The escalation of IDF military activity in southern Lebanon in recent weeks, which caused extensive damage to Hezbollah's assets (damage to infrastructure, weapons, and many operatives), as well as to the residents of the Lebanese villages from which the organization operates, has placed Nasrallah in a dilemma regarding the nature of the continued fighting against the IDF on the Lebanese border. The killing of senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri and six other Hamas operatives in Beirut intensifies the dilemma, for two main reasons:
- Nasrallah's expressed commitment in a speech last August that the killing of any leader in the resistance front will lead to a harsh response by Hezbollah; this is certainly the case when it comes to al-Arouri who operated from the Dahiya quarter in Beirut under Nasrallah’s auspices and in full coordination with him.
- The humiliation of Hezbollah, given the message that Israel sends to the organization in its stronghold in Beirut (even if Israel has not taken responsibility for the killing) and the message regarding its determination and special capabilities to operate in Lebanon (intelligence; control of the airspace).
Nasrallah is required to change Hezbollah’s fighting tactics in face of the intense IDF activity in order to score achievements and maintain the action and reaction equations that he seeks to dictate. However, from the nature of Hezbollah's fighting so far it is evident that despite Nasrallah’s interest in continuing the fighting and confining the IDF to the north as long as the war in Gaza continues, he is still not interested in the situation deteriorating into a broad war with Israel at the current time. This is partly due to the clear calls by widespread elements in Lebanon to avoid it, as reflected in the immediate response to the killing by the Prime Minister of Lebanon’s transitional government, Najib Mikati, who condemned the action but at the same time emphasized that Lebanon wishes to keep the war away from its Lebanese soil.
It is expected that the response from Hezbollah will come, as it already officially committed after the incident, and it is clear that Israel is already prepared for this. Nasrallah will likely want to react in an unusual way, but not in such a way that would lead to another significant escalation in the fighting in southern Lebanon. Also possible is an unusual reaction under the auspices of Hezbollah on the part of Hamas elements in Lebanon. And in any case, experience teaches that the reaction does not always come immediately and or necessarily from the Lebanese border.
The escalation of IDF military activity in southern Lebanon in recent weeks, which caused extensive damage to Hezbollah's assets (damage to infrastructure, weapons, and many operatives), as well as to the residents of the Lebanese villages from which the organization operates, has placed Nasrallah in a dilemma regarding the nature of the continued fighting against the IDF on the Lebanese border. The killing of senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri and six other Hamas operatives in Beirut intensifies the dilemma, for two main reasons:
Nasrallah is required to change Hezbollah’s fighting tactics in face of the intense IDF activity in order to score achievements and maintain the action and reaction equations that he seeks to dictate. However, from the nature of Hezbollah's fighting so far it is evident that despite Nasrallah’s interest in continuing the fighting and confining the IDF to the north as long as the war in Gaza continues, he is still not interested in the situation deteriorating into a broad war with Israel at the current time. This is partly due to the clear calls by widespread elements in Lebanon to avoid it, as reflected in the immediate response to the killing by the Prime Minister of Lebanon’s transitional government, Najib Mikati, who condemned the action but at the same time emphasized that Lebanon wishes to keep the war away from its Lebanese soil.
It is expected that the response from Hezbollah will come, as it already officially committed after the incident, and it is clear that Israel is already prepared for this. Nasrallah will likely want to react in an unusual way, but not in such a way that would lead to another significant escalation in the fighting in southern Lebanon. Also possible is an unusual reaction under the auspices of Hezbollah on the part of Hamas elements in Lebanon. And in any case, experience teaches that the reaction does not always come immediately and or necessarily from the Lebanese border.