Interviewer: Mr. Amos Harel
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin
May 2018 was a highly volatile month. There were more security incidents then than in other months. But Israel was careful and used the correct policy so as not to allow the situation to escalate. Israeli deterrence is very strong, but there are incidents and provocations below the deterrence threshold, that if mismanaged could escalate. 2019 requires very careful management of risks so that Israel doesn’t enter into war – which might not even be the Third Lebanon War, but stands to be the First Northern War.
The Palestinian arena, comprising the West Bank and Gaza, is also highly volatile. This could easily spiral out of control. The “day after” Abu Mazen stands to be much worse that the current reality. In 2019, there are six scenarios, ranging between a hudna (which is not possible now) and a war, which neither Israel nor Hamas wants. We are now in a situation of ceasefire – but it is not stable.
Israel now enjoys unprecedented military strength, but this strength does not allow it to achieve its national security objectives. In addition, the Israeli society (like the US public) is not prepared to pay the cost of war. Wars in the modern era are costly, and they achieve little.
There is an asymmetry between Israel and its enemies. Israeli has high expectations of a military encounter, but these are unrealistic, in face of the asymmetric methods and tactics pursued by its enemies, which are below the escalation threshold.
The Second Lebanon War gave Israel the longest period of quiet that it has ever enjoyed on any front.
The precision missiles project in Lebanon presents a very important strategic challenge. Israel’s strategy in this regard, and against other efforts by Iran and Soleimani, has been the campaign between wars. This strategy worked well (for example, Soleimani came out with inaccurate reports), but will this continue to be the correct strategy in 2019? There are three dangers to the strategy in the coming year:
- Israeli planes will be hit
- There will be increasing friction with Russia
- There will be escalation that Israel doesn’t want
Lebanon may become a new front for Iran, if its efforts in Syria haven’t succeeded to the degree it hoped.
There has been excellent tactical coordination with Russia. Strategic coordination, however, is lacking. Both Russia and Iran share the interest that the United States is out of Syria, and both want Assad to remain in power. However, there are also divergent interests, and this alliance will likely not last forever. Still, neither Russia nor the US will remove Iran from Syria. Therefore, Israel needs to establish very clear red lines.
There are two military arms to Iran: the nuclear and the conventional, which includes regional insurgency. These two arms are tightly joined, and cannot be separated. While there is now much focus on Iran’s subversive activity in Syria, the nuclear threat is not over. Iran may well aspire to be like North Korea, which arrived in Singapore after having already achieved nuclear weapons. This is a major challenge for Israeli intelligence.