Strategic Assessment

Keywords: US-Israel relations, national security, military aid, missile defense, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nuclear proliferation, public opinion, American Jewry, UN Human Rights Council, Iran nuclear deal

Introduction

Every study on American-Israel relations includes chapters on the importance of the cooperation between the two countries in national security. This cooperation is not unilateral. Each of the two countries contributes to the national security of the other, albeit in an asymmetric manner. The American contribution is much more significant and essential to Israel than Israel's contribution to the United States. This study discusses the prominent American contribution in a wide range of areas relevant to national security, including military and economic aid, supply of modern and advanced weapons, joint development of revolutionary weapons, intelligence sharing, thwarting of nuclear threats, resistance to lawfare, especially in international organizations, and mediation efforts to achieve Arab-Israeli peace.

The many American contributions to Israel's security are anchored in the "special relationship" that the two countries have developed since Israel's establishment. It rests on “hard elements,” such as strategic interests, and "soft elements,” such as values. After World War II, the United States became a superpower with global strategic interests, while those of Israel were limited and regional (Cohen, 2012). The Cold War fostered strategic American interests in Israel when the revolutionary Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria joined the Soviet bloc, while Israel aligned with the United States-led Western bloc. Israel's overwhelming victories in the Sinai Campaign (1956) and the Six Day War (1967) over the Arab allies of the Soviet Union granted it the standing of a regional power with military might, and significantly raised its strategic value in the eyes of American leaders. This interest decreased following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989, but within a decade other strategic interests developed in the face of a new global threat radical Islam.

The soft elements in the special relationship have included similar features in the history of the two nations: the Judeo-Christian roots of American society, nation-building through waves of immigration, the pioneering spirit that beat in the hearts of the founding fathers of both the United States and Israel, conquest of frontiers and wilderness.

On September 11, 2001, in the worst terrorist attack in American history, the Islamic terrorist organization al-Qaeda attacked and completely destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and damaged the Pentagon in Washington. For decades, Israel had been subject to Arab and Palestinian terrorism, and the September 11 attacks created a sense among politicians, officials, and the public that the United States and Israel are on the same front, facing similar enemies, and must use similar means to fight them. Al-Qaeda was joined by the Islamic State of the Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a powerful terrorist extremist organization that declared war on the West and succeeded in taking over extensive swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Since then, the joint strategic interest of the United States and Israel has developed into an ongoing struggle against Islamic terrorist organizations. Israel was very familiar with this type of violence and significantly aided the United States in the effort to defeat it.

The soft elements in the special relationship have included similar features in the history of the two nations: the Judeo-Christian roots of American society, nation-building through waves of immigration, the pioneering spirit that beat in the hearts of the founding fathers of both the United States and Israel, conquest of frontiers and wilderness, shared values such as liberal-democratic regimes, significant support of the Jewish community, which until a few years ago was the largest in the Jewish world, and supportive public opinion (Gilboa, 2009; 2020, forthcoming). This rare combination of hard and soft elements stands at the base of the special relationship. Israel's military might and strategic interests have changed over the years, while the soft elements have remained fairly constant.

Military Aid and Strategic Cooperation

American military aid to Israel was intended to help it deter and defeat any pan-Arab aggression. Initially the aid was very limited and mainly humanitarian, and only in 1962 did the United States begin providing defensive weapons to Israel Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. In 1964 the United States agreed to provide Israel with modern weapons, including fighter aircraft and tanks. There were significant increases in the amount of aid after the Yom Kippur War, in order to replenish the empty depots, and after the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt, in order to compensate for the loss of strategic depth and the transfer of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) bases from Sinai. Since then, the aid's amount and components have been determined according to the Qualitative Military Edge formula: on the one hand Israel is to be supplied and its defense industry is to be developed in a way that enables it to cope with any coalition of hostile armies; and on the other hand it enables the United States to sell less advanced weapons to its Arab allies (Freilich, 2017). This principle has appeared in several official documents and Congressional resolutions, and has enabled Israel to receive the most modern and high-quality weapons that the United States has, such as the F-35 fighter, where Israel was the first foreign country to receive it. The implementation of this principle over many years has been the direct result of the special relationship.

Table 1. American aid to Israel, 1946-2020

(in millions of US dollars, not adjusted for inflation)

Source: Sharp, 2019, p. 2.

Starting in 1990, the amount and components of the military aid have been delineated in memorandums of understanding (MOUs) signed between the Israeli government and the US administration for ten-year periods (Sharp, 2019). The idea was to set a basic ongoing format, without a need to have prolonged consultations and discussions each year. However, since foreign aid is also a budgetary issue, the approval of Congress is required each year, and it is entitled to increase or decrease the amount or change the components. Since 2011, the amount of annual aid has been $3 billion. The last MOU was signed between the Obama administration and the Israeli government on September 14, 2016, and it determined an overall framework of $38 billion for the decade between 2019 and 2028. Table 1 shows that of this sum, each year, $3.3 billion is designated for military aid, and half a billion for missile defense (Gaouette, 2018). In this MOU, Israel committed not to ask Congress for additional funding for other specific projects.

Most of the foreign aid is allocated to acquisition of weapons from American industries, and only a small portion of it can be spent in Israel. In the 2016 MOU, the sides agreed to gradually phase out the spending in Israel. It would be cut moderately until 2024 and afterwards considerably, before expiring completely in 2028. The cancellation of this clause has significant ramifications for Israel's defense industry, which has sometimes been in competition with the corresponding industries in the United States. The Obama administration did not eye this competition favorably, and thus decided to stop it. Israel will have to spend higher amounts on acquisitions in Israel out of its own resources, while creating partnerships and perhaps even mergers with American companies, in order to maintain the option of acquiring weapons with the aid money. There is also a moderating measure at its disposal: in February 1987, President Ronald Reagan granted Israel the status of major non-NATO ally, which enabled local defense industries to compete in tenders for supplying weapons and equipment to the US army. Thus, Israel's defense industries can become a subcontractor of the American defense industries (Gold, 1993).

The majority of the aid budget has been channeled toward fighter aircraft (Sharp, 2019). Israel signed an agreement to acquire 75 F-35I aircraft at an estimated cost of some $15 billion. The value of reciprocal purchases from Israeli defense industries as part of this agreement is estimated at $4 billion. Another significant expense, at $1.9 billion, is converting "dumb" munitions to "smart" munitions. Israel is considering acquiring helicopters that would replace the old Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters, and aerial refueling aircraft, at prices that are not yet known.

Over the past decade, Israel was heavily exposed to the threat of rockets and missiles, and the United States and Israel are full partners in developing multi-layer missile defense. This involves joint development and manufacturing and technology transfer. The missile defense systems include Iron Dome for short range, David's Sling for short and medium range, and three generations of Arrow missiles for long range high trajectory interception. Table 2 presents the American investments in developing and arming the different defense systems. The total investment has reached $5.6 billion: about half of this amount has been invested in the Arrow and the rest in the other systems. In accordance with the 2016 MOU, from 2019 on, Israel will receive half a billion dollars each year for missile defense purposes. The threat of the attack tunnels from Gaza and Lebanon led to further cooperation between the United States and Israel, with the aim of developing effective means of defense against them. The funding was provided for locating, mapping, and destroying the tunnels. From 2016 to 2019, the United States invested a total of $177.5 million in these measures, while the Israeli investment is estimated at $450 million (Sharp, 2019).

Table 2. Aid for developing and producing missile defense systems, 2006-2019

(in millions of dollars, not adjusted for inflation)

Source: Sharp, 2019, p. 19.

In addition to the resources allocated to develop and acquire weapons, the United States maintains depots with large amounts of equipment and munitions in Israel (WRSA1). These repositories are intended for emergency use by both the United States and Israel, but Israel must request special permission and provide explanations to use the equipment, which include missiles, precision-guided munitions, and vehicles. Their value is estimated at $1.8 billion, and they are subordinate to the US European Command (EUCOM). Israel requested and received permission to use precision munitions from the repositories during the Second Lebanon War (2006), and tank shells and illumination mortars during Operation Protective Edge (2014) in Gaza.

The two armies carry out exercises intended to strengthen their fitness and capabilities. The most important exercise has been held almost every two years since 2001 (Juniper Cobra), and it is aimed at training teams in defense against regional threats, mainly ballistic missiles (Gross, 2018). In October-November 2012, a three-week exercise took place to test cooperation with about 3,500 American soldiers and forces from the UK and Germany (Austere Challenge). In the February 2019 exercise (Juniper Falcon), 300 American soldiers and 400 Israeli soldiers participated in an exercise designed to increase the coordination between the armies, practice emergency guidelines and regulations, and deepen the familiarity between the forces. Since 1998, the United States and Israel, together with additional countries, have also carried out joint naval forces exercises for rescue missions and counterterrorism (Reliant Mermaid).

The United States was able to use foreign aid to pressure Israel in cases of disagreement. In early 1975, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin objected to several clauses proposed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in an interim agreement that he tried to advance between Israel and Egypt. In response, Kissinger announced a "reassessment" of US-Israel relations, which meant suspending discussion and approval of new Israeli requests for weapons (Quandt, 2001). The pressure worked, and the Rabin government conceded. The US Foreign Assistance Act states that American weapons can only be used for the purposes of defense while observing US law regarding the use of force. After the June 7, 1981 Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq, the Reagan administration delayed the delivery of F-16 fighters for a few weeks following an allegation that their use went beyond defensive purposes (Perlmutter, 1982).

Foreign aid is not popular among American voters. Many of them prefer that the money be spent in the United States on health, education, welfare, and the environment. However, of foreign assistance, the aid to Israel is generally the most well-received, and over the years has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress.

In January 2007, the State Department investigated claims that Israel illegally used cluster bombs in the Second Lebanon War, but the report that it conveyed to Congress was vague and did not lead to countermeasures (Migdalovitz, 2009). Another US law states that the United States will not provide aid to countries that violate human rights. In February 2016, Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont (sponsor of the Leahy Laws) and ten other members of Congress requested that the State Department investigate whether the military aid to Israel should be stopped due to the violation of human rights in targeted killings and "torture" of suspected terrorists (Toosi, 2016). The State Department investigated and announced that Israel had not used the weapons in a manner that deviates from what is acceptable by US law.

Foreign aid is not popular among American voters. Many of them prefer that the money be spent in the United States on health, education, welfare, and the environment. However, of foreign assistance, the aid to Israel is generally the most well-received, and over the years has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress. Critics of Israel occasionally lambast what in their opinion is excessive US aid granted to Israel, and the more hostile among them compare the aid to Israel with what they feel is too little aid given to the Palestinians. However, this commentary is demagogical, mistaken, and misleading. The comparison to the Palestinians is unfounded because the question is not just how much money is granted, but also how the resources are spent and what the United States receives in return. In comparison to the effective uses and significant return from Israel, some of the aid to the Palestinians is wasted on corruption and ostentatious measures, and the United States does not receive any return on its investments. Moreover, the Palestinian leadership sharply criticizes US policy, regularly votes against it in international organizations, and Pew Research Center surveys indicate that Palestinian public opinion is among the most hostile in the world to the United States (Pew, 2013).

Use of the term “aid” in the context of US-Israeli defense relations is misleading. The more accurate and appropriate term would be “investment" that provides enormous profit. First, most of the resources are invested in the American defense industries toward the acquisition of advanced weapons, and not in Israel. The United States receives ongoing critical intelligence from Israel of major value, combat experience that tests and improves the weapons, joint development of weapons that are among the most sophisticated in the world, original and innovative technologies, and proven combat doctrines. Over the past few decades, the cooperation has focused on low-intensity warfare and on the military and civilian threat to the home front. In these fields, the United States collaborates only with the IDF. Israel also works with the United States in the areas of cyber warfare and nuclear proliferation. A significant system of strategic coordination and consulting has developed between Israel and the United States, perhaps the closest of its kind. Delegations of officers and senior officials from both sides meet frequently and exchange information and ideas.

Indeed, the scope of the US aid to Israel should be compared to US expenditure on defending its allies in other places in the world (Kirchick, 2019; Organski, 1990). By virtue of bilateral defense agreements and defense alliances such as NATO, the United States maintains some 150,000 soldiers in various locations abroad, including some 50,000 in Japan, 30,000 in South Korea, and 40,000 in Germany. The annual expense of maintaining these forces ranges between $85 billion and $100 billion. Consequently, for example, the annual military aid to Japan costs some $27 billion, the aid to Germany some $21 billion, and to South Korea $15 billion. The defense of Europe costs some $36 billion. Added to these expenses are significant sums, usually annual, for joint maneuvers with allies, and regular and special operational activity such as naval patrols in the Gulf, the South China Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the North Sea. Furthermore, Israel has announced many times that it does not ask US soldiers fight for it; it only needs weapons to defend itself on its own. In this perspective, the value of the military aid to Israel is much greater and contributes more to US national security than it seems.

Thwarting Nuclear Threats

Israel's struggle against the threat of destruction by Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s and by Iran in recent decades has required a suitable response on two levels: building a deterrent nuclear infrastructure without being exposed to pressure from the United States and other countries to stop or disarm it, and thwarting attempts by enemy states to acquire nuclear weapons. The Holocaust and threats by Arab states to destroy the Jewish state led Israel to establish a nuclear infrastructure in the 1950s, and in 1960, France aided in the establishment of a nuclear research center in Dimona. President John F. Kennedy tried to prevent the Israeli nuclear program, and this was the main reason why he agreed to supply defensive weapons to the IDF for the first time. In return, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was willing to slow down the project, but not to cancel it. The Israeli effort to achieve nuclear capabilities contradicted the American goal of preventing nuclear proliferation. Israel formulated a position of ambiguity surrounding Dimona (Cohen, 2010), and stated that while it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, nor would it be the second (Feldman, 1997). Israel announced that it would be willing to discuss the demilitarization of the region from nuclear weapons only once comprehensive peace was achieved with neighbors, both near and far.

Memory of the Holocaust, the Arabs' threat of destruction, Israel's limited territory, the ambiguity, and the special relationship contributed to the US display of understanding and a tolerant exceptional position toward Israel's nuclear program. On September 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon agreed with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that the United States would not pressure Israel to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or open up the Dimona reactor to international supervision on the condition that Israel not publicly admit that it has nuclear weapons. American presidents have continued to respect this agreement. Following emphatic declarations by Obama against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Netanyahu feared that he would break the unwritten agreement, and raised the issue in their first meeting, held in May 2009 (Lake, 2009). The Obama administration supported making the Middle East a nuclear weapons-free zone, but in May 2015, during a conference of the NPT signatories, the US along with the UK and Canada, thwarted an Egyptian proposal to force Israel to expose Dimona (Ravid, 2015). The agreement with Nixon on this issue remains in effect.

Israel adopted a strategic doctrine whereby it would not permit enemy states to acquire nuclear weapons, especially those that have also threatened to destroy it (the Begin Doctrine). This doctrine has been tested twice. In the 1970s, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein decided to develop nuclear weapons, and to this end acquired two nuclear reactors from France that could produce plutonium. The construction of the first, Osirak, was completed in 1977. On August 21, 1980, Saddam threatened to "destroy Tel Aviv and burn Israel." The United States and Israel applied pressure on France to cancel or stop the project, but to no avail (Sadot, 2016). On June 7, 1981, Israeli military aircraft destroyed the reactor. The destruction of the facility was so extensive that it could not be restored. The attack on Osirak was one of the only times when the United States did not have prior warning (Bass, 2015). Israel paid a heavy price for surprising the United States in the Suez-Sinai Campaign (1956) and since then has made sure to inform American administrations about its major military plans.

The Reagan administration criticized the action in Iraq and suspended a shipment of F-16 aircraft to Israel. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said that "Begin has lost his mind" (Danon, 2012), and the UN and many states strongly condemned the operation. The US Congress also discussed the question of whether the use of American-made aircraft violated the foreign aid clause that limits the use of weapons to defensive purposes only. A relatively short time later, however, the supply of the aircraft was renewed, and Congress did not find cause to determine that the action had violated the aid laws. During the Second Gulf War, Vice President Dick Cheney sent a satellite photo of the bombed reactor to Israeli ambassador to the United States and commander of the Israeli Air Force at the time of the attack, Gen. David Ivry, on which he wrote: “with thanks and appreciation for the outstanding job…which made our job much easier in Operation Desert Storm” (Horovitz, 2008). The CIA also sent a similar letter to the Mossad.

In the 1990s, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad tried to acquire a nuclear reactor from Argentina and from Russia, but vigorous American diplomatic activity thwarted his plan. In 2006, the United States and Israel began to suspect that Syria was building a nuclear reactor in the area of Deir ez-Zur, near the Euphrates. The structure of the reactor was identical to the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, a type that only North Korea produces. Israel had precise intelligence information about the site, backed up by pictures and documents that the Mossad took from the computer of Ibrahim Othman, director of Syria's Atomic Energy Commission, as well as a tour on the ground by the IDF's elite reconnaissance unit (Makovsky, 2012). The information was presented to the intelligence agencies of the United States, reviewed by them. and found to be reliable. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asked the United States to bomb the reactor, but upon receiving a negative response, decided to carry out the strike. The George W. Bush administration knew about the plan and unofficially supported it (Bass, 2015; Katz, 2019). On September 6, 2007, Israel destroyed the reactor, but did not report the action or take responsibility for it. Syria behaved similarly, and did not retaliate. Israel admitted only ten years later that it had carried out the attack. The area of the reactor was later conquered by the Islamic State terrorist organization, and one can only imagine what would have happened had the reactor been active and producing nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. .

Iran's effort to acquire nuclear weapons has presented much tougher challenges. Since the Islamic Revolution (1979), Iran has defined the United States and Israel as its greatest enemies the "Great Satan" and the "Little Satan." Israel has defined Iran's conduct surrounding its borders and its nuclear program as the most severe military threat to its survival and wellbeing (David, 2012). US administrations have also defined Iranian nuclear bombs as a severe threat to the United States, its allies, and world peace, and have committed to take all measures at their disposal to stop it. The argument was not over objectives but over the most effective means of achieving them. A serious dispute arose between the Obama administration and the Israeli government regarding negotiations to reach a deal with Iran. Obama decided to negotiate a nuclear agreement together with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1).

Iran, a signatory to the NPT, has claimed many times that its nuclear facilities are intended for peaceful purposes only, that they meet the demands of the NPT and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons, and that such development even contradicts the tenets of Islam (Rezaei, 2017). But the reality is different. Iran's claim that its nuclear facilities are intended only for producing energy, research, and medical uses is false. Iran is one of the world's biggest exporters of oil, and there is no economic sense in building nuclear reactors for producing electricity. The nuclear infrastructure that Iran built was much larger than what is necessary for peaceful purposes, and it acquired equipment for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons from various countries. Iran also hid two facilities for enriching uranium, in Natanz and Fordow, and a reactor for producing plutonium in Arak.

The US intelligence agencies observed that considering the exposure of some of the secret facilities and skeptical IAEA reports, in 2003 Iran suspended its program to develop a nuclear bomb. Israel's intelligence data contradicted that conclusion. Later, it became clear that Iran did indeed continue to secretly develop the infrastructure necessary for producing nuclear weapons. Israel worked to stop or at least to slow the program using diverse methods, including the possible killing of Iranian nuclear scientists and cyberattacks (Katz & Hendel, 2012). In June 2010, it became known that Israel, in cooperation with the United States, had inserted the Stuxnet virus into Iran's nuclear infrastructure computing system.

Between 2010 and 2012, Israel threatened to use force against the Iranian nuclear facilities and made operational preparations for an attack. The threats influenced the willingness of the United States and the international community to stop Iran’s nuclear progress. Heavy sanctions, which were approved by the Security Council, led to Iran's willingness to engage in negotiations over its nuclear program (Hurst, 2018). The Obama administration led the negotiations along with the P5+1. The talks produced an agreement whereby in return for removing the sanctions, Iran committed to enrich uranium at a sub-military level that would not exceed 3.6 percent, dismantle its stockpile of enriched uranium, reduce the number of centrifuges that it holds by two thirds for at least 15 years, and enable closer supervision of its nuclear sites (Entessar & Afrasiabi, 2017).

A heated debate erupted in the United States and in Israel on the advantages and disadvantages of the agreement. Obama emphasized its advantages while Netanyahu emphasized its deficiencies. All agreed that continued sanctions were preferable to a bad agreement, but Obama argued that the agreement that they reached was better and the only alternative is war. Netanyahu said that the agreement is bad and would not succeed in stopping Iran. He also carried out an unusual action in defiance of Obama, when he accepted an invitation by the Republican Congressional leadership to present his opposition to the emerging deal, and on March 3, 2015 addressed both houses of Congress. A large portion of the Democratic representatives boycotted the speech, because they saw it as illegitimate criticism of Obama's policy. The Israeli campaign failed, and on July 14, 2015 in Vienna, the powers reached an agreement with Iran, officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or by its popular name, "the nuclear deal" (The Obama White House, 2015).

There are several prominent deficiencies in the JCPOA. It is limited to between ten and fifteen years, after which, without a new agreement, Iran can use its nuclear infrastructure without restrictions. The agreement ignored the development of missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, and Iran's direct and indirect military interventions and subversion in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Trump denounced the agreement, defined it as the worst deal in American history, and promised to cancel it and enter negotiations to rectify the deficiencies in the Obama agreement.

The Mossad does not usually reveal its work methods in enemy countries and its findings. In a rare exception, on April 30, 2018, Netanyahu exposed Iran's nuclear archive, which the Mossad had succeeded in bringing from Tehran. The material proved beyond a doubt that Iran had lied about the aims of its nuclear program, and that it had systematically prepared infrastructure for producing nuclear weapons. A few days later, on May 8, 2018, Trump announced the United States' withdrawal from the agreement and the imposition of severe sanctions on Iran (Entessar & Afrasiabi, 2019). Unlike Obama's strategy, which led to cooperation with Iran and recognition of its standing in the region and improved relations with the West, Trump adopted an opposite strategy of "maximum pressure," which, he argued, could lead to negotiations and to a new agreement. Israel and all the Sunni Arab states hailed these actions, but all the partners to the agreement denounced Trump and made an unsuccessful effort to help Iran bypass the sanctions. In response, Iran began to violate the agreement and to accelerate the enrichment of uranium beyond the deal's permitted level.

Confronting Lawfare

Lawfare is "the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve warfighting objectives" (Kittrie, 2016, p. 2). The Arabs and the Palestinians, in cooperation with countries in Western Europe and the developing world, have employed lawfare strategies to delegitimize and dehumanize Israel, primarily in international organizations (Gilboa, 2020). Israel is the state most discriminated against in international organizations, especially at the UN and its many agencies (Blum, 2016; Muravchik, 2013). Each year, the UN General Assembly adopts one-sided resolutions against Israel at an exceptionally high rate. From 2012 to 2019, the General Assembly adopted 202 resolutions that condemn countries, out of which 163 condemned Israel, accounting for 81 percent (UN Watch, 2019).

In comparison, in 2019 the General Assembly adopted 18 resolutions condemning Israel and one resolution on each of the following states: Syria, Iran, North Korea, the United States, and Myanmar. Often, in the face of massive voting in favor of the Palestinians, the side supporting Israel includes the United States and a few additional states such as Australia, Canada, or Micronesia. Votes at the General Assembly are not backed by enforcement capabilities; these exist only at the Security Council, which can impose sanctions, but there the United States has veto power. On 44 occasions the United States has vetoed especially extreme anti-Israel resolutions and resolutions condemning US policy, such as the one that condemned the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem.

Resolutions and actions of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) are highly relevant to Israel's security, inter alia because they deal with rules of war in conflict zones. The identities of the Council members, the discussion rules, and the resolutions indicate very little connection if any between the agency and human rights. The UNHRC systematically discriminates against Israel, indiscriminately adopts anti-Israeli resolutions, appoints biased and bizarre rapporteurs on the conflict, and establishes biased, unethical, and unprofessional committees of inquiry (Baker, 2019a). The discrimination is contained in the very agenda items of the Council's discussions item 7 which is designated only for Israel and another item for the whole world. This is a permanent item on the Council’s agenda, and the only one that is aimed at a single country. The United States and several European countries have strongly condemned this built-in discrimination and tried to cancel it, but have not succeeded.

The UNHRC was established in 2006 to replace the UN Human Rights Commission due to its being tainted by politics, and because many of its members were the world's most flagrant violators of human rights. Despite the name change, the current Council suffers from the same afflictions that characterized its predecessor. The General Assembly selects the 47 members of the Council according to a geographic formula for a period of three years. Its members have included Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Somalia, China, and Russia. All these are countries that violate human rights defined by the UN itself.

In 2006, when the UN decided to establish the Council, the George W. Bush administration proposed reforms in the structure and rules of the new body, in order to rectify the deficiencies of the Commission that preceded it. The reforms were rejected, and Bush found no reason to join this body. Obama decided differently and the United States joined, assuming that membership in the Council would enable changing the organization's conduct from the inside. Obama was mistaken, and the Council continued to suffer from the same biases and failings. The United States attempted to moderate the Council's aggressive and hostile activity toward Israel but failed. Obama, who believed in close cooperation with international organizations, did not draw the evident conclusions and kept the US in the Council.

The Trump administration also tried to change the composition of the Council and correct the severe defects in its conduct, but it too did not succeed. Trump's conclusion was that the organization is irredeemable, and unlike Obama, in June 2018 he decided to leave it, largely due to the Council's hostile and biased attitude toward Israel (Gilboa, 2018). The United States demanded that the Council cancel the discriminatory item 7, but the members rejected the request. The US Ambassador to the UN at the time, Nikki Haley, explained that for a long time she tried to change the Council's structure and activity but did not succeed. She attacked the practice of choosing countries that are severe violators of human rights, such as Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to serve on the Council, and the Council's ongoing refusal to condemn rights violations in member countries such as Iran and China. Haley and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attacked the Council's bias and prejudice toward Israel and the conflict with the Palestinians. The United States withdrawal harmed the Council’s credibility and reputation, thus helping Israel's campaign against it.

Since its establishment, more than half of the resolutions passed by the UNHRC have concerned Israel and the conflict with the Palestinians. For comparison, in March 2019 the Council, discussed 11 reports, of which 7 dealt with Israel, 2 with North Korea, 1 with Iran, and 1 with Syria i.e., 64 percent of the reports dealt with Israel (UN Watch, 2019). The Council adopted five resolutions against Israel and only one resolution against Iran. The majority of the Council's resolutions regarding Israel are one-sided and rely on biased, incorrect, and deliberately falsified evidence. The rapporteurs on Israel's conduct toward the Palestinians, appointed in part for their prejudice against Israel, frequently submit reports and opinions to the Council that are biased and not truthful. The greatest damage to Israel's security was caused by three ostensibly "independent" committees of inquiry that the Council established to investigate Israeli war crimes allegedly committed during military defensive operations against the aggression of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from Gaza. The bias is already contained in the definitions of the committees' mandate: investigation of Israel's "war crimes." Israel refused to cooperate with the committees due to their composition, the mandate they were given, and the Council's endemic hostile attitude.

The Goldstone Report, which was written about Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009) and submitted to the UNHRC in September 2009, accused Israel of a series of war crimes, including intentionally firing at and killing civilians (UN Human Rights Council, 2009). The report included only a few references to Hamas, but mostly targeted Israel. The United States and Israel castigated the biased and false report, but the Council approved it and its resolution was only against Israel. The report was sent to the General Assembly for approval and transfer for possible prosecution at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The General Assembly approved the request, but it stopped there, because in order to submit the lawsuits a Security Council resolution is needed, and it was clear that the United States would veto it.

The Obama administration criticized the report and ordered to vote against it at the Security Council meeting. The House of Representatives also passed a resolution with a majority of 344 to 36 stating that the report is irredeemably biased against Israel and is not legitimate, and demanded that Obama prevent its adoption at the Security Council. Obama indeed announced that he would veto any attempt to transfer the issue to the ICC, and thus at this stage Israel was saved from legal and reputation damages. Goldstone subsequently withdrew from some of the assertions of the committee that he headed, but in terms of the damage to Israel, his retraction was too little, too late (Goldstone, 2011).

The second UNHRC appointed committee of inquiry "investigated" Operation Protective Edge (July 8 to August 26, 2014). The report it submitted to the Council in June 2015 was also highly biased, unethical, unprofessional and mostly false. It too scarcely dealt with Hamas's responsibility for the violence and its own war crimes. The report accused Israel of war crimes, excessive use of force, and lack of effort to minimize damage to the civilian population. The report accused senior policymakers in Israel of ordering a policy of intentionally harming civilians. The Council, which approved the report, called for putting Israeli leaders on trial for war crimes according to the doctrine of "universal jurisdiction," whereby it is possible to put war criminals on trial in any country that has assumed such authority for itself. Again, the Obama administration castigated the committee of inquiry and the report's findings and conclusions (Lazaroff, 2015). The State Department announced that the report was tainted with attitudes hostile to Israel, and that the United States did not believe that it should be discussed or further acted upon at the UN (Staff, 2015). When a spokesperson for the department was asked if the United States would support transferring the report to the ICC, he said it would not. Here too the hint was clear: if the issue reaches the Security Council, the United States will veto it.

In 2018, Hamas initiated and organized violent attacks on Israel's border with Gaza with tens of thousands of people, as part of what it called the "Marches of Return" (March 2018 to December 2019). In May 2018, a proposal was submitted to the Security Council to establish a committee of inquiry about Israel's conduct vis-à-vis the marches. The United States prevented its approval and also foiled another proposed resolution initiated by the Palestinians and submitted by Kuwait, which called for stationing international forces in Gaza in order to "defend" the population. In the meantime, the UNHRC strongly condemned Israel's defensive actions and appointed yet another biased committee of inquiry to investigate what it called "Israel's excessive use of force against peaceful protesters." While this committee noted that Hamas had failed to prevent violent attacks against IDF soldiers who guarded the border between Israel and Gaza, like previous reports, the bulk of the criticism was of Israel. The committee accused Israel of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the United States again condemned the report and the UNHRC (Baker, 2019b).

All of the reports and discussions held at the Council on events in the Palestinian territories and Hamas's violence against Israel were biased and based on incorrect, slanted, and fabricated information. The reports absolved Hamas of responsibility for the violence, ignored the severe war crimes that it carried out, and primarily blamed Israel. The reports tried to limit Israel's right to self-defense. No country involved in an international conflict has ever been exposed to such baseless inquiries and reports as those that the UNHRC has conducted against Israel. The problem was that the Council's reports not only tarnished Israel's image; they were also intended from the beginning to produce a factual basis for putting Israeli leaders on trial at the ICC. At the Security Council, the United States indeed prevented the formal transfer of the UNHRC reports and resolutions to the Court, but the prosecutor at this institution has the authority in her own right to investigate and file a lawsuit against Israeli individuals, and she did so.

On December 20, 2019, Fatou Bensouda, the ICC's Chief Prosecutor, requested authorization from a pre-trial chamber of judges to begin an investigation of "war crimes" that Israel allegedly committed in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza (Gilboa, 2019). Like the UNHRC committees, she also referred to Hamas and "the other armed Palestinian organizations," but her clear intention was to focus mainly on Israel. This can be concluded from the Palestinians' enthusiasm from her actions. Bensouda's request relied on reports and resolutions of the UNHRC and other UN institutions regarding the conflict. The Prosecutor's decision constitutes a severe threat to Israel. Unlike other international judicial institutions, the ICC files lawsuits against people and not against states. If allowed, Bensouda could summon senior Israeli policymakers and army officers for investigation with the accusation of war crimes, and if they refuse, as can be assumed, she could issue international arrest warrants against them that 123 countries that are currently members of the Court statute must honor.

Both the United States and Israel suspected that the ICC would position itself in similar fashion to the highly politicized conduct of the UNHRC, and did not join it. Both have lambasted Bensouda's decision. Israel claimed that first, the Court does not have the authority to hear the issue because Palestine is not a state, and the ICC can only hear crimes committed in states; second, since Israel is not a member of the Court's statute, its leaders cannot be investigated; and third, the Court was established in order to investigate and judge only leaders whose states do not investigate and put on trial those who have committed war crimes. Israel has recognized military and civilian legal systems that investigate and punish violations of the accepted laws of war, and thus the principle of complementarity overrides ICC investigations. As such, Israel does not meet any of ICC's criteria for prosecution and trial.

The United States had its own incident with Bensouda, who sought to investigate Americans accused of committing war crimes in Afghanistan. The Trump administration castigated the Prosecutor with extraordinary severity over the decision. Then-National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Pompeo stated that the ICC is tainted by corruption and a lack of legitimacy, authority, responsibility, and transparency. They warned that if it dares to prosecute Americans or individuals from among its allies, including Israel, the United States would retaliate with severe sanctions against the Prosecutor, her staff and the judges. These include cancellation of visas to the United States, confiscation of US-based financial and other assets, and prosecution in US courts.

The United States did indeed cancel Bensouda's visa (Wroughton, 2019). They also threatened that if the Court detained American citizens, the United States would use force to free them (Khan, 2018). These threats were effective, and the pre-trial proceedings ended with a decision to reject Bensouda's request to investigate Americans. She appealed this decision to a higher court, which was accepted, but at this stage it is not clear if the investigations of the United States and Israel will take place. It is clear that the US activity to thwart dangerous anti-Israel resolutions and actions at the UN's political and legal institutions and to significantly undermine the credibility of organizations such as the UNHRC and the ICC has been essential in maintaining Israel's ability to defend itself.

Mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict

From the initial stages that ultimately led to the establishment of the State of Israel, the United States made many every effort to mediate and advance resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Quandt, 2001). There were several reasons for this. First, it is an essential American strategic interest to ensure the peace and security of Israel. In the first decades of its existence, Israel faced Arab threats to wipe it off the map, and resolving the conflict would remove this threat. Second was the need to prevent wars, which in various periods such as the Cold War could lead to direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Third, the United States feared that support for Israel would harm its relations with the Arab world. These relations were important because of the dependence of the United States and its European allies on Arab oil, and due to the alliances between the Soviet Union and the revolutionary Arab states, which threatened the existence of the pro-American Arab regimes. There has not been any other international conflict that so many American presidents have invested so much personal effort in resolving.

The first opportunity to bring about an end to the conflict was the Partition Plan, which, in the aftermath of World War II, was discussed and approved by the UN in November 1947. President Harry Truman supported the plan because he thought that if two national movements claim ownership over the same piece of land, partition is the most appropriate and just solution. Along with Turkey, the United States was a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission that tried to advance a resolution of the conflict in 1949 after Israel's War of Independence. The next opportunities only appeared after the Six Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973).

In the Six Day War, Israel demonstrated its military might, and conquered territories that could be exchanged for peace agreements. In December 1969, during the War of Attrition, Nixon's Secretary of State William Rogers issued the first US detailed peace plan. Both Israel and the Arabs rejected it, because each saw only the concessions that it had to make and ignored what it would receive from the other side in exchange. Yet despite the heavy Soviet involvement in Egypt, which expanded and intensified after the Six Day War, American mediation led to the end of the War of Attrition and laid the foundations for exclusive, agreed-upon US mediation of the conflict in the coming years.

The Yom Kippur War with Egypt in the south and Syria in the north opened up new opportunities for serious American mediation. Israel and Egypt paid heavy prices that influenced their willingness to reach a settlement. President Anwar Sadat "transferred" Egypt from the Soviet bloc to the American bloc. Since then, the United States has been the only party that has enjoyed good relations with both Israel and the Arab states, and became the only possible mediator in attempts to reach a resolution. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger mediated between the sides and achieved ceasefire agreements, an agreement on disengagement and prisoner exchanges, and an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, which paved the way for the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Since Kissinger's successful diplomacy, American efforts to mediate the conflict have multiplied and expanded (Ross, 2005).

The conflict’s two most significant peace processes, the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Palestinian (Oslo) processes, began with secret direct talks between the parties with the United States outside of the picture, but the American involvement was essential in order to reach and implement agreements. Successive presidents intervened to overcome obstacles, close deals, and mobilize legitimacy and public support for agreements through high-profile media events at the White House and in the region. The United States also established a peacekeeping force in Sinai to prevent aggression, gave substantial military and economic aid to all of the parties; and various guarantees for implementing and carrying out the agreements. The United States provided aid to Israel that enabled the withdrawal from Sinai and the transfer of the IDF bases. It gave economic aid to Egypt and the Palestinians in order to demonstrate the fruits of peace.

After Begin and Sadat agreed on a peace process, it ran into difficulties. In September 1978, President Jimmy Carter summoned them to Camp David for a summit that ended with a statement of principles for a peace settlement. After difficulties also developed in translating these principles into practice, Carter undertook visits in the Middle East that ultimately produced the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement signed in March 1979. President George H. W. Bush initiated and convened the Madrid Conference that took place in October 1991 in order to promote a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. For the first time, representatives of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation participated alongside one another.

After Israel and the PLO reached an agreement on mutual recognition in secret talks in Oslo, President Bill Clinton took it under his auspices and held an impressive signing ceremony on the White House lawn. In October 1994, Clinton helped with the signing of a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel. When the implementation of the Oslo process ran into difficulties in October 1998, he initiated a summit at the Wye River Conference Center, with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat, and the two reached an important interim agreement. Toward the end of his term, in July 2000, Clinton made another personal effort to reach a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat to Camp David. Barak proposed a far-reaching peace plan that Arafat rejected.

In December 2000, following the outbreak of the second violent Palestinian intifada, Clinton presented his own peace plan (also known as the Clinton Parameters), which included far-reaching Israeli concessions. Barak accepted the plan, but Arafat rejected it. This was a historic missed opportunity. Clinton also tried to mediate personally and advance a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. In January 1994, he met in Geneva with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad who expressed interest in negotiations with Israel. In January 2000, Clinton invited Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk a-Sharaa to a summit conference in Shepherdstown. Despite his efforts, this conference did not produce an agreement.

George W. Bush formulated a roadmap to resolve the conflict, participated in establishing the "Quartet" mechanism, and convened a summit peace conference at Annapolis, with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. The Quartet was established in April 2002 during the second intifada, in order to advance a resolution of the conflict. It comprised the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the UN, and from 2007 to 2015 it was represented by Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the UK. Two months later, Bush presented his Roadmap for Peace, calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state and security arrangements for Israel. Bush was the first US president to explicitly support a Palestinian state, but he also ruled out Israel's return to the June 1967 borders. He argued that it is necessary to recognize the reality that developed in the West Bank, and the impracticality of removing the large Israeli settlement blocs. In order to maintain momentum toward an agreement, in November 2007 Bush invited Olmert and Abbas to a summit at the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The goal was to facilitate direct negotiations between the sides and cultivate international support for the Roadmap. Indeed, Olmert met with Abbas dozens of times and offered a more generous proposal than was ever offered to a Palestinian leader. Abbas did not respond to it, and this American attempt also failed.

Trump is one of the most pro-Israel presidents in American history. He reversed US policy toward the conflict, arguing that the approach of all of his predecessors had failed numerous times, and thus should be fundamentally changed. He recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and transferred the US embassy there.

Obama, who was one of the most pro-Palestinian presidents in American history, tried to advance a settlement, first via special envoy George Mitchell, who had formerly succeeded in mediating and achieving an agreement in Northern Ireland, and then via Secretary of State John Kerry. He personally intervened in the process less than his predecessors. His administration did not succeed in advancing an agreement, and in comparison to other administrations, during his presidency there were the fewest talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Obama succeeded in influencing Netanyahu's policy on two issues: he forced him to publicly support the two-state solution and to freeze settlements. These were Abbas's conditions for renewing the negotiations with Israel, and Obama thought that if Netanyahu accepted them, the talks would be renewed. He was wrong. In a speech at Bar-Ilan University in June 2009, Netanyahu declared support for the establishment of a Palestinian state under certain conditions, and in November 2009 he froze construction in the settlements for a period of ten months. Netanyahu met Obama's conditions, but Abbas still refused to renew the negotiations.

Trump is one of the most pro-Israel presidents in American history. He reversed US policy toward the conflict, arguing that the approach of all of his predecessors had failed numerous times, and thus should be fundamentally changed. He recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and transferred the US embassy there. This was a historic correction, because states determine where to locate their capitals, and the case of Jerusalem was exceptional. The embassy was moved to West Jerusalem, a part of Jerusalem where no one questions Israel's sovereignty; it is the status of East Jerusalem that is contentious and requires negotiation.

Trump froze the economic aid to the Palestinian Authority, claiming it was intended for those who cooperate with the United States and not those who sharply criticize its policy. He also stopped funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees, arguing that the agency is corrupt, perpetuates the Palestinian refugee problem, and its schools are engendering hostility toward Israel and Jews. In addition, he closed the PLO office in Washington, claiming that after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority there was no more room for such a Palestinian mission. Trump also recognized Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights.

Trump ordered the preparation of a comprehensive and detailed plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which he called "the deal of the century." He placed this task in the hands of his closest associates, including his son-in-law Jared Kushner, Jason Greenblatt, who served as vice president and legal counsel for Trump's businesses, and David Friedman, the US ambassador to Israel, who was Trump's attorney and advisor in his presidential election administration. The plan included two main parts economic and political (The Trump White House, 2020). The presentation of the plan was postponed several times due to the frequent rounds of elections in Israel.

Ultimately, the economic part was separated from the political part and presented at a workshop in Bahrain in June 2019, with only businesspeople and politicians from around the world, including from the Arab world. No official representatives of Israel or the Palestinians were present. The idea was to present a comprehensive package for economic development in the West Bank, Gaza, and states such as Jordan and Egypt, with a proposed scope of $50 billion. The 40-page document included 175 projects. The Palestinians boycotted the workshop and demanded that the Arab states not participate, claiming that the economic part is no more than a plot to buy welfare at the expense of the Palestinians' aspirations for independence. Abbas and his staff said that "Palestine is not for sale," but despite their efforts, they failed to prevent the workshop.

The political portion of the plan was presented at a meeting held between Trump and Netanyahu on January 28, 2020 at the White House. The detailed plan, described over 180 pages, offers the Palestinians a state in the West Bank and Gaza and a capital on the periphery of East Jerusalem, and offers Israel significant security arrangements. It details a new division of the territory 70 percent of the West Bank for the Palestinians and 30 percent for Israel as well as compensation for Palestinians in Israeli territory within the Green Line. Along with the territory of Gaza, the territory allocated for the establishment of a Palestinian state would reach approximately over 80 percent of the territory of the West Bank, and with the compensation within Israel's territory it could reach 100 percent. The plan proposes a tunnel to connect Gaza and the West Bank. The territory that would be annexed to Israel includes the Jordan Valley, which is important for defending the state, and most of the Israeli settlements.

The establishment of the Palestinian state hinges on several conditions, including recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, restoring the Palestinian Authority's rule in Gaza and demilitarizing it, ending all activities against Israel at international organizations, ending the incitement against Israel, and forfeiting the right of return. Israel accepted the plan in principle, but the Palestinians rejected it outright. The Arab League also rejected it, and the European Union and a few more countries criticized the sections that enable Israeli annexation of territories separately from the implementation of other sections (Abdelaziz, 2020).

Conclusion

The United States contribution to Israel's security, in its various forms, is essential to Israel’s existence and well-being (Freilich, 2017). These contributions are irreplaceable. They have been maintained over decades and survived less sympathetic administrations, like those of Carter and Obama (Ross, 2016). Among the contributions are essential military aid that includes the supply of modern and advanced weapons that Israel cannot acquire from any other source in the world; intelligence cooperation; efforts to thwart nuclear threats; diplomatic assistance; and mediation efforts to achieve Arab-Israeli peace. In several of these areas, such as those related to the military and intelligence cooperation, both sides contribute to one another. In other areas, such as neutralizing anti-Israel activity in international organizations, Israel is entirely dependent on the United States. Without the significant financial aid for acquiring advanced weapons, the burden of Israel's security on the country's budget would be much heavier.

The American contributions are a direct result of the special relationship that has developed between the two countries, which the United States does not have with almost any other country. Recently, Netanyahu proposed signing a defense pact with the United States and even discussed this with Trump (Gearan & Hendrix, 2019). It is not clear if the proposal surfaced only against the backdrop of the third round of elections in Israel within a year, or whether there is a deeper intention behind it. Nor is this a new idea. It has come up several times before and was rejected as unnecessary by the defense authorities and experts (Inbar, 2019; Sher & Pinkas, 2019). The findings of this study show that it is not necessary, because in the current situation all of the advantages of a defense pact exist without the inherent disadvantages, which could significantly limit Israel's freedom of action. While Israel usually informs the United States about military operations, there is a difference between merely informing and receiving official approval. Israel is always proud to say that it does not need the defense of American forces; if a situation develops that is so threatening and requires direct American intervention, one can assume that it would take place even without an official defense pact.

Erosion in the soft elements of the special relationship cast a shadow on the continued American contribution to Israel's security. While since the beginning of the 21^st century two-thirds of the American public have a favorable view of Israel and majorities identify with its positions in the conflict, demographic segmentation shows that this support is high among older groups and much more limited among young people and minorities such as Hispanics and African-Americans (Gilboa, 2020 forthcoming). These populations have very little interest in Israel, and their proportion of the American population is gradually growing. Israel has lost bipartisan support in Congress as a result of the leftward tendency of the Democratic Party, Netanyahu's support for Republican presidential candidates and the conflict with Obama over the Iranian nuclear issue, and Israel's policy on the conflict with the Palestinians. This development and the tendency toward religious and rightest extremism in Israeli politics have also negatively influenced the attitudes of the American Jewish community, the majority of which supports a liberal ideology and the Democratic Party. Israel must take a series of steps to restore its relations with the Democrats and American Jewry, to prevent harm to the essential American contributions to its national security.

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