Strategic Assessment

Introduction

On July 17, 1973, less than three months before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan delivered a speech to senior members of the security establishment at the Habima Theater in Tel Aviv. He defined the speech as “a summary of our security situation and general thoughts about the future,” or in other words, “where do we stand on the political-security issue” (“Speech by Defense Minister,” 1973, p. 1). Fifty years after the Yom Kippur War, this broad speech can be seen as an effort by a senior minister in the government to explain, and perhaps also to justify, the government’s policy at that time. It is also possible that his remarks were influenced by the forthcoming elections, scheduled for October 1973.

Over the years the issue of the “preconception” in the Yom Kippur War has been widely discussed. The usual tendency was to stress its military dimension. The Egyptian leadership, it was claimed, was well aware of Israel’s military superiority and was afraid of a crushing defeat in the case of hostilities. Therefore, the likelihood of a belligerent initiative by Egypt was perceived as limited: “The governing assumption that convinced key Israeli military figures [was that] Egypt, unable to engage in the necessary deep penetration bombing of Israel, would not start a war it could not win,” writes David Makovsky (2023). According to the head of Military Intelligence, Eli Zeira, at the government meeting on April 24, 1973, Egypt was well aware of its inferior military status. Therefore, “in our estimation, the likelihood that Egypt will open fire in May is very small” (Government Meeting, 1973, p. 3).[1]

Significantly, notwithstanding Dayan’s position as Minister of Defense, the military aspect was not the focus of his remarks. In fact, he laid out the broader concept that characterized strategic thinking and was widely accepted by the political leadership of the time. He touched on international, historical, social, and even psychological aspects that were characteristic of Arab society in those days. To be sure, Dayan did not present a formal thesis to prove that the chances of war were slight. As if in an ordinary conversation, he presented his position and his assessment of the situation in the Arab world, namely, its weakness in the balance of power against Israel, and this is partly why his words are so significant. Most important, the clear conclusion presented by the speech is that the ideological basis of the “preconception” that led to the assessment of the “low likelihood” of the outbreak of war was far broader than the military aspect, and included the following main elements: the political situation within the Arab states, Arab society, superpower relations, and of course, Israel’s military strength. This article looks at the principal arguments used to establish this assessment. Most of them are expressed explicitly in Dayan’s speech, while others are implicit.

The Superpowers Reject the War Option

Moshe Dayan began his speech by referring to the relations between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and the ramifications this would have for the Middle East. He focused mainly on the summit meeting between US President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in San Clemente, California, on June 23, 1973. In Dayan’s opinion, the meeting was characterized by a constructive approach on both sides, which focused on the efforts to find what was common to them rather than what divided them. The trend was to engage less in ideological aspects and differences of opinion, and more on attempts to find compromises that would be acceptable to both and thus avoid belligerent conflicts between them. Both powers, Dayan argued, exhibited an “approach reflecting that [in spite of the differences between them] they did not want war” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 1). This was also the impression of German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who subsequently met with Prime Minister Golda Meir (Historic Visit, n.d.).

This approach, according to Dayan, was very comfortable for Israel. Under the existing circumstances, Israel certainly had no interest in fighting a war with Arab states. It was content with the status quo and wished to maintain it as long as possible. Ambassador Rabin gave a brief account of the favorable situation in the Middle East in the period that preceded the Yom Kippur War. Shortly after he returned from Israel in early February 1973, he told Kissinger: “Everything in the Middle East is fine” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973a).

War at such a time, any war, even one that would end in victory, “would arouse sleeping dogs” and lead the powers to take steps to change the status quo. Agreement between the powers that the differences would be resolved by peaceful means only was a strategic asset for Israel. It could rule out the war option that Arab states frequently threatened to use if their demands for the terms of any settlement were not met. This mindset, it should be stressed, did not demand any concessions of Israel.

Documents  at hand indeed show that the principal subject at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit was the issue of a settlement in the Middle East. At the start of the meeting, President Nixon told his counterpart that both powers must reach understandings that would enable them to exert pressure on the states close to them in the region to reach a settlement. The President stressed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a matter of highest urgency. The United States would pressure Israel and the Soviet Union would pressure the Arab states to implement the understandings achieved by the powers. In response, Brezhnev made it very clear that “we must put this warlike situation to an end,” and that he was “categorically opposed to the resumption of the war.” This statement reflected the fact that the Soviet Union strongly supported Egypt’s fundamental position at the time, which sought only an end to belligerency instead of a peace settlement, as Israel demanded (Memorandum for the President’s Files, 1973).

Dayan avoided discussion of the underlying question: how significantly might the Soviet Union influence Egypt’s position. At an IDF General Staff meeting on April 16, 1973, one of the participants, most likely the head on intelligence, gave a cautious assessment of the Soviet Union’s influence on Egypt: “The Russians are against war. They will certainly make this clear to Egypt.” However, he was not convinced that the Egyptians would be influenced by this position: “If the Egyptians decide to fight, they will do so even if the Russians tell them ‘no’…Political reliance on the Soviet Union and the political expectations pinned to it have also declined since July [1972, the month in which the Russian military advisors were expelled from Egypt].” He also estimated that the Soviet Union could give Egypt advice, but it appeared that Israel could not rely on the Soviet Union as the ultimate restraint with an active role to play in preventing Egypt from starting a war (General Staff Discussion, 1973).

Notwithstanding these reports, the dominant assessment in Israel seems to have been that the Soviet Union could, and would, restrain belligerent tendencies in Egypt. At the government meeting on April 24, 1973, intelligence chief Zeira stated unequivocally that “we know clearly that the Soviet Union is not interested in war in this region. On the contrary, it keeps explaining to the Arabs that war today would be a disaster, since such a war would not end in success. The general impression one gets from his long survey is the Egyptians are not in a position to ignore the Soviet interests at that period of time. As for the United States, it too is not interested in war, among other reasons because a war today would again present the US as part of the Israel-US camp against the Arabs” (Government Meeting, 1973, pp. 4-5).

A similar assessment was presented by Zeira at the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in May 1973. His assessments were apparently based on the assumption that Egypt’s almost complete dependence on the Soviet Union would make it very hard for it to adopt an independent policy opposed to that of the Russians: “At the time that Egypt's President Nasser died…a new phenomenon began to take shape in the international community: an effort to bring an end to the cold war, reflected mainly by intensive dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. It should be recalled that Egyptian policy until 1970-71 was based on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently,  since the age of dialogue [between the powers] began in 1971, the foundation of Egyptian policy for twenty years has, to a large extent, disappeared. And today, in 1972-73, the problem facing Egypt is how to invent, how to create a new policy [though they can no longer rely on the rift between the great powers]. That is the basis of their problem in foreign policy” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1973c, p. 2).

A similar view was expressed by Prime Minister Golda Meir to King Hussein at their meeting in May 1973: “The Soviet Union” she said to the King, “is moving in the direction of a peaceful settlement, and it will exert its influence in this direction on its allies in the region” (Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders, 1973). Previously, at the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meeting on February 25, 1973, Meir said: “From information reaching us, we can summarize and state almost with certainty that the Russians are not encouraging the Egyptians to go to war. They are not taking on the task of saying ‘no’ [don’t start a war]…but neither are they saying ‘yes’ [go to war]” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1973a, p. 7).

Returning to Dayan’s speech to the security personnel: his words imply that the main reason for this policy is the recognition by the great powers that an atmosphere of war has no benefit for them. It certainly does not contribute to the realization of their desires to focus on solving their own socioeconomic problems. Their concern, apparently, is that the Arab-Israeli conflict will spill over into hostilities of a warlike nature between the powers and thus halt, or at least delay, the trend toward rapprochement. According to Dayan, “They have a whole series of issues, of problems…such as the economic problem, raising the standard of living in the Soviet Union, the need for additional markets and improvement of the United States trade balance…They also have domestic problems…and these [lead them to work on reducing] the risk of war, on disarmament, or at least weapons restrictions.” In Dayan’s opinion, the statements that were given after the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting may lead to the conclusion that overall “the Arabs are justly disappointed, and we are rightly satisfied” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 1).

Matters concerning Israel, Dayan stated, were addressed according to a so-called “constructive approach.” The powers understood that “there is an unsolved problem here, [and that] there are differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States [about the way to solve them]. But these differences, they believe, should by no means, lead them to a war.  And as with many other topics, here too there is a need for [cooperative] handling from both sides…They will continue to engage in the subject [in the effort to achieve a settlement] but without saber rattling, and if possible not [by] increasing the tension, not in this part [of the Middle East] and not in the whole world” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 2).

The Foreign Ministry had a similar assessment of the situation; it stated that on June 26, 1973, Nixon and Brezhnev and their spokespersons had expressed open satisfaction with the outcomes of the Washington summit. They clearly implied that the understandings between them would have concrete effects on the efforts to achieve a settlement in the region. The leaders clarified that they were aware of the differences between them, but were determined to continue the process of rapprochement in the framework of detente, insisting that “this is an irreversible policy.” They also clarified that the summit led to a closer personal link between them and the meetings lasted up to 44 hours, including seven hours of meetings between the two leaders alone. It was agreed that President Nixon would be invited to visit the Soviet Union during 1974, while Brezhnev would be invited to the United States in 1975 (Foreign Ministry, 1973).

However, ultimately even Dayan understood that “the atmosphere of peace,” dialogue, and rapprochement could not completely ensure that war would not erupt in the Middle East. President Nixon’s statement that the issue of the Middle East was of the highest priority was not, as we shall see below, translated into United States readiness to pressure Israel to moderate its position on the matter of a settlement. Even Brezhnev’s “words of reconciliation” were not entirely honest, and were accompanied by conditions that the Israeli government was not prepared to accept. Dayan was therefore right to slightly lower the audience’s expectations of the meeting. He stated that in practical terms “we can say that [the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting] did not pour oil on the bonfire of war.” Dealing with the Middle East issue would continue, but it would be similar to the handling “of any economic-commercial issue…with meetings, discussions, and pressure, in an attempt to win over public opinion. Not with shooting” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 2).

The Israeli assessment of the situation chose to downplay Egypt’s determination to design a policy that suited its own interests, and to implement it even at the cost of conflict with the Soviet Union. The significance and consequences of the severe criticism of the Soviet Union expressed in Egypt for its policy to engage in dialogue with the United States were to a large degree pushed aside. At a Non-Aligned Movement conference (September 1973), Sadat warned the great powers against thinking that they could reach agreement between themselves without considering the interests and positions of the “smaller” states: “If the discourse now taking place is around agreement between the large blocs and about removing the danger of a global nuclear war,” said Sadat, “then it is clear that this understanding cannot be realized against the wishes of the non-aligned states or in spite of them. In fact, it will only be realized in harmony with their wishes and their efforts…The international agreement will not constitute a real peace and will not endure unless it grants all peoples political justice, economic justice, and social justice” (Sadat’s speech, 1973b, pp. 3-4).

Egyptian spokespersons stressed, with a barely disguised critical tone, that the Soviet Union had agreed to important concessions at the Arabs’ expense:

1. It undertook to reject the Arabs’ military option before they received anything in return.
2. It did not manage to halt, or at least limit, the massive US military support for Israel.
3. It agreed to avoid mentioning Security Council Resolution 242, which as the Egyptians saw it, required Israel to withdraw from the territories captured in the Six Day War.
4. There was no mention of the Soviet Union’s willingness to allow Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel, although it was well aware that this strengthened Israel.

The bottom line is that the Israeli leadership was aware of Egyptian criticisms of Soviet moves, but estimated that Egypt’s dependence on the Soviet Union was too great for Cairo to deviate far from the Soviet line (Foreign Ministry, 1973).

In a conversation with Prime Minister Meir on March 1, 1973, President Nixon made it clear to her that his dialogue with the Eastern bloc took the approach of “respect him and suspect him.” He cautioned her against the naive approach toward detente shown by “your friends,” some of the European leaders, whom he called “hopeless idealists.” “They see us meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Union and Communist China and think that the world has already changed,” said Nixon. “They are naive people who think that because of our dialogue with the Communists, we can reduce our security expenditure. We don’t think like that. We understand that contact with the Communists is essential to our interests. For example, thanks to it we have managed to end the Vietnam war. But we are realists.” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973b).[2]

The Prime Minister was forced to fall into line with the President. She said to him that she had told her “socialist friends in Europe,” and particularly German Chancellor Willy Brandt, that it was good he was seeking dialogue with the East (the Communist bloc) “but don’t be deceived by this policy.” This response did not satisfy the President. He was full of bitterness at the positions of European leaders during the Vietnam War: “Please tell your socialist friends in Europe,” he said to the Prime Minister, “that the new leadership developing in Europe has a naive approach regarding the weakening of the defensive power of the United States…They [the Russians] are realists, and we have to be realists as well” (Prime Minister’s conversation with the US President, 1973, p. 1).

The impression is that the Prime Minister was uncomfortable with the pressure applied on her by the President to identify with his position unequivocally with respect to the influential European socialist leaders who sympathized with Israel. She tried to bring the meeting to a conclusion: according to the minutes of the meeting, “She always says to her friends that when the Russians speak about coexistence they intend it to be coexistence according to their format…We all like idealists but not when they live in the clouds” (Prime Minister’s conversation, 1973, p. 2). The President was satisfied with this clarification and dropped the subject.

United States Support for Israel

One of Israel’s biggest sources of strength is its relationship with the United States. The close relations and the broad agreements between the two states naturally strengthened Israel’s deterrent image in the eyes of the Arab world, and particularly Egypt. Cloudy relations marked by numerous disagreements and controversies between Israel and the United States would most likely harm Israel’s image of strength. In his speech, Dayan appropriately devotes considerable space to this issue, given the active involvement of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Dayan stated that the United States had a critical interest in improving relations with the Arab world in general, and with Egypt in particular. In this context, he mentioned: considerations of “oil and money”; the desire to recruit Arab support for the US in international bodies, mainly the United Nations; and the fear of actions by Arab terror organizations against US interests worldwide. In his opinion, these and other considerations could lead the United States to look for “ways to create such a position with respect to the Arab states that would not be completely alienating. I don’t think it would mean they would sell us out for their Arab interests, but it might lead to the rise of tension between us and them from time to time” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 3).

Contrary to the attitude of the United States toward Israel and in spite of detente, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of full support for the Arab states. It gave full backing to the positions displayed by the Arab world in the Arab-Israeli conflict and supplied them with large quantities of weapons. There were widespread concerns in Israel that given the US desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab world, and in view of its efforts to promote a peace agreement, the United States would adopt positions that were uncomfortable for Israel. Dayan said that Israel must consider the possibility that the superpowers would reach agreement over an imposed solution. Until now, however, the meetings between the heads of the great powers “did not end with some kind of coercion; [they didn’t say]: ‘do this, do so and so on the Golan, do so and so in the West Bank, do so and so with the refugees, and do this with Egypt.’ Eventually, the approach that supported an imposed settlement was not adopted by the great powers. Instead we got a different approach that says that there are problems, and they must be solved” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 4).

Thus, the conclusion implied in Dayan’s speech is that the decision regarding the relationship between Israel and the Arab states rested to a large extent with the US administration. Back in April 1968 he stated that in military and economic terms Israel could continue under the existing status quo for an unlimited period. But in the end, he believed that the key to either changing the situation or leaving it unchanged was held by the United States. He believed that if the US accepted, directly or indirectly, Israel’s position that the status quo could continue as long as there was no peace between Israel and the Arabs, then this situation could carry on for many years (Telegram from the Embassy, 1973).

It is hard to understand what led Dayan to attribute such far-reaching ability to the United States, where it could force Israel to adopt positions contrary to its vital interests. Toward the end of the Yom Kippur War, in the severe disagreement with the administration regarding the Third Army, Dayan likewise displayed a submissive stance toward the US, based mainly on Israel's dependence upon the United States for the supply of arms it needed to continue the war: “If in the afternoon the government of Israel fires the shells it receives from the United States in the morning—the Americans can compel us to implement their demands…My assessment is that they will pressure us on this matter, and perhaps we will not be able to resist…The moment is coming [when we will understand] that the Americans are stronger than we are… They don’t say they will break off relations with us, but they say: manage without us, because you don’t want to give the Third Army food and water” (Meeting of Dayan, 1973). According to another source, on October 22, 1973, Dayan reported to the Prime Minister that Kissinger whispered in his ear that “if we started a war we would get nothing from the United States, not even a nail” (Yom Kippur War, 2023).

Moshe Dayan served in senior roles under several Prime Ministers: David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett (as Chief of Staff), Levi Eshkol, and Golda Meir (as a minister). He saw how the Israeli leadership operated according to US dictates and contrary to its own wishes (e.g., the retreat from Sinai after the Sinai Campaign), when it looked as if Israeli stubbornness might lead to a confrontation with the superpowers. At the same time, he saw many more cases where, contrary to the position of the United States on issues that it deemed vital, Israel refused to follow the administration’s dictates, for example: the declaration of the state; the move of the Knesset and ministry offices to Jerusalem; implementation of the retaliatory operations policy; the Sinai Campaign; activity on the nuclear option, IDF marches in Jerusalem; scuttling of the Rogers initiative. He could have assumed that Israel’s status in 1973 was much stronger than before the Six Day War, and that would allow her to stand up against unwelcome US policy initiatives.

Furthermore, the situation regarding Israel-United States relations, as reflected in Dayan’s speech, is very far from the situation that is clearly reflected in the many and varied available primary sources. These sources seem to indicate the existence of a deep, broad, and covert web of strategic understandings between Israel and the United States in the year prior to the Yom Kippur War including, in my estimation, the following main principles:

1. The willingness, in practice, of the Nixon administration to support the continuation of the status quo created after the Six Day War, as long as there was no change in Egypt’s position.
2. Agreement that there would be a form of political activity to give the international community the impression of a desire to promote a settlement. It was clarified that the activity would not reach a practical stage.
3. The United States undertook to supply Israel with the weapon systems it needed for its defense, without making the purchases conditional on Israel’s political positions.
4. The United States would do what it could to prevent any damage to Israel’s status in the international arena.
5. It is possible that the framework also included an undertaking by Israel to refrain from a preemptive strike on Egypt.[3]

It is not clear if this discrepancy derives from the fact that Dayan, like many other ministers in the government, was excluded from the relevant information on this issue, which was held mainly by the Prime Minister and her advisors. Another possibility is that Dayan chose not to reveal the information in a broad forum of Defense Ministry employees.

The Depressed Condition of the Arab World

The split in the Arab world: Dayan believed that the Arab world at that time was at one of the lowest points in its history, due to two causes: poor leadership and the deep rifts between Arab states. It is very possible that these two causes are linked: without high-quality leadership whom the masses trust and follow, there is a growing tendency for division. Dayan believed that the process of the deterioration of the Arab world began with the bloody events in Jordan in September 1970, dubbed “Black September,” in which King Hussein responded with extreme cruelty to the Palestinian terrorist organizations that threatened to topple his regime (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1970a).

“At the beginning of the conflict in Jordan between [King] Hussein and the terrorists,” said the Defense Minister, “there was nobody who could say to the terrorists and to Hussein—stop [the fighting]…Later this fighting led to a severe rift between Egypt and Jordan as a result of  the murder of Wasfi Tal [Prime Minister of Jordan, on November 28, 1971]. The Syrians tried to enter [invade] Jordan. Today, in July 1973, the eastern front that was supposed to unite Syria, Iraq, and Jordan no longer exists. The terrorist organizations are…in conflict with Jordan. ‘The united triangle’ of Qaddafi [ruler of Libya], Egypt, and Syria is also not running smoothly” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, pp. 4-5).

The ceasefire agreement: In Israel-Egypt relations, the most important event during that period of time was the ceasefire agreement of August 1970, which led to the end of the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal. In an assessment of the situation on May 18, 1973 to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the head of Military Intelligence,  Zeira, spoke of “Israel’s victory in the War of Attrition, a political and military victory” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1973c, p. 2). There was indeed justification for presenting the ceasefire at the canal as an expression of Israel’s victory. Israel's  basic position—that it would not retreat from the ceasefire lines without a change in its relations with Egypt—was effectively accepted. Egypt was forced to agree to the ceasefire without Israel committing to any withdrawal from the canal line.

But that was only a partial, and perhaps even over-simplified, presentation of the state of Israel-Egypt relations at that time. Israel came out of the War of Attrition injured and battered. The war exposed important weaknesses in its national resilience. It revealed the fact that Israel’s impressive victory in the Six Day War failed to create a solid dimension of deterrence against Egypt. Shooting at the canal began, at Egypt’s initiative, soon after the Six Day War. On October 23, 1967, only a few months after the war, Egypt risked starting another war when it sank the Israeli Navy’s destroyer Eilat, with about 50 IDF soldiers on board (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1967).

However, the biggest challenge to Israel’s deterrent capability came with the signing of the ceasefire in August 1970. Even before the ink on the agreement was dry, Egypt decided to move surface-to-air missiles close to the canal. This ran explicitly counter the ceasefire agreement in which the sides agreed to a standstill in their positions at the canal. At a meeting with a British diplomat, Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyad linked the movement of the missiles to the change of regime in Egypt following Nasser’s death. His argument was that moving the missiles was an army initiative, and the new regime led by Sadat could not clash with the army on this issue. Riyad claimed that under the circumstances, returning the missiles to their previous position would lead to a “revolt” by the Egyptian army. Whatever the case, the bottom line is that Egypt blatantly violated the ceasefire agreement, with the clear knowledge that this could lead to renewed fighting on the canal. Ultimately the missiles remained in their new location with no military response from Israel. Clearly these events reflected the weakness of Israel’s deterrent capability.[4]

In addition, the War of Attrition led the IDF to build a very expensive line of fortification along the canal. This obliged the IDF to change its longstanding modes of warfare—from fast, mobile fighting with maximum concentration of forces at the decisive point to static and passive fighting. This gave the Egyptian army many advantages over the IDF due to its structure and the firepower at its disposal. The war along the canal claimed many casualties and damage to IDF equipment. It clearly demonstrated the weaknesses of the IDF, and particularly its difficulty of dealing with anti-aircraft defense systems that were deployed along the canal with the assistance of Russian experts.

Furthermore, the war created wide cracks in Israeli society and its trust in the political and military leadership. The unwavering internal support for Israeli governments on matters of national security was based on the claim that Israel was a peace-loving country and would do everything it could to bring peace. This long enduring belief  suffered a serious blow after this war. Large portions of Israeli society, particularly on the left, claimed that the government led by Golda Meir had "fallen in love" with the occupied territories and wished to continue ruling them. They maintained that the government’s declarations of its readiness for territorial concessions in return for peace were just for show.

Other groups, supporters of the Meir government and people from the right, rejected these claims. Israel’s insistence on the continuation of its deployment along the lines created by the Six Day War was justified, they believed, both ethically and for security reasons: at a later discussion, following the Yom Kippur War, Knesset Member Yigal Horowitz said, “There were people who told us there was no value to territories  in modern warfare. However, this war showed us that fighting over square kilometers could be extremely uncompromising and bloody. This war proved the essential value of strategic depth, which led the IDF to refrain from a preemptive strike. To me  it seems logical that we did not start a preventive war” (Special Knesset Session, 1973).

Egypt’s leaders: Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser died in September 1970. Nasser was an admired leader in the Arab world as a whole and Egypt in particular, although iIn Dayan’s view, this admiration was not justified. The period of his rule was marked by numerous failures, including: the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, the effort to set up a federation with Syria, and more (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973). The conclusion implied by Dayan is that it was unreasonable for any government system in Egypt to ignore these ongoing failures. In Dayan's view these failures would most likely deter future Egyptian leaders from further military adventures.

Later Dayan referred to the link between the quality of leaders in the Arab world and the poor conditions within the Arab society: “The nature and quality of the people [leading the Arab world] is certainly significant from a strategic point of view. Sadat has not filled Nasser’s place; he is a very weak leader. He certainly lacks the  authority needed to be considered the leader of  the Arab world (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 5).

In his reference to Sadat’s feeble character, Dayan was almost certainly influenced by the widespread perception in the Intelligence community regarding the Egyptian President’s weakness. “Sadat’s status at that time was problematic,” writes Prof. Shimon Shamir. “His image was poor. He reached the presidency not as a result of his  strong position. On the contrary. It was because the ‘power centers’ within Egypt believed that due to his weakness  the real power would still rest with them, and they would be able to get rid of him easily whenever they wanted. When Sadat was crowned president, in the eyes of many Egyptians  he seemed to be  pathetic and derided. There were endless jokes about him…This negative image was widely held in Egypt, in the Arab world and beyond, and in Israel as well” (Shamir, 2013, p. 26).

At a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on October 8, 1970, the head of Intelligence Aharon Yariv described Sadat as “a colorless person, a weak person, and there are many jokes about him.” Against this background, Yariv stated firmly: “I think it would be justified to say that the death of Nasser is a benefit for us. Because Nasser was after all an expression of strength and symbolized Arab nationalism…[He] expressed the feeling in Arab hearts that the Arab people were a strong element in the world. There is no doubt that his death weakens Egypt, and Egypt is our enemy. His death also weakens the Arab world” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1970b, pp. 2-3).

A similar opinion of Sadat’s weakness was expressed by Zeira a few months before the war: “Egypt has internal problems that it is unable to solve. At the same time, the Egyptians  also have external problems that cannot be solved at present. In the past Nasser managed to whitewash [the hard feelings of many Egyptian citizens in view of the poor state] of Egyptian morale by proclaiming his ostensible victories within the international community. He managed to give Egypt the sense that in spite of its unresolved domestic problems…at least it was an important country in the world. (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1973c, pp. 2-3).

In a memorandum written for President Nixon in October 1970, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger stressed that Sadat was part of the first group of “free officers” headed by Naguib and Nasser who led the revolution in Egypt in the early 1950s. In December 1969 Nasser appointed him Vice President. His appointment as President had a dimension of legitimacy and continuity, which was essential to ensure Egypt’s political stability after Nasser’s death. Sadat lacked the charisma, authority, and reverence that characterized Nasser’s rule. He brought with him long years of loyalty to Nasser and acceptance by pro-Soviet circles and by the more moderate elements in Egyptian leadership. Presumably he was accepted by military circles, although he was not considered an authentic army person (Memorandum for the President, 1970).

On January 20, 1971, the Intelligence Branch gave a graphologist a sample of Anwar Sadat’s handwriting for an opinion of his personality. The graphologist wrote: “He has good intelligence, although fairly primitive…He has an open mind. He is not a spiritual person…he plays his cards as best he can. He has no political consistency or ideological philosophy. He is consistently practical…Intellectually, he lacks the necessary flexibility and adaptability; he functions mechanically…In spite of his stubbornness, he does not stick to his goals…He is quite rational, thinks carefully before taking action” (Character Analysis, 1971).

The state of Arab society: The general public in Egypt was also included in this “depressing” picture of the Arab world. Dayan’s speech gave a clear message: the Egyptian public was tired, frustrated, and perhaps desperate. “The Egyptians” he said, although on what basis is not clear, “are tired because so many [people in the leadership] have spoken, so many have been preoccupied [with the issues], so many have promised, and nothing happened.” [For that reason the Egyptian people] became apathetic [and] Behind all there’s no actual activity, dynamism, or energy” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 5).

Dayan went even further. In his opinion, this picture of apathy and helplessness robbed the Egyptians of the desire to invest efforts in changing the situation, whether by war or in any other way. They were fixed in their positions, and they had no real wish to change things: “This means,” said Dayan, “that the helplessness in Arab states [leads them] to barricade themselves behind intransigent formulas, because there is no effort to make war, to organize and do things…There is no intellectual effort to find a way out, to move things, to bang their head against the wall, [at least] in terms of thinking if not in terms of action” Ultimately, in Dayan's view, this mood of apathy and helplessness found expression in the fixed political positions of the Arab world: “Part of that almost fatalistic approach,” said Dayan, “can also be seen in the political approach of the Arabs (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, pp. 5-6).

These remarks reflect the fact that Dayan was apparently influenced by various academic studies of the severe division and helplessness characterizing Arab society that were prominent during those years. Maj. Gen. (res.) Yehoshafat Harkabi, who turned to academic research after retiring from the IDF, was known as a highly influential academic figure during that period of time. He claimed, for instance, that the exile of Arabs from the Land of Israel in 1948 occurred “because of the disintegration of Arab society…Arab society is atomized. Each family takes care of itself” (Ginossar & Shalom, 1995).

In an interview a few weeks after the Six Day War, Harkabi presented various statements about Arab society that, with the perspective of time, appear patently without foundation: Harkabi said that “war is a social action. The ability of a nation to fight depends, to a large degree, on the ability of its citizens to work together. The Egyptian nation is not an organism, but lots of individuals, operating as individuals, according to their personal interests, and not as a group, according to collectivist ideas. Therefore they are unable to fight an effective war …Nasser…was unable to mix the Egyptians into a nation” (Pundak, 1967).

“In Arab society,” said Harkabi, although it is not clear on what basis, “there is hardly any unity. Each individual works for himself, and feels alienated from the others…The Egyptians…are only capable of limited camaraderie.” Against this background, Harkabi cast the limited fighting ability of the Egyptian soldier: “In the IDF every soldier knows that [if he is wounded] his comrades will not leave him on the battlefield. The Egyptian soldier believes that his fellow soldiers will abandon him. The result is that an IDF unit responds to fire by uniting. The Egyptian unit responds by crumbling…Even if every Egyptian soldier was talented, the Egyptian army would remain ineffective. War demands group action” (Pundak, 1967).

In a speech before the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on February 18, 1969, Maj. Gen. Harkabi specified the sources of weakness in the Arab world that in his estimation led to the Arab defeat in the Six Day War: (a) the isolation and inability of the Arab individual to make a collective effort, i.e., the inability of Arab society to make a collective effort because of individual isolation. (b) The numerous lies in Arab society. No society can boast that it speaks only the truth, says Harkabi, but the number of lies in Arab societies by far exceeds the number in other societies. (c) In Arab societies moral corruption sets in from the start (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1969).

In Harkabi’s opinion, the Six Day War did not lead the Arab world to learn from its mistakes. On the contrary, there are signs that the process of disintegration has accelerated—at the social level and the national level. They are only halfway down the slope. There is an atmosphere of “spiritual depression” in the Arab world. “The gods have sunk.” Harkabi’s summary relates naturally to the enormous gaps between “us” and “them”: “Our society is full of vitality and resourcefulness, and facing a society that has doubts about itself…The gap between us and them is growing wider…They are unable to close this gap because of their hatred of the West…It is hard for them to digest Western culture” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1969, pp. 4-5).

Defense Minister Dayan’s conclusion was unambiguous. This situation does not rule out the possibility of exchanges of fire and battles along the canal as in the War of Attrition. However, it makes the possibility of total war very unlikely. And this is what Dayan said only three months before the eruption of the Yom Kippur on October 6, 1973: “We can’t say that the Arabs won’t open fire. On the contrary, we can say that in fact because [the situation is so dire] some   Egyptian military units might open fire on the canal. But a planned, total war of Arab states on all their fronts, that is something that is not on the horizon in the near future…If it does happen [a war will break out] , I’ll make another speech and explain why it happened. But that doesn’t seem likely” (Defense Minister’s speech 1973, p. 5).

These assessments ignored or at the very least attached little importance to explicit remarks by many people in Egypt in 1973, including President Sadat, about the approaching war with Israel. In a speech at Alexandria University on July 26, 1973, Sadat said that the defeat [in the Six Day War] was temporary, and in spite of the defeat, they should not surrender. The Arabs had known eighty years of Crusader conquest and ultimately were victorious. The current struggle will continue for several generations, maybe for 25-30 years. Egypt is growing stronger politically, economically, and militarily. “Our will now rests on real force, and we only have to use it in the appropriate circumstances and at the time of our choice…They expect us to give up…but we never will!…We will never give up our wish, however long it takes” (Sadat’s speech, 1973a, p. 97).

Dayan later developed a fairly interesting thesis. This too was presented as a statement that was beyond doubt, although it is not clear what it was based on: “For the Arabs in general, for the Arab leaders as individuals, as people, for the Arab leadership—it is much easier and more comfortable to be in a state of war with us [the existing situation] than to reach some kind of settlement with us…Generally when there is war, and it ends [the parties] want to reach some peaceful relations. [There are] some who are prepared to pay more for peace and others who are prepared to pay less Eliminating the situation of war and reaching a situation of peace, that’s a desirable thing that [many people] strive for within the international community. I don’t think that’s the case with the Arabs” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 6).

At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Dayan continued to develop this thesis: “The Arab world is not yet ready to see an Israeli ambassador in Cairo, and is not yet ready to see Israeli tourists in Cairo, in Beirut, or in other places. Even if they [the Israelis] do everything [agree to significant concessions]. The first thing [that is needed in order to promote a political settlement with the Arab world] is to prepare the hearts [in Arab society, to come to terms with the existence of normal relations between the Arab world and Israel]. [At this stage] it is not yet possible to reach such a formal situation  of open relations between Israel and Arab states” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1973b).

Dayan’s explanation for the Arab preference for continuing the state of war rather than reaching a peaceful settlement is quite amazing. As Dayan put it, the Arabs live according to a clear, unambiguous narrative, which says that the Zionist movement invaded their country and stole their land from them. They cannot accept this reality. Assuming that Israel will not agree to change the status quo, they choose to maintain the state of war and avoid contact with Israel, to avoid the dilemma of changing the status quo. If there is a peace agreement, according to Dayan the Arab leaders will be in disagreement on complex and difficult issues, such as the Palestinian issue: would Egypt insist that no peace treaty be signed with Israel before the Palestinian problem is resolved? Or the borders issue: would Egypt insist on a full withdrawal to the June 5, 1967 lines? This would require difficult decisions (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 6).

The Intelligence assessment of May 1973 showed a similar picture of rigid thinking, apathy, and passivity that was in effect leading the Arab world to prefer the status quo over any material change. In Zeira’s opinion this type of thinking suited the interests of Israel and the powers: “I think that the four partners in the region—Egypt, Israel, the Soviet Union, and the United States—are not interested in changing the current situation. Egypt is weak, and therefore not interested in meaningful negotiations, because it would start [participating] from an inferior position. So to sum up, in my opinion, in spite of all the disadvantages, the situation today is the most comfortable for it. It’s the least bad” (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 1973c, p. 7).

Balance of Military Power

Just before the end of his speech to security establishment employees, Dayan turned to the decisive issue of shaping the balance of power between Israel and its enemies—the balance of military forces. Dayan stated unambiguously: “At present we have an advantage [over our enemies].” He said that this advantage is not expressed in quantitative terms. On the contrary, in this area the enemy has an advantage of about three to one. However, the quality of our army and the lines where we are now give us an advantage. “If they start a war—they will be beaten and defeated” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, pp. 9-10).

However, focusing on the northern front, Dayan clarified that before being defeated, Syria could shell towns in the north and cause Israel heavy damage: “Until we finish conquering Syria,” he said, “they can fire 500 shells at Kiryat Shmona and Tiberias, causing a lot of damage and loss of life…In the end we will win.” In terms of equipment, Dayan said that “until the end of the 1970s we are in a good position. We will take steps to ensure that after that, in the 1980s, we’ll still have an advantage” (Speech by Defense Minister 1973, pp. 9-10). In fact, as we know, this statement did not stand the test of time. In the early days of the Yom Kippur War Israel already needed immediate supplies of arms from the United States.

Dayan expressed satisfaction with the quality of the IDF recruits. There was a time, he said, when we were concerned about the younger generation; now the situation is better. “With all due respect and my admiration for all the older generals,” said Dayan, “and really some of them are due all praise…but the younger generation are no less talented than they.” Dayan did not ignore the severe criticism sounded at various stages of the War of Attrition, of the security policy and the inflexible political attitudes that many felt made it harder to achieve a peace settlement with Egypt. Dayan did not attach much importance to this in connection with the motivation of soldiers. “Even if there are occasional expressions of criticism, even if there are different world views, perhaps also on matters of security, it appears that this is not [expressed] in the military ability [of the IDF soldiers], in their approach, and their dedication” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 10).

Apart from that, Dayan stressed that the IDF’s strength was focused on the Air Force and the Armored Corps. These forces are based, he said, “on limited, elite groups of people.” In these groups, the spirit of volunteering is stronger than in the past. Many of the pilots come from agricultural settlements, kibbutzim, and moshavim. The population of these places represents no more than 7 percent of the whole population, but their proportion among Air Force pilots is very high. “This public,” said Dayan, “provides the nucleus of this strength in our  Air Force” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, p. 10).

And finally, another important component of Israel’s strength, according to Dayan, lay in the ceasefire lines since the Six Day War, and the means made available for the IDF to defend its borders, which had cost a great deal of money. “And if battles take place—they don’t immediately affect the home front…it gives us confidence knowing that if they do open fire, they will lose the war. And they are more or less aware of this…It’s good that there is no war. But if there is a war, then we are prepared for it” (Speech by Defense Minister, 1973, pp. 11-12). A few months later it became clear that these words were not grounded in reality.

Conclusion

Two important points should be highlighted in this paper. The first concerns the “preconception” that led the decision makers in Israel during the period prior to the Yom Kippur War to conclude that the likelihood of war was very low. The main anchor of this concept was the assessment that as long as there was no dramatic change in the balance of military power between the two states, including regarding airpower, Egypt would not dare to embark on a war against Israel.

Moshe Dayan’s speech shows that there were many other layers that contributed to the concept, apart from the military aspect:

1. The closer relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the consensus over the policy of detente in the international system, built around agreement that disputes between states must be resolved by negotiations and not by military means
2. The Nixon administration’s support for Israel, both politically and militarily
3. The weakness of the Arab world and the deep rifts between Arab states
4. The weakness of Arab societies, which makes it hard for them to deal with the strength exhibited by Israel
5. The lack of authority and the weakness of President Sadat
6. Finally, the military balance of power which is clearly in Israel’s favor and ensures absolute defeat for Egypt if they start a war.

On October 6, 1973, around 2:00 in the afternoon, the Yom Kippur War broke out. In one stroke it destroyed the concept that was so deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of Israeli decision makers, which led them to adhere fanatically to the belief that the possibility of Egypt initiating a war against Israel was very unlikely. In the early hours of October 6, 1973 it was already clear to the decision makes in Israel that war would break out that day. The assessment was that war would start “in the evening.” In fact, as we know, it began a few hours earlier.

At the end of the war and following the deep distress that ensued, the Israel public demanded to know how the Israel  had suffered such terrible political and military failures, which in the view of many had posed an existential risk to the Jewish state. Under heavy public pressure, the government set up a national commission of inquiry headed by Supreme Court Justice Shimon Agranat. The Argranat Commission pondered the issue for many long months. They heard testimony from large numbers of people, and eventually submitted a report that surveyed the chain of events leading to the war, pointed to those “guilty of the failure” and wrote recommendations that were intended to prevent the future recurrence of such failures.

And now, with shocking coincidence, fifty years later, on October 7, 2023, the State of Israel found itself in a similar situation. Hamas initiated an action of war, again on a Jewish holiday, including seizing communities in the south, murdering civilians and soldiers, and taking hostages. Within a short time, Hezbollah joined in the campaign, if not with the same intensity, followed by the Houthis in Yemen. Once again, a preconception that was deeply rooted among Israeli decision makers was shattered. Again Israel was taken completely by surprise, and again forced to deal with harsh threats on more than one front. It appears, therefore, that there is no single piece of advice, insight, or formula that can ensure that the leadership will not adopt erroneous concepts that will also collapse when put to the test and once again threaten the existence of the State of Israel.

***

The author wishes to thank the interns who assisted him in the collection of sources for this essay: Amit Olami, Sharon Melamed, Ben Zion Borochowitz, Eva Burmak, Sharon Price, Almog Alon, Ilan de Haas, Yasmin Leshagri, and Yuval Raviv.

References

Character Analysis: President of Egypt. (1971, 28 January. Section 44 709/1. Files of Directors General M. Gazit, E. Eran—Egypt (vol. A), 271/4-A, p. 55, State Archives. https://tinyurl.com/5e748dzf [in Hebrew].

Commission of Inquiry (Agranat Commission). (1974, February 4). Witness: Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Meeting no. 76. https://tinyurl.com/swby8fwa [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1967, October 24). Protocol no. 88, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1969, February 18). Protocol no. 166, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1970a, September 20). Protocol no. 74, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1970b, October 8). Protocol no. 77, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1973a, February 25). Protocol no. 269, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1973b, March 27). Protocol no. 279, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (1973c, May 18). Protocol no. 287, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Foreign Ministry: Weekly Political Summary (1973, 27 June). The American-Soviet Summit in Washington. File 185/383/1975, IDF Archives.

General Staff discussion. (1973, 16 April), 34-341-mn, file 43-264/2016, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Ginossar, P., & Shalom, Z. (1995). Interview with Yehoshafat Harkabi, 14 January 1994. Studies on the Resurrection of Israel, 5, 1-20; see pp. 10-11. https://tinyurl.com/4jbfrj6r [in Hebrew].

Government Meeting 41/5733. (1973, April 24). State Archives, p. 3. https://tinyurl.com/4asc5v5p [in Hebrew].

Historic visit of German Chancellor Willy Brandt. (n.d.). Teudot 7-9, State Archives, https://tinyurl.com/ybhh8jb6 [in Hebrew].

Makovsky, D. (2023, October 26). The collapse of Israel’s Hamas "conceptzia." National Interest. https://tinyurl.com/4yvvwja2

Meeting of Dayan with newspaper editors. (1973, October 27). File of Interviews with Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, 7049/36-a, pp. 1, 5. State Archives.

Memorandum for the President: The UAR Presidency. (1970, October 12). The White House.

Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). (1973, May 25). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, p. 192. https://tinyurl.com/466cajje

Memorandum for the President's files by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). (1973, June 23). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973. https://tinyurl.com/3rh2xs5x

Memorandum of conversation. (1973a, February 5). The White House.

Memorandum of conversation. (1973b, March 1). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, p. 106. https://tinyurl.com/2dt5yb3f

Prime Minister’s conversation with the US President. (1973, March 1). File of Prime Minister’s discussions with the US President, 7055/9-a, pp. 30-40, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Pundak, N. (1967, August 18). Fantasy instead of reality: Conversation with General Yehoshafat Harkabi. Davar. https://tinyurl.com/y6at8t77 [in Hebrew].

Sadat’s speech at Alexandria University. (1973a, July 26). Research Department of the Foreign Ministry. File Sadat, vol. B., 8177/3-HZ, pp. 88-97, State Archives. https://tinyurl.com/rebw5cyj [in Hebrew].

Sadat’s speech at the Conference of Non-Aligned States. (1973b, September 6). Section 44, 375/9, Sadat File, vol. B, 8177/3-HZ, p. 70, State Archives. https://tinyurl.com/rebw5cyj [in Hebrew].

Shamir, S. (2013). The situation of Egypt before the crossing. In A. Melzer (Ed.), Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, 5734-1973: Forty years later. Conference Proceedings. Center for Intelligence Heritage. https://tinyurl.com/2rcfshhw [in Hebrew].

Special Knesset session: 462nd session of the 7th Knesset (1973, October 23). Knesset Proceedings, 42, p. 4521. https://tinyurl.com/mtneskps [in Hebrew].

Speech by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to security establishment staff section B. (1973, July 17). Mixed Miscellaneous File, 7068/15-a, State Archives [in Hebrew].

Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State. (1973, February 13). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, p. 47. Office of the Historians. https://tinyurl.com/5ezn9hx8

Yom Kippur War: Memories, scars, pains, and all the rest (2023, October 22). 22 October 1973: Before the ceasefire (that was breached), Kissinger arrives in Israel and meets the political leadership. Post by Moshe Shaverdi. Facebook. https://tinyurl.com/n6n2r67e [in Hebrew].

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[1] For the components of the concept, see also: Tsoref, H. (Ed.). (2016). Golda Meir—The Fourth Prime Minister: Selected documents and introductions to her life, 1898-1978. State Archives, pp. 506-508. https://tinyurl.com/5n7nxwsx [in Hebrew].

[2] On Golda Meir’s meetings with President Nixon see also: Vanetik, B., & Shalom, Z. (2012). The same lady in another guise: The meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and United States President Richard Nixon, March 1, 1973. Cathedra, 146, 143-172. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23408809 [in Hebrew].

[3] In this context, researcher Yigal Kipnis (2022) writes: “In return for American foot-dragging [on the issue of the political process] Israel was required to refrain from a preemptive strike and from escalating the tension, if Egypt created it by large-scale reserve callup. The avoidance by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan of a preemptive strike and summoning the reserves in the days prior to the war, an action which many mourned and were astonished by afterwards, was an expression of this secret commitment.” See 1973: The road to war. Kinneret Zmora Dvir, pp. 14-15 [in Hebrew].

[4] Tsoref, H., & Boimfeld, M. (2022). “The day will come when the archives are opened”: Golda Meir and the Yom Kippur War. Carmel, pp. 47-49 [in Hebrew].