Four years of war between Russia and Ukraine no longer constitute merely a phase of “acute crisis”; rather the consolidation of a new strategic reality. It’s not only a regional war but a long-term test of the resilience of states, alliances, and military doctrines.
The price of the war is staggering. Total casualties on both sides are approaching two million people, including about 350,000 dead on the Russian side, and a smaller but comparable number on the Ukrainian side. The most recent harsh winter, combined with Russia’s campaign of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, led to a severe crisis in the supply of electricity, heating, and water across the country. Entire neighborhoods in major cities were left without services for extended periods. Russia, too, has absorbed heavy blows deep within its territory, as Ukraine targets oil logistics infrastructure. These strikes, alongside continued sanctions pressure and enforcement by the West, are harming revenues and steadily eroding the Russian economy. Although Russia continues to advance on the front, its progress remains slow. Its recruitment capacity (averaging between 30,000 and 35,000 soldiers per month) is barely sufficient to compensate for ongoing losses.
In the fourth year of the war, following pressure from the Trump administration, diplomatic efforts between the countries resumed and several rounds of talks were held. However, the gaps in their positions have not been bridged. The central dispute concerns Russia’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from a fortified territory in the Donbas that the Russian army has failed to capture. In Ukraine, there is no willingness to compromise on this issue, out of concern that such a withdrawal would significantly improve Russia’s operational position and provide a springboard for further invasion and potentially even threaten Kyiv, the capital.
Trump’s return to the White House has changed Western dynamics regarding the war. US assistance—which had been the largest under Biden—was halted, except for limited intelligence and communications-logistics support. American weaponry continues to reach Ukraine, but now in exchange for payment from European countries (“Coalition of the Willing”), which have become the primary providers of military and economic aid. Trump has adopted a transactional, deal-oriented approach, applying pressure on the parties—primarily on President Zelenskyy. Both Russia and Ukraine are trying to adjust to this new reality and appeal to Trump: Ukraine has agreed to territorial compromises, while Russia has signaled openness to dialogue (without retreating from most of its demands), alongside proposals for bilateral economic cooperation with Washington as an incentive for continued engagement with the United States.
European countries also continue to formulate a strategy adapted to the new reality—a tangible Russian threat, diminished American backing, and the need to preserve support for Ukraine. While most express support for Zelenskyy in his negotiations with Trump, domestic politics and isolationist right-wing movements prevent the continent from generating a proactive security front, despite the intensification of Russian hybrid activity, including sabotage operations and even the use of military tools (attack UAVs, electronic warfare disruption, and airspace violations).
The West is no longer a unified bloc unanimously supporting Ukraine on the basis of liberal principles. This lack of unity has weakened the flow of assistance (security, economic, and diplomatic alike), but at the same time, it has accelerated dialogue processes between the warring parties, although these have yet to bear fruit. At the current stage, it appears that Russia will continue to advance slowly on the front and maintain diplomatic pressure on Ukraine, without relinquishing its demands. This trend is unlikely to reverse unless a cluster of challenges—primarily economic—emerges that is capable of collapsing the entire Russian system, although it is impossible to predict how close such a scenario may be.
The shift in security relations between the United States and its Western partners increases Europe’s (and Ukraine’s) need for alternatives to American weaponry and security expertise. From Israel’s perspective, this creates an opportunity to enter as a provider of https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/מפה-אנגלית.jpgknowledge, technology, and methods in the security and adjacent fields, particularly vis-à-vis countries in Eastern and Northern Europe.
Four years of war between Russia and Ukraine no longer constitute merely a phase of “acute crisis”; rather the consolidation of a new strategic reality. It’s not only a regional war but a long-term test of the resilience of states, alliances, and military doctrines.
The price of the war is staggering. Total casualties on both sides are approaching two million people, including about 350,000 dead on the Russian side, and a smaller but comparable number on the Ukrainian side. The most recent harsh winter, combined with Russia’s campaign of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, led to a severe crisis in the supply of electricity, heating, and water across the country. Entire neighborhoods in major cities were left without services for extended periods. Russia, too, has absorbed heavy blows deep within its territory, as Ukraine targets oil logistics infrastructure. These strikes, alongside continued sanctions pressure and enforcement by the West, are harming revenues and steadily eroding the Russian economy. Although Russia continues to advance on the front, its progress remains slow. Its recruitment capacity (averaging between 30,000 and 35,000 soldiers per month) is barely sufficient to compensate for ongoing losses.
In the fourth year of the war, following pressure from the Trump administration, diplomatic efforts between the countries resumed and several rounds of talks were held. However, the gaps in their positions have not been bridged. The central dispute concerns Russia’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from a fortified territory in the Donbas that the Russian army has failed to capture. In Ukraine, there is no willingness to compromise on this issue, out of concern that such a withdrawal would significantly improve Russia’s operational position and provide a springboard for further invasion and potentially even threaten Kyiv, the capital.
Trump’s return to the White House has changed Western dynamics regarding the war. US assistance—which had been the largest under Biden—was halted, except for limited intelligence and communications-logistics support. American weaponry continues to reach Ukraine, but now in exchange for payment from European countries (“Coalition of the Willing”), which have become the primary providers of military and economic aid. Trump has adopted a transactional, deal-oriented approach, applying pressure on the parties—primarily on President Zelenskyy. Both Russia and Ukraine are trying to adjust to this new reality and appeal to Trump: Ukraine has agreed to territorial compromises, while Russia has signaled openness to dialogue (without retreating from most of its demands), alongside proposals for bilateral economic cooperation with Washington as an incentive for continued engagement with the United States.
European countries also continue to formulate a strategy adapted to the new reality—a tangible Russian threat, diminished American backing, and the need to preserve support for Ukraine. While most express support for Zelenskyy in his negotiations with Trump, domestic politics and isolationist right-wing movements prevent the continent from generating a proactive security front, despite the intensification of Russian hybrid activity, including sabotage operations and even the use of military tools (attack UAVs, electronic warfare disruption, and airspace violations).
The West is no longer a unified bloc unanimously supporting Ukraine on the basis of liberal principles. This lack of unity has weakened the flow of assistance (security, economic, and diplomatic alike), but at the same time, it has accelerated dialogue processes between the warring parties, although these have yet to bear fruit. At the current stage, it appears that Russia will continue to advance slowly on the front and maintain diplomatic pressure on Ukraine, without relinquishing its demands. This trend is unlikely to reverse unless a cluster of challenges—primarily economic—emerges that is capable of collapsing the entire Russian system, although it is impossible to predict how close such a scenario may be.
The shift in security relations between the United States and its Western partners increases Europe’s (and Ukraine’s) need for alternatives to American weaponry and security expertise. From Israel’s perspective, this creates an opportunity to enter as a provider of https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/מפה-אנגלית.jpgknowledge, technology, and methods in the security and adjacent fields, particularly vis-à-vis countries in Eastern and Northern Europe.