Policy Papers
Between a Nuclear Arrangement and Military Strike in Iran—Toward a Decision
The talks that began in April 2025 between Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff—with Oman’s mediation—are bringing Iran, the United States, and Israel closer to critical moments regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear program. The results of the negotiations will largely determine whether the direction will be toward a political-diplomatic settlement on the nuclear issue or toward a military strike (Israeli, American, or joint) against Iran’s nuclear facilities. At this stage, it is clear that both the Iranian leadership, headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the American administration, led by President Donald Trump, prefer a diplomatic solution over military confrontation, the outcomes and consequences of which are difficult to foresee.
However, in the absence of an agreement that blocks Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, and given a decision to resort to a military option, Israel must coordinate this with the United States—even if this does not guarantee active American participation in the strike. Coordination and cooperation with the United States are necessary for Israel to defend against an Iranian response, preserve achievements following the strike, and ensure American support in efforts to prevent the rehabilitation of Iran’s nuclear program—whether by kinetic military means, covert operations, or diplomatic measures.
In any case, it is essential to emphasize the need for a comprehensive campaign against Iran and not solely against its nuclear program. A joint American–Israeli strike could provide the optimal solution to the challenge, provided it is part of a broader campaign against the Islamic Republic and should be planned accordingly. At the end of such a campaign, a complementary diplomatic move must be led, ensuring the achievement of all strategic goals against Iran, including blocking its path to nuclear weapons, dismantling the pro-Iranian axis, and imposing limits on its missile project.
6 May, 2025
INSS Insight
Three Strategic Paths to Achieve the Objectives of the War—One Is Preferable
Occupying the Gaza Strip, imposing a siege, or establishing an alternative civil administration while Hamas remains underground: Which of these three is the most preferable (or least harmful) option for achieving the goals of the war in Gaza—and how can the inherent challenges be addressed?
6 April, 2025
INSS Insight
Unpredictable, Forceful, and Disruptive: The Trump Effect in the Middle East
What is the “Trumpism” strategy adopted by the new president in the White House, which is reflected, among other things, in the proposal to depopulate the Gaza Strip? How can its roots be explained, and what opportunities and challenges does it present for Israel?
5 March, 2025
Policy Papers
The State of Israel’s National Security: Doctrine and Policy Guidelines for 2025–2026
Contemporary Israel, probably more than ever before, requires a widely accepted national security doctrine—grounded in the values of Israel’s Declaration of Independence. Its overarching objectives are to ensure Israel’s security, prosperity, and Jewish-democratic character, with a firm Jewish majority and defensible, recognized borders
2 March, 2025
INSS Insight
Security Concerns of the Gaza Ceasefire and Hostage Release Agreement
What should concern the State of Israel regarding the cost of the ceasefire and hostage agreement?
21 January, 2025
Strategic Assessment
Israel and the Palestinian Dilemma: Strengthening the Palestinian Authority or Containing Hamas
In the reality of the zero-sum game between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), a strong Hamas and a strong PA cannot coexist. The weakness of the PA alongside a strengthened Hamas, compounded by the erosion of deterrence against Hezbollah and Iran and the increased likelihood of a multi-front conflict, poses a strategic dilemma for Israel. Israel must define its strategic goal vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena, and consider whether there is any value to a formative military move against Hamas that is not part of a broader political plan. Weakened military capabilities would significantly reduce the challenge Hamas poses to the PA that accelerates its weakening, and remove an obstacle to effective moves to strengthen the PA. A weakened Hamas would also loosen the Gordian knot between the various arenas that Hamas seeks to tighten, and presumably also strengthen Israeli deterrence in the region. Under the existing political conditions, the current Israeli government is unlikely to agree on the need to strengthen the PA, or at least stop weakening it. Therefore, the government does not face a strategic dilemma on taking proactive steps to strengthen the PA, even though the PA’s weakness harms Israeli interests: a move of this magnitude can only be led by a national unity government with broad public backing. At the same time, the status of the Palestinian Authority is so shaky and problematic that it is doubtful it can be restored under the existing conditions.