Ephraim Kam

While the Security Council ban on arms sales to the Islamic Republic will expire in a few days, Iran’s weapons stockpiles will not be filled overnight. Even without an embargo, Tehran will find it difficult to conclude significant arms deals due to its economic plight. But this does not mean Iran will not invest major efforts in the attempt to acquire high-quality weapons, or that Israel has no cause to worry

Iran is not expected to cede its consolidation in Syria, despite its economic difficulties and the danger of extensive popular protest related to the coronavirus pandemic. But it is possible that Iran will be forced to reduce its entrenchment activity in Syria, at least temporarily, mainly for economic reasons. Against this backdrop, the question arises: could Iran try to take advantage of Israel’s preoccupation with the coronavirus crisis to ignite a large scale conflict, especially through a strong response to Israeli air strikes against Iranian and Shiite targets in Syria and Iraq? The Iranian regime might hope that such a response could divert the Iranian public’s attention from the distress of the coronavirus crisis; make it clear to Israel that Iran will no longer stay silent in the face of the Israeli attacks; strengthen its standing in Syria and Iraq; and present as part of the retaliation for the killing of Qasem Soleimani. But the likelihood of this scenario is limited: Iran has never responded strongly to the Israeli air strikes, and on a few occasions has settled for a modest, indecisive response. The reason for this is twofold: the Iranian air force cannot match the Israeli air force; and broad use against Israel of the large missile arsenals in Iran and those in the hands of Hezbollah could lead to a harsh Israeli response, perhaps even with American backing.

Against the backdrop of its military involvement in Syria, Iran has taken a series of steps since 2014 to reinforce its standing in Syria and Lebanon and enhance its military preparedness there, as well as that of its proxies – first and foremost Hezbollah. These steps are of two types. One consists of steps designed to influence Syria’s internal situation and bind it to Iran for the long term, including economic agreements on reconstruction, resettlement of Shiites in Syria, introduction of Iranian religious and cultural values into the country, and establishment of Syrian Shiite militias modeled on Hezbollah in Lebanon. These steps are of great importance to Israel because they entrench and empower Iran’s position close to Israel’s border. The second type is of even greater significance for Israel, because they are meant inter alia to amplify the direct Iranian threat against it. Steps include the construction of strategic axes, e.g., the improved land corridor through Iraq that connects Iran with Syria and Lebanon; the convergence of Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian railroad tracks that will link the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean; and the use of the Syrian seaport in Latakia, which will represent an Iranian foothold on the Mediterranean shore. Other steps of this type include the manufacture of high quality weapon systems for Hezbollah and their transfer to the organization. Any external entity trying to stop Iran’s penetration of the domestic Syrian arena will encounter great difficulty. At the same time, Iran has yet to find an effective response to Israel’s aerial attacks on Iranian and Shiite targets in Syria and Iraq aimed at blocking the construction of the land corridor. Nonetheless, Iran is liable to craft a response with enough deterrence to be of concern.

The Six Day War ended with a resounding military defeat for the Arab states. Indeed, in Israel’s War of Independence, the Arab armies failed in their efforts to stop the creation of the State of Israel, which at the end of the war held a larger area than it had been allotted by the UN Partition Plan. However, the Arab armies at that time were weak, and the lack of agreement among the Arab countries, which were ruled by the old regimes, prevented effective cooperation between them. In the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Egyptian army was defeated and the entire Sinai Peninsula fell to the IDF within four days. Yet in all fairness to the Egyptian army, it was forced to fight simultaneously against British and French forces that had penetrated into the northern Suez Canal. In contrast to these two conflicts, the Six Day War was a total military failure for the Arabs. Within six days, the three most powerful Arab armies were defeated; the IDF captured large expanses of territory from three Arab countries; and the State of Israel now possessed natural borders—the Suez Canal, the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights—while creating a threat to the strategic depth of the Arab countries. This time there were no justifications for defeat: The Egyptian army was a product of the Free Officers Movement; the Egyptian and Syrian armies were equipped with up-to-date Soviet weapons; and since 1964, there was a joint Arab command and initial cooperation between the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, with  an Egyptian commander in charge of the eastern front. Although in both1949  and 1956 Israel captured Egyptian territory, these areas were returned to Egypt within a few months. This time, it would take years (and the Yom Kippur War) until the Sinai Peninsula was returned, and until today the Golan Heights and the West Bank remain under Israeli control.

This collection contains essays analyzing the state of Iran’s nuclear program and the deterrent relationship between the United States and Iran since the nuclear agreement was presented; Iran’s relations with specific Middle East states; and dominant political and social issues within Iran, and their influence on Iran’s foreign policy. These trends and developments constitute a changing strategic environment for Iran, which necessarily affects Iran’s geopolitical stature.

The Iranian regime has assembled a large toolbox to deter military, economic, and political challenges and threats. The foundation of this deterrence system is a large arsenal of missiles built in Iran and in the possession of Shiite militias, most prominently, Hezbollah. The militias are designated for land warfare against Iran’s adversaries; Iran’s large naval array threatens shipping and oil exports in the Persian Gulf. Nuclear capability would compound Iran’s deterrence, even if Tehran is in no hurry to use it. Consequently, even Iran’s powerful adversaries, including the United States and Israel, avoid steps liable to lead to large-scale conflict. Nonetheless, there are weak points in Iran’s deterrence system. Realizing the superiority of the US military, the regime too is careful to avoid large-scale conflict. Iran has no solution for the heavy economic pressure leveled by the US or for the Israeli attacks on Iranian and Shiite targets in Syria. It recoils from using its missile system against the US and Israel, except on a limited scale. The killing of Qasem Soleimani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh demonstrate that Iran faces difficult deterrence challenges.