Strategic Assessment

Introduction

Since
1945, the Middle East has been viewed as an area afflicted by conflict and
confrontation (Sørli et al., 2005), with the most prominent of those conflicts
being the Arab-Israeli wars, the Iran-Iraq War, and the First (1991) and Second
(2003) Gulf Wars. These were joined by conflicts and civil wars in Iraq, Syria,
Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Yemen, and Lebanon, as well as border disputes such as
those between Egypt and Libya, Jordan and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Iraq and
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and others. Many of these conflicts are the
result of colonial legacies and the fragility of the countries that emerged in
their wake from the early twentieth century through the 1970s. Competing
ideologies, ethnic and religious tensions, competition between the powers, and
the development of autocratic nation-states are some of the accepted causes of
conflict in the region (Fox, 2001; Sørli et al., 2005).

The
events of the “Arab Spring” that swept through the Middle East beginning nearly
a decade ago have deepened regional instability and tensions that have long characterized
the region and sparked new conflicts. The regional turmoil has assumed various
conceptual and structural forms over the years; prominent among have been the
“revolution” phase (2010-2011), which represents the uprisings that led to the
downfall of four regimes¾in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Yemen¾and to turmoil within Syria,
which is still struggling to stabilize itself following a prolonged civil war. Other
countries that did not experience turmoil directly (Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, and
Lebanon) are characterized by ongoing instability. The rise of the Salafi-jihadists
from 2014-2016 and the emergence of the Islamic State, which attempted through
violent means to impose the Salafi-jihadist idea as the region's leading
ideology, as well as the increased involvement in the Middle East cauldron of
regional and international actors driven by competing political and economic
interests, all served to make the Middle East a fragile, chaotic, and violent
arena (Valensi, 2015).

This
study examines the violent conflicts in the Middle East over the past 72 years,
starting in 1946, the year following the end of World War II, through 2018, from
a quantitative-statistical perspective. The purpose of this study is to enable
a deeper understanding of Middle East conflicts¾their various types, scope, intensity, the number of
fatalities caused, and how they are resolved. This topic has been examined
relatively little in quantitative research (compared to qualitative analyses). The
study will also compare Middle East conflicts with conflicts in other arenas
worldwide.

The
findings show that beginning in 2003 there was a sharp rise in the scope of
conflicts in the Middle East, primarily in intrastate conflicts. This trend is
inconsistent with events at the global level, where there has even been a
slight decline in the scope of such conflicts since 2016. In addition, there is
a trend both in the Middle East and globally of a gradual and continuous
increase in the incidence of intrastate conflicts, as opposed to interstate
disputes. A similar trend, both in the Middle East and in the global arena,
indicates an increase in foreign involvement in conflicts. However, contrary to
the global trend that demonstrates a decline in high intensity wars and an
increase in the incidence of low intensity conflicts, the Middle East is
characterized by a relatively higher rate of high intensity wars. There has
been a sharp increase in the number of fatalities in the Middle East since
2011, although since 2014 there has been a decline of some 75 percent in
fatalities. Finally, around 74 percent of all conflicts in the Middle East have
not concluded.[1] Of the conflicts
that ended, the findings indicate that the most common ways to end disputes are
low levels of activity (conflicts that do not come to a complete conclusion); a
military victory by the state over rebels; and regulation of the conflict
through a ceasefire. On the other hand, the less common ways to end a conflict
in the region are victory for rebels (the non-state party) or a peace agreement.
That conflicts in the Middle East persist and sometimes do not end at all can
be attributed to the characteristics noted above¾a high level of intensity and a great degree of foreign
involvement, which reduce the chances of bringing conflicts to an end, in
particular through peaceful means. Therefore, in most cases conflicts in the
Middle East reflect global trends.

The
article includes a review of the relevant literature on conflicts in the Middle
East and around the world and the ways they are terminated. The methodology is
described below, including the research method and definition of variables. The
empirical findings that emerged from the analysis are then discussed in detail.
Finally, the main conclusions and recommendations for future research are
presented.

Literature
Review

For
years, the Middle East was considered one of the most violent areas in the
world. Since the Cold War, the Middle East has witnessed a series of intrastate
wars that are among the most prolonged conflicts in the world (for example, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict) and bloody interstate wars (for example, the
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988). Moreover, foreign actors are prominently involved
in the region (as in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and in Syria in 2015). This section
presents some notable findings from the literature on theories and
conceptualizations of conflict types, their intensity, and their termination, including
from the literature on conflict research in general and the Middle East in
particular.

Conflict
Types

The
research literature discusses primarily two types of conflict The first focuses
on conflicts between states; the second focuses on conflicts inside states¾between the regime and non-state actors (for example a
rebel organization). This division is largely related to competing paradigms in
international relations. The realism paradigm dominated research during the
period when conflicts between states were common, and emphasized the centrality
of states as well as the importance of structural factors, polarities, and the
balance of forces in the global system as possible drivers for the outbreak of
conflicts (Cunningham & Lemke, 2013). On the other hand, later theories
such as liberalism and especially constructivism began to focus on non-state
actors as influencers of political processes and on "softer"
considerations that go beyond the discussion of interests, power, and influence
(that are common in realism) as motivators for actors' behavior. The non-state
actors are violent and often threaten the state, or fight each other without
any interference on the part of the state. These organizations threaten
national and international security as they challenge the state monopoly
through the use of force, usually within defined territory, thus creating a
phenomenon of intrastate conflicts (Williams, 2008). These conflicts are considered
a grave threat to global peace and security, given their particularly lethal
form of warfare. They are characterized by slim prospects for termination
through regulation and peace agreements (Salman, 2014; Backer & Huth, 2014;
Toft, 2010).^[2]

The widespread
proliferation of violent non-state actors has led to the fact that since the
end of the Cold War, the most common type of conflict currently occurring in
the world in general and the Middle East in particular is intrastate conflict
that includes ethnic/religious conflict, revolution, and genocide (Schiff,
2018). The number of interstate conflicts, on the other hand, has remained
relatively low.

Conflict
Intensity

Conflict
intensity is measured primarily in the number of fatalities, although the issue
is sometimes examined through the number of combatants and the size of the
combat area.[3] Clearly
many factors affect the intensity of both interstate and intrastate conflicts,[4]
and can be classified in three categories: psychological factors, internal
state factors (socio-economic), and external factors. Another significant
factor relates to the competing ideologies of the parties to the conflict. Political,
secular, and religious ideologies often legitimize the use of violence,
accentuate the differences between rival groups, and raise the level of
hostility between them. Fundamental belief in ideology can lead people to
sacrifice their lives in its name (Taber, 2002; Sanin & Wood, 2014;
Ugarriza & Craig, 2012).

One
of the factors affecting the intensity of intrastate conflict is a difference
in religious, cultural, and ethnic identification between different population
sectors. Such gaps and contrasting worldviews prolong the duration of the
conflict and make it difficult for the parties to conduct
successful negotiations (Leng & Regan, 2003; Toft, 2003). Feelings of
belonging and societal and sectorial solidarity affect conflict intensity and
the willingness of communities to protect their identity. Economic ability
(Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008) and type of regime are other factors that
influence conflict intensity and the strength and staying power of the parties.
Thus, for example, democratic regimes are less violent, and therefore the
intensity of conflict within democratic states will be lower (Fearon, 2004).

Furthermore,
intensity of conflict may also be influenced by external factors such as the
involvement of foreign actors. Such support, usually expressed in the form of military
armament and economic aid, influences the strength and spirit of the fighting
forces (Saideman, 2001; Filote, et al., 2016). In fact, the longer and more
violent a conflict and the higher its intensity, the harder it will be for the
parties to terminate the conflict peacefully (Deitch, 2016).

Termination
of Conflicts

Conflict
resolution as a field of research began in the 1950s and 1960s and matured in
the era following the Cold War. Conflict resolution research poses several
challenges, especially in view of the rise in internal conflicts and the global
war on terror that has weakened the idea of ​​”democratic peace,” whereby there
is a low chance of violent conflict in democratic states (Ramsbotham et al.,
2011).

A
common definition of conflict termination is when there has been a significant
reduction in the number of fatalities. However, it is clear that the means of
termination is an empirical phenomenon that is difficult to characterize and
measure. In fact, there are a number of ways to terminate conflicts, from
military victory and annihilation of the enemy to a peace agreement with the
enemy. In the pre-World War II era, most internal wars ended when one party
completely defeated the rival who surrendered, was annihilated, or fled (Toft,
2010). However, the standard assumption today is that a conflict does not
necessarily end with a military victory or a peace agreement, but in other
circumstances that are less sharply defined, such as fatigue on both sides
(Kreutz, 2010).^[5] In fact, the
number of internal wars that have ended without a decisive military victory or
peace agreement has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War
(Toft, 2010).^[6] Kreutz (2010) expanded the conventional division of termination of
conflicts into four types: military victory, peace agreement, ceasefire, and
“other,” with the latter category the most common end to internal disputes in
1946-2005.

The
involvement of many parties can lead to difficulties in finding peaceful solutions
to conflicts. According to Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov (2010) there are strategic,
structural, and psychological barriers to a peaceful resolution of disputes.
Strategic barriers arise from security risks following peacemaking and tangible
concessions. These barriers also relate to the strategies implemented by the
parties, sometimes due to concerns over the future, ignoring the need to
construct peace. Structural barriers relate to internal, bureaucratic, and
institutional constraints that create difficulties for the peace process. These
barriers stem from the opposition of political elites, political parties,
interest groups, and security bodies to the peace process, which they regard as
running counter to interests. Psychological barriers are cognitive and
emotional barriers, such as national narratives, values, culture, ideology, or
religion, which make it difficult to change attitudes toward rivals and to the
conflict as a whole. Thus these barriers may make it difficult to accept
compromises and concessions, and lead to skepticism regarding a peace process
and resolution of the conflict.

 Most studies surmise that negotiations to
terminate a conflict contribute to the stability of peace more than military
victories (Licklider, 1995; Dubey, 2002; Fortna, 2008; Toft, 2003). However,
Luttwak posits otherwise, and contends that wars lead to termination of
conflict (Luttwak, 1999). In this context, Wagner's premise (1993) supports
Luttwak's approach, arguing that negotiated settlements tend to break down due
to the failure to involve rebel forces in a new government, while victory leads
to the destruction of the opponent in a way that prevents recurrence of the
conflict.^[7]Similarly
Kreutz (2010) finds that military victory on the whole characterizes short
conflicts and reduces the chance of their recurrence. However, Hartzell (Hartzell,
2009; Hartzell 2007) examines 108 civil wars that occurred between 1945 and 1999,
and concludes that both military victories and negotiated settlements reduce
the chances of conflict recurrence. Other researchers found that there is
indeed no statistical significance to the means of termination and the duration
of peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2004).

The Study
of Middle East Conflicts

In
the most recent research on Middle East conflicts, one school of thought tends
to attribute realistic explanations (cost-benefit considerations, power, and
interests) to the large number of conflicts and wars in the region (Sørli et
al., 2005; Milton-Edwards &
Hinchcliffe, 2007). This school of thought emerged in response to
scholars who rely on a substantive view and attribute a Hobbesian nature to the
region (Gran, 1998; Salamey, 2009; Hariri, 2015). These researchers surmise
that the roots of the conflict in the Middle East lie in the region’s economic,
cultural, post-colonial, and institutional characteristics (Gran, 1998). The
economic approach explains the uniqueness as a product of the failure to
establish liberal economics in the region, that is, the weakness of the middle
classes and poor international economic policy in the region. Cultural
explanations focus on the failure of Middle East modernization processes, the
predominance of Muslim codes and culture, gender superiority, and widespread
cultural suspicion of Western modernization. Another cultural aspect is linked
to post-colonial views, which claim that it was Western colonialism that led to
the creation of fragile and dependent Middle East policy establishments and the
rejection of democratic institutions and values. Institutional explanations
focus on the absence of proper democratic institutions in the Middle East that
work to advance political freedoms and are characterized by military and
security dominance (Salamey, 2009).

In
contrast, realist researchers do not see the Middle East as a unique region,
and attribute the phenomenon of conflict to universal explanations, resulting
from a desire for power and influence. In their book Conflicts in the Middle
East since 1945, Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe analyze several conflicts
in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iran-Iraq
War, and clashes between the Kurds and the Iraqi government through an
examination of the social, political, cultural, and religious characteristics
of each of the arenas. They contend that in many cases, the roots of the
conflict lie in the ongoing history of intervention by external powers
motivated by strategic interests, including access to regions rich in natural
resources, primarily oil, and do not result from characteristics unique to the
Middle East (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2007).

The
continued involvement of external actors in the region is usually conducted in
the name of the battle against extremist religious groups (such as al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State) or in the name of humanitarian intervention, whether as a
justification or a pretext (such as in Libya and Syria). These accelerated
clashes and proxy wars and encouraged battles for control, influence, and power
(Mahdavi, 2015).

Quantitative
studies examining the causes of conflict in the Middle East in comparison to
other arenas around the world have also concluded that “there is nothing
mysterious or particular about conflicts in the Middle East or in Muslim
countries.” The conflicts can be explained satisfactorily with general theories
of civil war and conflict resolution (Sørli et al., 2005). These studies shed
light on the wide range of different types of conflict in the Middle East that
go beyond the classic definition of military warfare and extend to political
violence, low intensity fighting, malign propaganda, economic boycotts,
territorial and water disputes, resistance to occupation, and more, and maps
the clashes that have occurred in the region according to several criteria
(Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2007): interstate clashes, including clashes
between Arabs and Iranians, between Israelis and Arabs, and between Arabs and
Arabs; regional clashes that occurred mainly as part of the Arab-Israeli
conflict; and clashes between regional and external actors such as the 1956
Sinai Campaign and the 1991 Gulf War. Finally, there are intrastate conflictsand ethnic violence, including the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990; the
tragic struggle of the Kurds¾a minority spread
among four countries in the region, whose demands range from recognition of their
right to self-determination to political and social rights in the countries in
which they live; civil wars in Libya and Yemen; and the early stages of the
fighting in Syria.

This
division illustrates the change in the type of actors involved in the
conflicts. In the past, research into regional conflicts dealt with traditional
rivalries between states and competition for control of natural resources such
as water and oil. From the 1990s, with the end of the superpower conflict in
the framework of the Cold War, conflict research has focused on the growing
role of non-state actors that began to compete with the sovereign state for
power, influence, and resources.

The
spread of intrastate conflicts in the Middle East, as in other arenas,
especially Third World countries, is linked to the weakness of those countries
and their limited ability to provide public services and security on a
continuous basis, as evident in Afghanistan, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq. There
are cases in which the regime provides basic public services in central towns
but is less effective in the periphery. The government in these areas may share
its sovereignty with violent non-state actors. This phenomenon, called “fragile
sovereignty,” results from the friction and interface between the state and the
violent non-state actors. The lack of full control by the state in a particular
area is what enables the penetration by these actors and fans internal
conflicts (Mulaj, 2010).

Furthermore,
in some countries in the Middle East, national institutions do not reflect the
will of the people, but rather the will of the ruling elite or the aspirations
of a specific ethnic group. This reality leads to the rise of power elements that
challenge central government, among them local leaders. Such processes can
result in the emergence of sub-state entities and in some cases even lead to
civil war, which can end with the collapse of the existing order.

Joel
Migdal (1988) examines the question of relations between the state and civil
society in Third World countries, including in the Middle East, through a model
of state-society relations. This model sharpens the struggle of the state
against other social organizations. According to his findings, even though the
government that emerged in these countries following the decolonization process
has at its disposal resources greater than those of other social-political
organizations in the country, and even though the rulers present a veneer of
absolute state control over events in society, and of government and society
being identical, for the most part they fail to achieve this, except for the sake
of appearance. Consequently, they are weak states with strong societies
(Migdal, 1988). In these countries, there is an ongoing struggle between state
leaders on the one hand, who seek to mobilize residents and hoard resources in
order to subordinate all and everything to one set of rules designed according
to their vision, and on the other hand, traditional, social, local, and other
organizations competing with them for de facto control. Sometimes these
organizations are so powerful that they succeed in “conquering” parts of the
country, as happened with Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq.

Like
Migdal, Ayoob (1995) deals with conflicts in Third World
countries, including in Middle East states, in the post-Cold War era. His
arguments are based on two assumptions: first, these countries are
characterized by a narrow legitimacy base; and second, security is rooted in
the political space more than in the military space. He argues that the source
of instability in these countries lies in the early stages of their creation.
Namely, their late entry into the state system created the infrastructure for
crises (Ayoob, 1995).

Methodology

This study examines all violent conflicts in the
geographical area of ​​the Middle East (not including North Africa, and
therefore the war in Libya is not included here) over the past 72 years,
starting in 1946¾the
year after the end of World War II¾through
2018, from a quantitative-statistical perspective. This time period was chosen to correspond with the
database through which the analysis was conducted. However, the research
focuses on the past two decades and the impact of these conflicts on the Middle
East system.

These
violent conflicts include interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts that
occur between a state and a non-state party. The unit of analysis is 347
violent “conflict years,”[8]
which include the total of conflict years examined in the Middle East, while
making a comparison to trends in the international system. The purpose of this
study is to enable a deeper understanding of Middle East conflicts¾their various types, scope, intensity, number of
fatalities caused, and how they are resolved. This topic has been examined
relatively little in quantitative research compared to qualitative analyses.

The Empirical
Basis

The
study quantitatively-statistically examines 347 “conflict years” from 1946-2018
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database,[9]
which contains a comprehensive list of 2,385 “conflict years” that occurred
worldwide during this time frame. A violent conflict is defined as “a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”
(UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 2013). The definition includes five
components: first, the use of armed force: any physical weapon, including guns,
but also sticks, stones, fire, water, and so on; second, at least 25 deaths in
a calendar year as a result of the use of armed force between rivals; third, rivals:
the government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of these
organizations. A government is defined as the party that controls the capital
of a state, while an opposition organization is defined as a non-governmental organization
that employs armed force in order to influence a given conflict. This database
deals only with officially organized resistance, and not with spontaneous
violence. Fourth, the state: an internationally recognized sovereign government
that controls a population and a defined territory; and fifth, a conflict pertaining
to government and/or a disputed territory: opposing positions regarding
government, i.e., opposition to the type of political system, to a change of
central government, or a change of political composition. Alternatively, these
disputes may be in relation to a specific territory, for example in the case of
transfer of control of a specific territory to another state (international conflicts),
a request for secession, or autonomy (intrastate conflicts) (UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset, 2013).

For
the purpose of the study, violent conflicts in the Middle East were coded
according to selected criteria available in the framework of the database,
which will be discussed extensively in the next section. A comparison will also
be made between the Middle East system and the global system.[10]
Data regarding the global arena likewise includes data for conflicts in the Middle
East.

Research
Variables

This
study seeks to characterize conflicts in the Middle East arena and compare them
to global conflicts according to five main criteria: the type of conflicts,
their scope, their intensity, the number of fatalities caused, and how they are
terminated.

Type
of conflict: Coded according to
the UCDP dataset as follows: (1) extra-systemic conflict: takes place between a
state and a non-state actor, with the state struggling to gain control of a
territory outside of its own territory; (2) interstate conflict: takes place between
two states; (3) intrastate conflict (internal): takes place within a state,
where Party A is a government while Party B is a non-state actor (one or more).
This type of conflict does not include foreign involvement by another
government in fighting; (4) internal conflict with international involvement
(internationalized internal): takes place between Party A, which is a
government, and Party B, the non-state actor (one or more), together with
foreign involvement by another government in the fighting.

Scope
of conflict:The number of
conflicts that take place in each given year, between 1946 and 2018.

Intensity
of conflict:This variable
relates to the level of violence, which is measured in the number of deaths in
a calendar year. The variable was binary-coded by the dataset in the following
way: (1) low intensity: between 25-999 battle-related deaths as a result of
fighting between rival sides to a conflict in a calendar year; (2) war: at
least 1,000 battle-related deaths as a result of fighting between rival sides
to a conflict in a calendar year.

Number
of deaths:A continuous
variable of the exact number of fatalities in a calendar year, reported
according to the UCDP database.[11]

Termination
of conflict:According to
the dataset, termination of conflict is when there are fewer than 25 deaths
during a calendar year.[12]
This variable was coded as follows: (1) peace
agreement; (2) ceasefire; (3) government victory; (4) rebel victory; (5) low
level of activity (due to a cause other than the above, for example, fatigue of
one of the parties); (6) an actor ceases to exist.[13]

Findings

Presentation
of the findings will focus on conflicts that took place in the Middle East from
1946 to 2018, with reference to the five variables mentioned above.

Scope
and Trends

Figures
1 and 2 present data on the scope of conflicts (y-axis) between the years 1946 and
2018 (x-axis). Figure 1 provides a comparative view of the scope of global conflict
by year (including the Middle East, 2,385 “conflict years” in total) compared
to the Middle East (347 “conflict years”), while Figure 2 focuses only on the
Middle East. Figure 1 indicates a significant increase of three and a half
times in the scope of global conflicts between 1960 and 1991. Despite a decline
in the 1990s and early 2000s, there is another increase starting in 2012, which
peaked in 2016.

Figure
1. Scope of conflicts: global vs. regional trends, 1946-2018

Figure
2 shows an increase in the number of conflicts in the Middle East from 1959 to
1967, and an additional increase from 1977 that remained relatively stable
until 1995. From 2002 to 2018 there is a dramatic (sixfold) increase in the
number of conflicts that occured in the Middle East.

Figure
2: Scope of conflicts in the Middle East, 1946-2018

Conflict
Types

Figures
3 and 4 present data on the types of conflicts from 1946 to 2018.[14]
Figure 3 focuses on the types of conflicts in the world (including the Middle
East, 2385 “conflict years” in total), while Figure 4 focuses only on the
Middle East (347 “conflict years”). Figure 3 indicates that there is a
significant decline in the scope of conflicts between countries in the world,
and in the number of extra-systemic conflicts. However, there is a significant
rise in the rate of conflicts inside states against non-state organizations,
and these constitute the majority of conflicts in the world today (around 61
percent of all conflicts in 2018). Moreover, beginning in 2012, there has been
an increase in the scope of internal conflicts characterized by foreign
international support.

Figure
4 indicates that similar to the global trend, along with a limited scope of
interstate conflicts and extra-systemic conflicts, there is a growing trend in
the Middle East (constituting 58 percent of total conflicts in 2018) of intrastate
conflicts between state and non-state organizations. In line with the global
trend there is also an increase in conflicts characterized by international
involvement of foreign countries in internal fighting, in particular from 2014
onward.

Figure
3. Conflict types: global trends, 1946-2018

Figure
4: Conflict types: regional trends, 1946-2018

Conflict
Intensity

Figures 5 and 6 present data on conflict intensity regarding
conflicts around the world from 1946 to 2018 (including the Middle East, 2,385 “conflict
years” in total), and the Middle East (347 “conflict years”), respectively. Figure 5 shows that as of 1946 there has been a
consistent increase in the rate of low intensity conflicts (fewer than 999
deaths per year), alongside a relatively steady trend in the scope of wars
(more than 1,000 deaths per year). Furthermore, it is evident that the incidence
of wars among overall conflicts has decreased, compared to the rate of low intensity
conflicts, which in 2018 accounted for about 88 percent of all conflicts in the
world.

Figure
5. Conflict intensity: global trends, 1946-2018

Figure
6, which focuses on the Middle East, charts a mixed trend, although for most of
the period under review, it is evident that the scope of low intensity
conflicts exceeds the scope of wars. However, from 2009 and until 2015 there was
an increase in the incidence of wars in this region, which influences the
global trend.

Figure
6. Conflict intensity: the Middle East, 1946-2018

Number
of Fatalities

Figure
7 presents a comparison between the number of fatalities in the regional arena
as compared to the global area (including the Middle East) from 1989 to 2018.
The figure indicates that there is a sharp increase in the number of fatalities
in the Middle East beginning from the events of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, peaking
in 2014 with more than 73,000 fatalities. However, since 2014, there has been a
consistent decline in the number of fatalities in the region, and they have declined
by some 75 percent (some 19,000 fatalities in 2018). As of 2010 the number of
fatalities has been compatible with the global trend. A global increase in the
number of fatalities in the late 1990s and from 2007 to 2009 does not characterize
the regional arena.

Figure
7: Number of fatalities: global vs. regional trends, 1989-2018

Termination
of Conflicts

Figures
8 and 9 present data on the termination of conflicts in the Middle East from
1946 to 2015 and include 371 combat dyads.[15]
Figure 8 shows that most of the conflicts in the region, comprising 276 dyads
that constitute some 74 percent, have not been terminated and continue until
the present day. However, some 26 percent of conflicts in the Middle East (composed
of some 95 dyads) have terminated. Figure 9 focuses on the group of conflicts
and presents distribution according to termination types. From
the graph, it is evident that some 40 percent (38 dyads) of these conflicts
terminated as a result of a decline in rebel activity over the years. Eighteen
percent (17 dyads) of the conflicts terminated as a result of a ceasefire
between the parties. An additional 18 percent (17 dyads) terminated as a result
of military victories by states. Ten percent of conflicts (9 dyads) terminated
as a result of an actor ceasing to exist (for example, a rebel organization
disbanding), while 8 percent (8 dyads) of these conflicts terminated as a
result of a peace agreement signed between the warring parties. It is evident
that only 6 percent of these conflicts (6 dyads) ended with a military victory
by the rebels.

Figure
8.Termination of conflicts in the Middle East, 1946-2015[16]

Figure
9. Type of termination of conflicts in the Middle East, 1946-2015

Discussion

What, therefore, characterizes conflicts in the Middle East
and how are they terminated?

Until
the early 2000s, conflicts in the Middle East appeared to reflect trends similar
to conflicts in other arenas around the world, such that the Middle East was
not a more violent arena. In fact, between 1980 and 2005 there was a decline in
conflicts in the Middle East relative to other areas (in the early 2000s there
were more conflicts in Africa and in certain areas of Asia that also saw higher
fatality figures than in the Middle East) (Sørli et al., 2005).[17]

However,
data show that since 2003 there has ben a gradual, steady increase in the
number of conflicts in the region. During that year, three conflicts took
place, including the US-British led coalition invasion of Iraq in March 2003
aimed at overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein (a struggle that continued
until December 15, 2011, when the United States officially declared an end to
its military involvement in Iraq); the battle against Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad within the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the
confrontation between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which Ankara
defines as a terrorist entity.

The
most prominent increase in the number of conflicts was registered in 2010 and was
connected to the Arab tremors that shook the Middle East and raised hopes of a
liberal and democratic change. Instead, the Middle East became a more chaotic
and violent arena. This trend peaked in 2018, a year in which there were 12
conflicts, involving a series of clashes with the Islamic State (in Syria, Iraq,
and Egypt); fighting between the forces of Bashar al-Assad and the rebels in
Syria; Egypt's struggle against its rival, the Muslim Brotherhood and
especially against the HASAM movement¾Harakat Sawa’d Misr; Iran's ongoing struggle against the
Kurdish minority in its territory, and specifically against the Democratic
Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and
the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which in 2016 renewed its armed struggle
against the Iranian regime; Syria against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)  and Turkey against the PKK in Turkey; and the
war in Yemen. Israel is listed as a party to conflicts in that year as part of
the conflict with Hamas, and as part of the low intensity confrontation with
Iran along the border with Syria. Despite the relatively negligible position of
the Kurds in the Middle East story, they constitute integral and consistent
actors involved in the region’s conflicts.

In
the remaining arenas in the world there was a consistent increase from 1946
until the end of the Cold War (including a peak in 1991). From 1991 there was a
gradual decline until 2006, characterized by inconsistency until 2012, when until
2016 there was a sharp and consistent spike in conflicts; this can be
attributed primarily to the events of the “Arab Spring.” This trend has
moderated and seen a minor decline since 2017. In the Middle East, on the other
hand, there has been a consistent increase in the rate of conflicts since 2003.

With
regard to the types of conflict, the Middle East does not differ from the
global trend of a decline in the number of wars between states, and an increase
in the number of intrastate (internal) wars; in 2018 there were seven such
conflicts in the region: Egypt against the Islamic State
and against the Islamist HASAM movement; Iran against the Iranian Kurds (PDKI,
PJAK); Israel against Hamas, Syria against the SDF; and Turkey against the PKK.

Similar
to the global trend, since 2014 there has also been an increase in conflicts in
the Middle East that include international involvement of foreign countries in
interstate fighting (internationalized internal). In 2018, for example, there
were four such conflicts: Iraq's battle against the Islamic State organization
(with the support of the United States and coalition countries); the Syrian
regime’s battle with the Islamic State (with Russian and Iranian support); the
Syrian battle against the rebels (again with Russian and Iranian assistance);
and the war in Yemen[18]
(supported by Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the United Arab
Emirates).

Foreign
state involvement in internal conflicts affects the shape of the conflict. Not
only do foreign states not solve the conflict, but overall, they extend it and
make it more lethal (Saideman, 2001; Filote, et al., 2016). The involvement of
Iran and especially Russia in Syria since September 2015 is a perfect example.
Russia led to a strategic shift in the war following a number of successes by
the rebels and the capture of large areas of Syria, bringing them close to the
capital, Damascus. It is widely believed that the Assad regime was close to
collapse and that it owes its survival to the support of the two foreign
countries, Russia and Iran¾intervention that also
led to the long duration of the war and its lethal outcomes (more than half a
million people are estimated to have been killed in the war).

 With regard to conflict intensity, the Middle East
differs from the global trend whereby there is a decline in the ratio of wars
compared to the total number of conflicts in the world. Most conflicts (88
percent) in 2018 were characterized by low intensity (less than 999
fatalities). In the Middle East, on the other hand, there was an increase in
the number of wars from 2011 to 2014 (in 2013 the number of wars was higher
than the number of low intensity conflicts) and the number peaked in 2016 to
six wars: Iraq-ISIS, Syria-ISIS, Syria-rebels, Yemen (Northern Yemen agaist
supporters of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi), Turkey-ISIS, and Turkey-PKK. Since
2016 there has been a decline in wars in the region, and in 2018 there were
three wars: Syria-ISIS, Syria-rebels, and Yemen.

In
line with the rising number of conflicts in the world, the events of the “Arab
Spring” increased the number of fatalities in the Middle East, with a sharp
rise since 2011. In comparison, the number of fatalities before the “Arab
Spring” stood at 3,800. The number of fatalities peaked in 2014 (73,501) and
was probably connected to the phenomenon of the Islamic State, which, after
declaring itself a caliphate in June, wielded unrestrained terror against the
Syrian and Iraqi populations. With the collapse of the Islamic caliphate and
the significant damage inflicted on the organization's military capabilities,
as well as the termination of the main fighting phase in Syria, there has been
a downward trend (some 19,000 fatalities in 2018).

Seventy-four
percent of conflicts in the Middle East from 1946 to 2015 did not end in the
period under review.[19]
Of those that terminated, 26 percent ended through a settlement (peace
agreement or ceasefire).[20]
Clearly these findings do not differ from the global trend.

Most
conflicts in the Middle East that terminated through peace agreements, both
intrastate and interstate conflicts (five out of eight conflicts), occurred
from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s and later periods. It would seem that the
number of conflicts terminating this way is decreasing. Examples include the
peace agreement between Iraq and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1970;
the Algiers agreement between Iran and Iraq (1975); South Yemen and North Yemen
(1972); and the peace agreements with Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen (1967) and the first Lebanese civil war (1958). [21]

Not
surprisingly, the termination of conflicts in the Middle East through
ceasefires (sometimes known as hudna or tahadiya) is more prevalent
than peace agreements, as they allow for more ideological flexibility in the
sense that a ceasefire does not require the sides to make significant
ideological concessions or unequivocal declarations. However, in many cases,
this type of termination leads to a recurrence of the conflict. Examples of
such terminations are the ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK in 2013; Israel
and Hezbollah (2006); Iran and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (2011); Egypt and
al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (1998); and more.

Only
24 percent of overall conflicts in the Middle East terminated with a military
victory. Of these, 18 percent ended as a result of the military victory by the
state. For example: the victory of the Lebanese government over the forces of
Michel Aoun (1990); the victory of the government of Yemen over the Democratic
Republic of Yemen (1994); and more. Furthermore, it is evident that just 6
percent of these conflicts terminated as a result of military victory over
rebels, for example, the Ba'ath Party coup in Iraq (1963); the Free Officers'
Movement in Egypt (1958); the Neo-Ba’ath Revolution in Syria (1966); and more.

Approximately
half of the conflicts did not officially terminate and were conducted at a low
level of activity, that is, the death toll remained below 25 fatalities per
year, with no definite and official termination such as a settlement or
decisive victory. For example, it is evident that 40 percent of conflicts
terminated as a result of diminishing rebel activity over the years, and
another 10 percent terminated as a result of an actor that ceased to exist or
diverted its military activity to the political dimension (such as the al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades in the West Bank, or the Amal organization that abandoned its
military operations).

Conclusions

Studies
on the Middle East tend to emphasize its violent character and the multitude of
contests, conflicts, and wars that take place in the region relative to various
other arenas in the world (Hariri, 2015; Sørli et al., 2005; Gran, 1998). This
article compares conflicts in the region with other conflicts in the world
using a quantitative method that relies on a broad database. The comparison
shows that according to most of the criteria tested, the characteristics of
conflicts in the Middle East and their development reflect similarities to the
characteristics and trends of conflicts in the international arena. Thus, regarding
the types of conflict, findings show that the conflicts taking place in the
Middle East and elsewhere in the world reflect a gradual and continuous
increase in the ratio of intrastate conflicts to interstate conflicts.

Another
data item relates to an increase in involvement by a foreign country in
internal conflicts, both in the Middle East and in the global arena. In this
context, the findings presented here support the claim that international
involvement is one of the leading factors leading to more lethal conflicts,
translated into a higher number of fatalities. Similarly, the number of
fatalities in the Middle East over the past decade reflects similar global
data.^[22]

Finally,
as in other places in the world, most conflicts in the Middle East (as of 2015)
have not yet terminated. Among the conflicts that have terminated, the least
common ways to terminate intrastate conflicts in the region are: victory for
rebels (the non-state party) or a peace agreement. This data is especially
interesting given that most of the conflicts in the Middle East today are
intrastate and therefore include non-state actors/rebels. This finding significantly
challenges the effectiveness of the struggle of the non-state party and
therefore indicates a low chance of success or victory for that party in
conflicts.

The
findings that are inconsistent with the global trend (but not significantly
contradictory) relate to the scope and intensity of the conflict. Thus there
was a drastic increase in the scope of intrastate conflicts in the Middle East
from 2003 to 2018. At the global level, on the other hand, there is a
moderation and even a slight decline in the scope of conflicts since 2016.

Furthermore,
contrary to the global trend that demonstrates a decline in wars and an
increase in the number of low intensity conflicts, it is evident that since
2003, and especially since the events of the “Arab Spring,” the Middle East is
more violent than in previous years, and is characterized by a higher ratio of
wars in comparison to the global arena. In line with the level of clashes, it
is evident there has also been a sharp increase in the number of fatalities in
the Middle East since 2011, although since 2015 there is a decline of about 75
percent in fatalities.

These
findings indicate on the one hand a more positive trend in the Middle East, whereby
since 2015 there has been a decline in the number of wars and the number of
fatalities in the region. On the other hand, data do not indicate the beginning
of a period of peace, reconciliation, or agreement, but rather “fatigue” of one
of the parties as a result of being worn down by the other party (usually the
state party), especially since there is not a linear decline.

A
further conclusion from the findings is that the widespread conflicts in the Middle
East over the past decade reflect the broad spectrum existing in conflict
classification in a way that undermines the conventional binary classification
in quantitative research and in general research. Conflicts in the present era
constitute a combination of a number of categories. Thus, for example, the
civil war in Syria, which began as a local uprising, became a wide scale civil
war to which a regional aspect was added with the growing involvement of Sunni
states¾Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey¾on the one hand, and by Shiite elements headed by Iran
and its proxy Hezbollah on the other. American involvement, especially since
the establishment of the international coalition against the Islamic State in
September 2014 and the entry of Russia into the Syrian maelstrom a year later,
shaped the international nature of the conflict. This phenomenon, in which an
intrastate crisis becomes a broad conflict with regional and international
dimensions, is known in the literature as “cross and integrated conflicts”
(Kriesberg, 1980). Thus, the conflict in Syria can be perceived as an
intrastate conflict and an interstate conflict (the regime against Turkey).
This complex reality undermines to some measure the validity of unequivocal
categories prevalent in quantitative research, and their ability to provide a
comprehensive and complete explanation for complex political phenomena.

Finally,
the Middle East in 2019 was rife with conflicts and clashes. The ongoing wars
in Libya, Yemen, and to a lesser extent in Syria; the confrontation between
Iran and its proxies and between Israel, which for the time being has been
limited to disruptive and preventive actions in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, and
containment actions in Gaza; the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which
has recently become a direct confrontation, the potential for escalation to a
conflict between Iran and the United States, and the growing ferment of
anti-regime sentiment among sectors of the public in their countries (Iraq,
Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt) that could translate into rebellion, clashes, and
internal wars¾all these suggest that
the violent reality and multiplicity of conflicts will continue to be a part of
the Middle East landscape in the coming years, and hence the need to deepen the
understanding of the issue is growing.

This
paper has focused on an initial attempt to characterize the conflicts in the
Middle East on the basis of a number of parameters and with reference to a
broad database, and to compare them to other disputes in the international
arena. The use of theoretical statistics leads to a number of interesting
initial conclusions that may constitute the foundation for further studies that
will deepen the comparison between conflicts in the Middle East and those
around the world through the use of additional criteria (for example, the
duration of the conflict, the number of combatants, or the area affected as
additional indices for conflict intensity). Furthermore, beyond description and
characterization of the conflicts, the way that conflicts have been
characterized in this paper indicates the potential for further research to
address the factors that lead to the outbreak of conflict (including regime
type, economic growth, natural resources, religion, ethnicity, and more) using
methods, tools, and methodologies of deductive statistics.

Mora
Deitch is a Neubauer research associate at INSS and a Ph.D. candidate in the
Political Science Department at Bar-Ilan University.

Dr. Carmit Valensi is
a research fellow and manager of the Syria research program at INSS.

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[1]The UCDP database
defines termination of conflict as a year in which there are fewer than 25
battle-related deaths.

[2]Salman (2014, p.
163) notes that according to one estimate, between 1945 and 1990, approximately
3.3 million people were killed in 25 international wars that included the
participation of 25 states, and in which mediation efforts to stop the
conflicts lasted on average three months. On the other hand, during the same
period some 16.2 million people were killed in 127 civil wars that took place
in 73 countries, and in which mediation efforts went on for six years on
average.

[3]See: Political
Instability Task Force dataset.

[4]The article does not
discuss the factors affecting conflict intensity, but only descriptive data.

[5]However, Balcels and
Kalyva (2014) determine that in the past decade there has been a trend showing
an increase in the number of military victories of the state, compared to
victories by rebels (the non-state party).

[6]For more, see Fortna
(2009), which examines why the date of change differs in both types of wars. In
the last decade there has been an upward trend in the number of state victories
compared to rebel; see Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014. However, Carroll (1969)
referred to international wars involving two or more countries, and claimed
that most of them end with peace agreements or ceasefire agreements. Civil
wars, wars of independence and imperial wars, on the other hand, for the most
part do not end with an agreement, but in other fashions.

[7]See also Licklider
(1995, p. 681) who supports his assumption, but only in wars based on identity.

[8]The unit of analysis
in the database is a “conflict year,” that is, one conflict containing several
units/rows of analysis in the database, as per the number of years the conflict
continued. The choice of this unit of analysis is necessary in order to obtain
numerical data by years.

[9]The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database is
available online at: http://ucdp.uu.se/#/.

[10]The coding is
conducted through the use of a “geographic region” variable that was coded by
the UCDP database as follows: (1) Europe; (2) the Middle East; (3) Asia; (4)
Africa; (5) North and South America.

[11]This variable was
coded by the dataset for conflicts that began in 1989 and up to 2018 only.

[12]For more see Kreutz
(2010, p. 244).

[13]This variable was
coded by the dataset for conflicts that began in 1946 and up until 2015, with
the dyad as the unit of analysis.

[14]In contrast to other
variables (scope of conflict, number of fatalities, and termination of
conflicts), for variables consisting of multiple categories (conflict types and
conflict intensity), two separate graphs were presented rather than one
comparative graph. However, a comparison was made and the choice was solely for
the sake of presentation.

[15]Until now, the unit
of analysis focused on two rivals only (for example, the Syrian conflict
includes Rival A, the government of Syria, while Rival B includes all the
organizations fighting against it). In this section, the analysis focuses on
the dyad level, which refers separately to the different organizations fighting
each country (for example: Syria-ISIS, Syria-al-Qaeda, etc.) in order to
characterize in the best possible way termination of conflicts.

[16]These figures chart
each year of the conflict years, in other words, the unit of analysis is each
and every year during which the conflict occurred, and not the conflict itself.
For example, the conflict between Israel and Hamas is counted by the duration
of years of combat. Years in which the sides reached a regulation or ceasefire
are included in the category of terminated conflicts (26 percent) .

[17]The only exception
was the Iran-Iraq War, which made the region the world’s most bloody area during
the 1980s.

[18] The conflict in
Yemen is different from the conflicts noted, as the involvement of the powers
(American and Russia) is limited. However, there is greater involvement of
regional actors.

[19]See Note 16.

[20]According to Deitch
(2016) some 50.6 percent of violent intrastate conflicts in the world terminate
with a settlement, as compared to 49.4 percent of conflicts that end with a
military victory.

[21]However, many of the
conflicts that terminated with a peace agreement broke out anew in later years,
but the dataset does not offer data on these conflicts. Furthermore, in the
Israel context, the Oslo Accord did lead to an end of the conflict (namely,
less than 25 deaths per year) and therefore was not coded in this category. In
addition, the conflict between Israel and Egypt terminated in 1974 and
therefore was not coded as termination as a result of a peace agreement (which
was signed later on, in 1979, when the conflict was no longer active).

[22]However, a global
increase in the number of fatalities in the late 1990s and from 2007 to 2009
does not charcterize the regional arena.