Tamir Hayman

Does the security concept that took shape informally after October 7 reflect a fundamental change in the identity of the state?

A comparative analysis of Israel’s situation on the eve of October 7 and after three years of war – what has changed in its national strength, conflict arenas, and the national security balance.

How can the Board of Peace plan for the future of the Gaza Strip be implemented in a way that does not jeopardize Israel’s security?

“Operation Roaring Lion,” the war against Iran and its proxies, has not yet reached its conclusion. Although the final outcome remains unclear and the current situation may soon shift, the campaign’s distinctive characteristics allow for an interim assessment. This is the most extensive war fought in the Middle East since the Second Gulf War, and the first in which Israel is fighting as an active partner in a coalition with the United States. While its global implications have yet to fully emerge, it is already clear that the war carries significant implications for the Gulf States, the global energy market, Israel’s international standing, and great-power competition.

Although we are currently in the midst of a war and do not yet know how it will end, the US negotiations initiative—which may bring the campaign to an end—requires a clear definition of Israel’s interest regarding the Iranian nuclear project. The conclusion of Operation Roaring Lion will place Israel and the international community before a new strategic reality vis-à-vis Iran. The regime in Tehran, if it survives the war, may—after experiencing systemic trauma and damage to its senior leadership—adopt a national security doctrine that relies on nuclear weapons as its sole existential deterrent capability. Under these circumstances, it is essential to ensure that Iran retains no nuclear capability that could serve as a foundation for a military nuclear program. This paper argues that previous models of “risk management” (such as the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are no longer relevant. Therefore, Israel must insist on the complete dismantling of Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure and relevant technological capabilities as a necessary condition for ending the war, whether by diplomatic or military means.

In the reality of the zero-sum game between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), a strong Hamas and a strong PA cannot coexist. The weakness of the PA alongside a strengthened Hamas, compounded by the erosion of deterrence against Hezbollah and Iran and the increased likelihood of a multi-front conflict, poses a strategic dilemma for Israel. Israel must define its strategic goal vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena, and consider whether there is any value to a formative military move against Hamas that is not part of a broader political plan. Weakened military capabilities would significantly reduce the challenge Hamas poses to the PA that accelerates its weakening, and remove an obstacle to effective moves to strengthen the PA. A weakened Hamas would also loosen the Gordian knot between the various arenas that Hamas seeks to tighten, and presumably also strengthen Israeli deterrence in the region. Under the existing political conditions, the current Israeli government is unlikely to agree on the need to strengthen the PA, or at least stop weakening it. Therefore, the government does not face a strategic dilemma on taking proactive steps to strengthen the PA, even though the PA’s weakness harms Israeli interests: a move of this magnitude can only be led by a national unity government with broad public backing. At the same time, the status of the Palestinian Authority is so shaky and problematic that it is doubtful it can be restored under the existing conditions.