems that Assad is in no hurry to join the campaign and apparently still harbors a grudge against the Hamas leadership, in light of the crisis between the organization and the Syrian regime that began during the Syrian civil war.
With the outbreak of protests in Syria in 2011, Hamas, whose ideological roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, supported the opponents of the regime and condemned the violent oppression under Assad. About a year later, the Hamas headquarters in Damascus was evacuated, and Hamas-Syria relations were severed.
This development undermined Hamas's relations with Iran and the Shiite axis, which found themselves on different sides of the civil war, with Hamas supporting rebel organizations identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the axis coming to the rescue of Assad, who was threatened at home. While Hamas and Iran restored their relations relatively quickly, Assad did not respond positively to Hamas's desire to restore relations with him.
Over the years, there has been a slow process of rapprochement between Hamas and the regime, which accelerated in part as a result of pressure exerted by Iran and Hezbollah to unite the ranks of the axis of resistance against Israel, while in tandem Hamas distanced itself from the Muslim Brotherhood movement. It is also possible that Assad's drive to portray himself as an Arab president who supports the Palestinian issue was reignited. The removal of Khaled Mashal, who is remembered as the right-wing sign in condemning the Syrian regime at the beginning of the fighting, from the position of head of the Hamas Political Bureau likely contributed to the regime's willingness to move closer to the movement again.
In October 2022, the parties agreed to turn over a new leaf and renew their relations, although in August 2023, Assad accused Hamas of hypocrisy and treachery. The Syrian president emphasized that relations will not return to the state they were in before the civil war, and that it is too early to talk about reopening the Hamas offices in Damascus.
Beyond Assad's resentment toward Hamas, it is likely that Assad is not interested in entangling Syria in a campaign against Israel, while he is busy with the internal fighting that is intensifying in the north of the country. Increasing pressure by the axis may lead to a change in the regime's policy toward Hamas, and it is likely that this will be influenced by how Iran and the axis assess Hamas’s situation in the fighting and the danger posed to the movement. In such a case, Assad might allow a wider operation from his territory, possibly led by pro-Iranian militias, thereby dragging Syria into the conflict.
The surprise attack launched by Hamas against Israel and the outbreak of the war in Gaza were a catalyst for other elements in the resistance axis to join the attempt to create a multi-arena confrontation with Israel. This was the case with Hezbollah from Lebanon and Iran's proxies from Iraq and Yemen. In Syria, on the other hand, beyond isolated shootings (attributed to Palestinian elements) and except for statements of support for the Palestinians, for now it seems that Assad is in no hurry to join the campaign and apparently still harbors a grudge against the Hamas leadership, in light of the crisis between the organization and the Syrian regime that began during the Syrian civil war.
With the outbreak of protests in Syria in 2011, Hamas, whose ideological roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, supported the opponents of the regime and condemned the violent oppression under Assad. About a year later, the Hamas headquarters in Damascus was evacuated, and Hamas-Syria relations were severed.
This development undermined Hamas's relations with Iran and the Shiite axis, which found themselves on different sides of the civil war, with Hamas supporting rebel organizations identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the axis coming to the rescue of Assad, who was threatened at home. While Hamas and Iran restored their relations relatively quickly, Assad did not respond positively to Hamas's desire to restore relations with him.
Over the years, there has been a slow process of rapprochement between Hamas and the regime, which accelerated in part as a result of pressure exerted by Iran and Hezbollah to unite the ranks of the axis of resistance against Israel, while in tandem Hamas distanced itself from the Muslim Brotherhood movement. It is also possible that Assad's drive to portray himself as an Arab president who supports the Palestinian issue was reignited. The removal of Khaled Mashal, who is remembered as the right-wing sign in condemning the Syrian regime at the beginning of the fighting, from the position of head of the Hamas Political Bureau likely contributed to the regime's willingness to move closer to the movement again.
In October 2022, the parties agreed to turn over a new leaf and renew their relations, although in August 2023, Assad accused Hamas of hypocrisy and treachery. The Syrian president emphasized that relations will not return to the state they were in before the civil war, and that it is too early to talk about reopening the Hamas offices in Damascus.
Beyond Assad's resentment toward Hamas, it is likely that Assad is not interested in entangling Syria in a campaign against Israel, while he is busy with the internal fighting that is intensifying in the north of the country. Increasing pressure by the axis may lead to a change in the regime's policy toward Hamas, and it is likely that this will be influenced by how Iran and the axis assess Hamas’s situation in the fighting and the danger posed to the movement. In such a case, Assad might allow a wider operation from his territory, possibly led by pro-Iranian militias, thereby dragging Syria into the conflict.