Strategic Assessment

In the midst of the second wave of the coronavirus crisis and following discussions on IDF involvement in the crisis management, a group of experts on the civil-military dimensions of the pandemic convened to discuss the implications and possible consequences of the IDF’s increasing involvement in the second wave of the crisis. The roundtable revolved around a number of fundamental questions, including the very importance of debating the issue; the potential effect of the IDF’s involvement on its social standing and on civil-military relations; the implications regarding the weakness of civil institutions; and the possible implications of expanding the military’s involvement for Israeli democracy. Participants were Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Elran, Prof. Stuart Cohen, Prof. Amichai Cohen, Prof. Yoram Peri, Dr. Carmit Padan, Dr. Asaf Malchi, and Dr. Idit Shafran Gittleman.

The Importance of Public Debate of the Issue

The participants were asked to explain why the public debate of the issue of military involvement in the coronavirus crisis is important, and what, in their understanding, is permitted and what is prohibited, taking into account the lessons learned from the IDF’s involvement in the first wave of the coronavirus crisis.

The participants pointed to the weakness of the civil system that “was exposed during the coronavirus crisis” (Elran) and the problematic, negative consequences that may result, due to the broad involvement of the IDF in a crisis that is civilian by nature.

Participants were united on the absence of concern of a military coup or the takeover of government institutions by the army. It is clear that this is not the issue under discussion. Rather, there seems to be a broad consensus regarding the very importance of the issue due to the special fabric of civil-military relations in Israel and the social status and influence of the IDF. The participants pointed to the weakness of the civil system that “was exposed during the coronavirus crisis” (Elran) and the problematic, negative consequences that may result, due to the broad involvement of the IDF in a crisis that is civilian by nature. Some participants pointed to a significant danger to Israeli democracy. For example, Meir Elran expressed concern about going “round and round, without getting to the point and without striking the iron while it’s hot.” The most significant question in his view is “to what extent the broadening involvement of the military in the coronavirus crisis threatens Israeli democracy.”

The weakness of the civilian system as opposed to the strength of the IDF when it comes to logistical, operational, and organizational capabilities enables the justification to the public of the use of the military. However by deploying the military the disparities in capabilities vis-à-vis the civilian system are perpetuated, as the civilian system is forced to lean on the capabilities of the military and does not develop an adequate response to its inherent and fundamental weaknesses. The success of the military in the first wave and the positive resonance this earned—primarily from the ultra-Orthodox and Arab populations, which are removed, if not alienated, from the military and from the military service experience—shaped the public attitude that sees the positive sides and the social benefit in deploying the military. However, this can establish a reality in which deploying the military for missions that are essentially civilian becomes the acceptable norm.

A legal dimension compounds the asymmetry between military and civilian capabilities, whose implications only intensify during an extreme crisis such as during the pandemic. To Amichai Cohen, Israeli law is relatively deficient when it comes to regulating military activities, when compared to the existing situation regarding the regulation of civil entities. The essence of the legislation is to limit the executive branch—the political echelon—vis-à-vis the executing entity. Legislation enables the executing entity to tell the political echelon, every time the latter exceeds the boundaries set by legislation: “'Excuse me, you have to operate in this way; that is what the legislative authority permits you’...True, we have relatively few written rules that dictate how the military is supposed to act or that define the limitations of its role, and what we do have is very opaque and open to interpretation. However, this dearth of regulation is not accidental.”

When it comes to military affairs, the legislative authority rarely limits the relationship between the executive echelon and the military.

When it comes to military affairs, the legislative authority rarely limits the relationship between the executive echelon and the military. This is not a situation that is unique to the State of Israel, and can be justified in operational contexts, as action that necessitates a minimum of political intervention allows the military to protect state security. A civilian context, however, is entirely different. Amichai Cohen explains: “When the power of politicians in the executive branch is limited by laws, naturally power moves to a place where it is less limited. As soon as politicians learn that it is possible to use the army in the absence of clear rules and a supervisory system, then naturally there is a fear that politicians will tend to use this channel.” This is a manifestation of sorts of the principle of connected vessels.

The political echelon’s preference for recourse to the military has implications for the ability to use the army, which is based on a mandatory conscription model, within a divided society. This also has budgetary implications, namely where funds are allocated, and more importantly, where funds are not allocated. It is more convenient for politicians to allocate funds to places where they enjoy relative control. Thus the concern is that if the political echelon learns that it is easier and more convenient to use the military to handle civil crises, “then why fund the healthcare system and its related items, where there is a lot of supervision, regulation, and laws, as well as oversight by the judiciary and the civil service commission” (Amichai Cohen). In the long run, overuse of the military will lead to the continued neglect of civilian systems. The fact that the well-funded Ministry of Health—which is not just another marginal government ministry—must use the military to install and run a technological data system constitutes no less than the bankruptcy of the public system, “which has been privatized and dissolved as part of a neo-liberal economic policy since the 1980s” (Malchi).

It is important to differentiate between the involvement of the military in the first wave and what we are now seeing in the second wave of the pandemic. Involvement during the first wave was successful and occurred with little or no friction between soldiers and civilians, when the army’s role was limited to provision of aid to the civilian population, and did not involve enforcing restrictions or a lockdown. At the height of the first wave, the authorities decided to set up an intelligence research center led by IDF intelligence officers. The center has grown since the first wave and has become a national intelligence center, charged with collecting, analyzing, and distributing information, including to the general public. Some of the analysis and recommendations from the center give the impression of criticism of the civilian echelon, and in practice the center has put the military, or at least army officers, in public conflict with the political echelon. With the expansion of the second wave, the operations of the intelligence center have broadened, and it has received license to access civilian bank accounts. Even if military officers have a reputation for responsibility and observance of rules pertaining to the use of the sensitive information, unlimited access to almost any information of this kind raises discomfort, to say the least.

The fear of friction between soldiers and civilians has increased, with the second lockdown more prolonged and problematic than the first, and marked by greater tension and levels of friction beyond the ultra-Orthodox and Arab sectors, for example with business owners protesting the closure of their businesses.

One of the most noteworthy insights raised during the roundtable concerned the degree of involvement of the IDF in the crisis. Participants agreed on the need to make use of the military’s logistical and operational capabilities. However, there was also agreement regarding restrictions that should be placed on the military’s involvement. “Yes, to assistance at various levels, no to overall or localized responsibility for managing the campaign” (Elran). Deploying soldiers, especially armed soldiers, alongside police officers at a civilian demonstration in front of the Knesset or in order to enforce a lockdown is problematic, and should be avoided at any price, due to the risk of friction between soldiers and civilians.

The fear of friction between soldiers and civilians has increased, with the second lockdown more prolonged and problematic than the first, and marked by greater tension and levels of friction beyond the ultra-Orthodox and Arab sectors, for example with business owners protesting the closure of their businesses (such as the violent clash between business owners and municipal inspectors and police on September 30, 2020). The temptation to broaden the IDF’s involvement in the second wave of the coronavirus crisis because of the threat to human life on the one hand, and the marked asymmetry between the IDF’s capabilities and the weakness and laxity of the civil system on the other, may prove to be a slippery slope that could endanger Israeli democracy.

The military leadership is determined to succeed in its mission and fully understands the price of failure to the social standing of the IDF, and the damage this could have on public trust in the military. Coinciding with the roundtable, Haaretz journalist Amos Harel published an article that stated that Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi’s term would be judged by the way the IDF handles the coronavirus crisis. Two days later the Yediot Ahronot magazine published a comprehensive investigative piece that severely criticized the performance of the Home Front Command and the IDF during the second wave of the coronavirus crisis.

Given that public trust is one of the most significant assets of the IDF as a people’s army, one can assume that in any event in which IDF commanders assess that the army will encounter difficulties in executing their mission, they are likely to request further powers and resources to improve the chances of success in executing their mission. Furthermore, the more the responsibility placed on the military grows, the more IDF commanders become stakeholders in the crisis management, and in the view of Asaf Malchi, inevitably, gain power and political influence in the broadest sense of the term. This situation can potentially spark tensions between the political and military echelons due to disagreement over the management of the crisis. Tensions may spill over into the wider system of civil-military relations in Israel and damage the standing of the military.

The more the IDF finds itself occupied with the coronavirus crisis, the more it will have to divert significant resources in that direction, and its ability to focus on military challenges will be reduced.

Alongside the efforts by the Minister of Defense to broaden the involvement of the IDF and the scope of aid it provides, and alongside the efforts of IDF commanders to succeed in their mission and to preserve the IDF’s standing, in light of the emerging failure of the Alon Command to break the coronavirus chain of infection, these issues clearly influence civil-military relations and military-political relations in Israel, and make the public debate on the issue most important. As a first step to lower the potential for conflict between soldiers and civilians, the possibility of reinforcing the Police with Border Police should be examined, as they are far more skilled than IDF soldiers in policing missions and constitute an inseparable part of the police force, and at the same time deploying IDF soldiers on aid missions for the civilian population.

Moreover, the more the IDF finds itself occupied with the coronavirus crisis, the more it will have to divert significant resources in that direction, and its ability to focus on military challenges will be reduced. Furthermore, the danger of soldiers being exposed to the virus will increase, leading to growth in the number of soldiers infected or having to quarantine.

In contrast to the broad agreement between the participants on the potential negative impact of military involvement in the crisis on Israeli democracy, and even endangering it, Stuart Cohen believes that IDF involvement in the coronavirus crisis should be the subject of a public debate for the same reasons that “everything the IDF does is a subject for public debate in the State of Israel. I do not see anything extraordinary at the theoretical level.” In his view, what is important in this instance is what is left opaque in terms of the scope of involvement and its nature. “Military involvement in coronavirus issues is not unique to Israel. There are a lot of militaries around the world that are involved.” The question that should be subject to public debate is what level of involvement there should be.

There is an obvious difference between logistical assistance provided by the military, which is certainly legitimate and necessary, and the military’s assumption of responsibility. The boundary must be the spillover to friction with the civilian population, which invites a new, problematic stage. In the view of Stuart Cohen that transition depends on several factors, primary among them the political echelon, even if the military is not passive. One should not expect the military echelon to refuse to carry out the orders of the political echelon, even in the event that it identifies a problem that could harm the standing of the army and public trust, although “the army can certainly drag its feet.”

The military is not eager to cross the threshold and be overly involved; the military has good cause to slow the pace and operate cautiously.

Stuart Cohen’s impression is that in view of the lessons of the first wave, the military is not eager to cross the threshold and be overly involved; the military has good cause to slow the pace and operate cautiously, for two main reasons: the first, the health risks to soldiers and the reduction in manpower available to the military’s fighting force. The second is connected to the reputation of the military as it views itself, and in the eyes of the public. What will happen if the military fails in its mission? In the current political reality, there will be no shortage of entities wishing to “inflate the failure so far as to even harm the IDF.” The IDF could “become a football on the political field.” Therefore, contrary to the opinion of Meir Elran, Cohen said, “I do not identify any danger of military rule, be it even temporary, as a result of the military’s involvement.”

A similar position was presented by Carmit Padan, who stressed that she does not fear a deterioration to military rule. In her estimation, such a situation will not arise in Israel in the current context. “The presence of the IDF in the public sphere, and all the more so of the Home Front Command, is perceived as positive by many sectors of the population.” It increases the confidence of civilians, in the sense of “we have someone to rely on amid the bedlam of the administrative failure of the political echelon and the helplessness of the civilian systems.” In her estimation, during the second wave, the trend is to deepen the IDF’s involvement in other crucial fields (the Alon Command, the Ella Unit for contact tracing, a field hospital). Sometimes it appears that the civilian population expects from political and professional echelons “to call in the IDF again in order to obstruct the ego wars between the various government ministries, the wars between the politicians...It is expected to take the reins and manage the campaign as a national savior.” The involvement in the first wave was extensive but cautious, primarily to avoid creating friction between soldiers and civilians. However, in context of Stuart Cohen’s emphasis on the two factors of the equation, consider the comment by the Deputy Chief of Staff back during the first wave: “As important as it is that we take responsibility, we, the IDF, cannot release the civilian bodies from their responsibilities.”

Boundaries between the Civilian and Military Spaces

To Amichai Cohen, the debate requires a re-examination of three basic concepts of boundaries, namely, concerning the limits of civil-military friction; military assistance vs. management; and the contract between the IDF and civil society. Existing assumptions regarding these boundaries are not sufficient, as it is difficult to draw clear boundaries and to determine where the boundaries lie. Thus, for example, with regard to the boundary between assistance and management, “Is the management of a quarantine hotel by the military, management or assistance?” Does the very fact of managing the quarantine hotel breach the boundary between the military and civilians? Events have a dynamic of their own. “Slowly but surely one progresses along the axis and every time the military is given more authority or is integrated into another event, the question is asked: Where do I lay the border?” (Amichai Cohen).

Although the military today does not fulfill civilian missions in the way it did in the founding years of the State of Israel, the phenomenon of the military’s functional expansion still exists.

This deliberation connects to a fundamental problem in the Israeli context, namely, the separation between the military and civilian spaces. In the view of Amichai Cohen, “this is connected to [Israel’s] history, of a military that is very involved in civilian life. We also talk of the IDF as the people’s army. Yet there is also the reserve army. These distinctions are difficult for us, and they expose problems in Israeli democracy.” The coronavirus crisis amplifies the existing lack of clarity with regard to the “essence of the social contract between the IDF and Israeli society; we do not really know and have not clarified for ourselves what the role of the IDF is.” Although the military today does not fulfill civilian missions in the way it did in the founding years of the State of Israel, the phenomenon of the military’s functional expansion still exists. Thus for example, it is difficult to speak in terms of friction limit with Israeli society in a reality in which the Home Front Command, which is part of the military, “is built entirely on the perception of concern for the civilian population while being engaged in intensive friction with it, via local authorities or directly, in times of crisis.” The coronavirus crisis has raised the importance of a formal debate on the role of the military in civilian life.

However, Amichai Cohen’s analysis, suggests Kobi Michael, leads to the conclusion that the history of the IDF’s functional expansion since its establishment has blurred the boundaries between the military and society and contributed to their penetrability, in the familiar typology of Robin Luckham and Moshe Lissak. Despite the changes over the years in the nature of this functional expansion, the coronavirus crisis represents a transformation of this phenomenon, which perpetuates the reality of blurred boundaries between society and the military.

The coronavirus is a civilian crisis just as home front needs in times of war and the fight against terror are civilian crises (Amichai Cohen). Therefore, the debate should focus on the nature and the types of civilian crises and how they are handled. We should ask ourselves as a society, “where do we want the military, and what roles should it have in civilian crises?” What is required in fact is a re-examination of the issues of boundaries between the military and civilian spheres and between the military and society.

In Asaf Malchi's opinion, almost all of what was discussed above can be examined through the prism of the IDF's involvement in the coronavirus crisis in the ultra-Orthodox community. This is a microcosm in which some of the phenomena diagnosed so far are reflected, for example, in the phenomenon of fragmentation of the IDF and the division of roles between the 98th Division and the Home Front Command, and the issue of boundaries between policing and enforcement roles and civilian assistance to the ultra-Orthodox population. The military itself has refrained from entering places where it is uncomfortable operating, places where it knows that it may lose the trust granted to it, especially when it comes to populations that from the outset are distant from or ambivalent toward the military. Indeed, the experience of the first wave shows that not only was trust in the military not harmed, but in fact increased, at least in the ultra-Orthodox sector.

In the second wave, politics have played a far more significant role. Therefore, once the ultra-Orthodox public does not want to accept dictates from the political echelon, it projects this refusal on the military as well. In such a situation, there is an increased risk of friction between the IDF and ultra-Orthodox civilians

In the second wave, politics have played a far more significant role. Therefore, once the ultra-Orthodox public does not want to accept dictates from the political echelon, it projects this refusal on the military as well. In such a situation, there is an increased risk of friction between the IDF and ultra-Orthodox civilians, and “it is not at all certain that the credit the military earned in the spring will stand in its favor come autumn. I am very concerned about this situation, which can translate into civil disobedience” (Malchi). Such a development can put the military in impossible situations and lead to the collapse of ultra-Orthodox local authorities that did not manage to handle the crisis during the first wave and will probably not manage to cope with the weight of the second wave, when the local population is already not cooperating with the army in the way it did in the first wave.

The Risk of Damage to the IDF’s Standing

As a result of the failure of the civilian system, will a situation arise that will lead the IDF to take on additional roles, even if it is not eager to do so? What consequences can this have?

The question concerns the criticism regarding the IDF's performance in breaking the chain of infection. According to Idit Shafran Gittleman, this raises a question about the price the army may pay for civilian failure. Will the IDF's lack of success in dealing with the pandemic lead to a crisis of confidence between society and the military, and between the political echelon and the military? Beyond that, what will be the impact on public morale?

Damage to public trust in the military could lead to mutual recriminations between the military echelon and the political echelon and to tensions between the IDF and society, something that could undermine Israeli national solidarity and cohesion.

Damage to public trust in the military could lead to mutual recriminations between the military echelon and the political echelon and to tensions between the IDF and society, something that could undermine Israeli national solidarity and cohesion. “I believe that we are marching toward a huge failure” (Shafran Gittleman). Even if the military provides explanations with regard to the difficulties in the operations of the Alon Command, “in this case the truth does not matter. What matters is how the public perceives reality.” Politicization of management of the crisis may evolve, dealing a severe blow to public trust if the public adopts the narrative that it is the army that is responsible for breaking the chain of infection.

The IDF cannot remain indifferent to such a development. Therefore, will the IDF’s fear of damage to its public standing, as a result of operations perceived as unsuccessful, lead the IDF to demand more powers in order to succeed? If so, what are the implications? In the view of Amichai Cohen, “It is difficult to see the IDF as one entity, especially as in an event that contains both a lot of money and a lot of powers there are different trends.” The IDF is indeed a hierarchical organization, “but even in a hierarchical organization there are different forces.” For some time, we have identified a phenomenon of an unraveling of the IDF’s unified hierarchical framework. “The danger is that the coronavirus crisis could intensify this unraveling, as there will be IDF units and specific persons that will have much to gain from involvement in a civilian crisis,” or much to lose. There are two possible dangers here. One is internal, inside the military, i.e., a possible process of internal fragmentation in the military. The second is politicization. These two dangers are intertwined and affect each other. Organizational fragmentation may lead to and strengthen the politicization of the organization, and vice versa. The more there are differing positions within the military regarding its involvement in the crisis, the more the danger increases of politicians being involved. These processes may damage the organizational cohesion of the military and its operational capabilities.

Extreme events always provide the opportunity to examine the performance of the civil system and the relationship between the military echelon and the civil and political echelons, and focus on the relationship between the military and society.”

Carmit Padan added another element in her reference to fragmentation within the ranks of the military and to a possible crisis of trust between the tactical levels and the more senior levels, a crisis that could threaten the sense of cohesion within the military. She points to the potential for a crisis of trust between the ranks as a result of failure in civilian missions, with soldiers feeling that they are not receiving sufficient support. In her opinion, “The IDF is a creation of Israeli society, and since it ‘dwells among its people,’ it is familiar with the tendency and the ease with which decision makers, the professional echelons, or even politicians make the IDF their punching bag.” However, we are nonetheless witness to a growing trend of deepening involvement by the IDF in the second wave of the coronavirus crisis.

The pandemic is an extreme event that puts social resilience to the test. “In the second wave the IDF has entered the heart of the civilian system in order to assist in the fight against the coronavirus. Extreme events always provide the opportunity to examine the performance of the civil system and the relationship between the military echelon and the civil and political echelons, and focus on the relationship between the military and society.” This is how Israel finds itself in a crisis reality that requires societal and national introspection. Even though the status of the IDF is not yet threatened, at least not at this point in time—in fact the opposite is true—we must be careful to avoid a situation where the civilian systems “lose their grip on this battle and its management, and sling mud at the IDF” (Padan). In any event, Carmit Padan claims that extreme events “should be seen as an opportunity to pause and reflect on the performance of civil systems in general, and on the relationship between civilian systems and the military. The use of the army must not lead to neglect of civilian systems—the opposite is true.”

Impact of IDF Involvement on its Relations with the Political Echelon

What effect does the IDF’s involvement in the crisis have on military-political relations? The issue is of increasing importance given the situation in which the military understands the failure of the political echelon, and in order to carry out its role successfully perhaps will not be able to avoid addressing the situation, reflecting this failure in one way or another, even if behind closed doors in the Cabinet. How will this in turn affect relations between the ranks at the level of trust between them? Will it remain only at the level of the coronavirus crisis, or will it impact on other areas as well?

“We are in fact at a crisis point that has been a feature of Israeli society for many years, and in particular in recent years. We are talking about a deep conflict between the politicians and the professionals.”

Yoram Peri believes, “We are in a battle, and the first question is how we should handle that battle. If a proposal were raised suggesting that the best way would be to give all the resources to the army, I would agree. We will have to examine the consequences later.” What is important is to emphasize the wider context. We are not talking here only about the issue of the military versus the civilian system. “We are in fact at a crisis point that has been a feature of Israeli society for many years, and in particular in recent years. We are talking about a deep conflict between the politicians and the professionals.” The conflict expresses itself in all systems: legal, diplomatic, academic, and others. Because Israeli society is “hyper-politicized,” the professional echelons should be prioritized over political echelons that are devoid of any professional approach.

The same is true in the context of dealing with the pandemic, where “each debate over a partial lockdown or a full lockdown is a political debate.” Thus, in the conflict between the professionals, in this case military officers, and the politicians, “I will fully support strengthening the standing of the military. I would give them greater weight in setting policy, and I would follow them. When the crisis is over, we can settle accounts as to who succeeded and who didn’t, and why.” It is clear that there are disadvantages to the military receiving more power than it ought to have. By its involvement in the handling of the pandemic it weakens civil society. If the IDF succeeds, this will weaken the cultivation of civilian leadership routes to the political peak. “We will continue to look for generals to go into government” (Peri).

Meir Elran clarifies that in the encounter between the political and military echelons it is important to address two basic facts. First, the military is not a monolithic entity; there are various groups and interests. Second, there are three levels that should be addressed in this debate. One is the current Defense Minister who has placed his hopes on the successful management of the coronavirus crisis and wishes to use the IDF for this purpose, and in this sense is a full participant in the political game. The second level is the Chief of Staff, and the third level is the Home Front Command. “The Home Front Command is not at the forefront of the IDF. It is not an important element within the IDF; it is not treated as significant and the Home Front Command’s commanders come and go with their sights set on their next position.” Therefore, the current challenge faced by the IDF and the Home Front Command is completely different from what we have seen in the past.

The lockdown may be far longer and the means of enforcement far tougher, something that would lead to complex dilemmas for the military and expose it to much harsher criticism. This would affect its relations with the political echelon and Israeli society.

The military will find it difficult to fulfill the Defense Minister’s demands to broaden its involvement in the crisis, primarily “as the civilian systems have really gone bankrupt” (Elran). However, greater involvement of the military in the second wave presents a danger greater than that we saw in the first wave. The lockdown may be far longer and the means of enforcement far tougher, something that would lead to complex dilemmas for the military and expose it to much harsher criticism. This would affect its relations with the political echelon and Israeli society.

This penetrability together with the securitization of the discourse could lead to the entrenchment of a reality whereby civil crises in Israel are managed by the military. This is a serious challenge to Israeli society.

“Between the position that there is no danger of a slippery slope and the fear of harm to Israel’s democracy there is a continuum of possibilities, and this continuum presents intellectual and institutional challenges” (Michael). He claims that what characterizes the present reality is securitization of the discourse—the tendency to conceive of the civilian crisis in security terms. This is neither insignificant nor coincidental. It is aimed at shaping perceptions and providing an infrastructure of legitimization for more significant use of radical means and broader deployment of the military, and expansion of its powers.

Kobi Michael argues that even if the military commanders are not motivated to take military control of the event, the public should be concerned about the weakness of the civilian systems versus the capabilities of the military, the motivation of the military echelon to succeed, and its growing involvement. This disparity may lead to greater perforation of the boundaries between the civilian and military spaces. This penetrability together with the securitization of the discourse could lead to the entrenchment of a reality whereby civil crises in Israel are managed by the military. This is a serious challenge to Israeli society.

Regarding the securitization of the discourse, Yoram Peri stresses that the phenomenon is a tool created by politicians through the political echelon’s control of the means of cultural production, such as the media. Thus, the root of the problem is not in the military, but rather in the wider context of the ground rules of Israeli democracy. Therefore, “what needs to be done is not to reshape the ground rules of the relationship between the military and society, but to reshape the ground rules of Israeli democracy. The fundamental definition of Israeli democracy must be reconceived—what is permissible and what is prohibited in the framework of Israeli democracy.” In Israel today, there is an evident weakness in civilian oversight regarding the management of crises via the military. “I do not think that this is a positive situation, but I am not concerned that the military will take upon itself more powers and intervene more in setting policy” (Peri).

Idit Shafran Gittleman observes that the Home Front Command is currently under fire. She argues that the military has an ego, and as soon as criticism of its performance during the pandemic emerges a situation will be created wherein it “will be forced to express a position that is either political or perceived as political.” In her opinion there is no concern that the military will take over the country, but there is a concern that it will take on broad powers. In conversations with military sources, she has heard statements such as, “True, we will ask for more powers, what’s wrong with that?” In her understanding, this is an expression of the fact that elements in the military do not understand the essence of the campaign that it finds itself in.

Asaf Malchi proposes that we look at the operations arena at the municipal level, where mutual relations between the military and local authorities point to potential for “positive shockwaves.” In his understanding, events in this arena provide an interesting and different angle from the perspective of mutual relations, division of roles, and the interface between the political and military echelons. In turn, Kobi Michael wonders if it is possible that the connection between the military and the municipal level can be interpreted as a challenge by the political echelon, a kind of defiance and expression of the military’s lack of trust in it, and intensify the failure of the political echelon in the eyes of the public.

Asaf Malchi believes that this is a possible development in the face of “the failure of the political echelon and the professional-bureaucratic system in the Ministry of Health and other ministries.” However, he asserts, it is the local authorities that are on the front lines, and they are required to provide an immediate response for residents and civilians. The events that occurred in April 2020 in Bnei Brak illustrated the quality of the integration of forces and the coordination between the military, via the Home Front Command, and the local authorities: “It is true that the political echelon is weakened or placed in a negative light, but the move, at least in the first wave, led to a strengthening of trust in the military among various populations.”

We are facing a need to reshape the unwritten contract between the IDF and Israeli society.”

Conclusion and Principal Insights

“Following the discussion, I am definitely beginning to reconsider the position I presented at the outset,” said Stuart Cohen, suggesting a new way of thinking. “This rethinking is expressed in the fact that due to the crisis and the acute nature of the second wave, we are facing a need to reshape the unwritten contract between the IDF and Israeli society.” The difficulty in drafting an updated contract is that both the military and society are highly pragmatic. There is a need for new and tighter connections between groups in Israeli society and groups within the military—referring to Peri’s partnership model (1983), except that Peri’s partnership model dealt with a partnership between politicians and military officers, while Cohen suggests a model of partnership between civilian groups and groups in the military..

Stuart Cohen summarized by saying that “all of us, including the Arab minority within us, will need to reshape the relationship between the military and society. Thus the debate that began with the management of the coronavirus crisis and a question on the extent of IDF involvement opened a window to a much larger and more crucial story, and I thank the forum for pushing me to think in these terms.”

Principal Insights

a. The coronavirus crisis raises problems connected to the very nature of Israeli democracy, and this should be the focus of the debate, as all else is derived from it.

b. The coronavirus crisis reflects an ongoing fragile reality in all that is related to the phenomenon of the functional expansion of the military on the one hand, and the functional, institutional, and professional weakness of the civilian establishment on the other hand.

c. This crisis places the issue of the permeable boundaries between the civilian and military spheres clearly on the agenda, due to the asymmetry between the capabilities of the military establishment and those of the civilian establishment.

d. The coronavirus crisis and the broadening involvement of the military in the second wave may encourage processes of politicization of the military. This has the potential to overburden the relations between the political and military echelons and increase distrust between them, which could also affect the relations between the military and society.

e. A possible failure of the military to deal with the challenge presents potential for erosion in the public standing of the military, which would harm what is perceived by the military as a critical asset. This could lead the military, if it becomes a scapegoat, to take steps—either by demanding more authority and responsibility, or by defending itself by taking a critical position against the political echelon—that will intensify tensions in the military-society-political triangle in Israel.

f. Against the backdrop of the coronavirus, the weaknesses of Israeli society have been exposed and may challenge the norms between the military and Israeli society.

g. This debate has implications for many other areas such as budgets and allocations of resources, with the apparent preference for deepening the involvement of the IDF in the crisis liable to translate subsequently into budgetary preference for the defense establishment over the weakened civilian systems.

h. The volatile political sphere has had significant influence on the role of the IDF in the national sphere in the spirit of the “well-known statement of the 20th French poet Charles Péguy that everything begins in mysticism(ideology) and ends in politics” (Stuart Cohen).

i. The importance of this debate is not limited to the deployment of the IDF in the civilian sphere during the current crisis. It is relevant to the question of the capability of civilian and military systems to draw lessons and implement them—before the next crisis.

j. The weakness of civilian systems is a result of a longstanding policy that has undermined public systems in vital fields of health, education, and welfare. This is a central part of the failure of the public system in dealing with a multi-level crisis. The military, on the other hand, is still perceived as an institution that is capable of providing public services. If it succeeds, its standing as a state institution will grow. The problem is that overreliance on the military as a civil factor, without significant strengthening of public systems, will establish a norm and will severely damage the balance required by Israeli society and its ability to deal with crises. When society and the political echelon prefer to place their hopes in the military, the wider public interest is harmed in the long term.