The Gulf states view the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as part of a broad regional initiative aimed at reshaping the Palestinian arena and advancing an American-led political process. However, their positions differ significantly from one another.
Saudi Arabia is pursuing a cautious and conditional diplomatic approach. It seeks to form an Arab–international coalition to oversee reconstruction but is clear that it will not provide substantial funding without the transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority or another internationally legitimate body. The kingdom insists on the demilitarization of Gaza and the disarmament of Hamas to prevent renewed conflict and the loss of investment, while avoiding direct cooperation with Israel.
The United Arab Emirates, by contrast, is currently the most active humanitarian player in Gaza, aspiring to be the leading actor in the “day after” the war. Reports suggest that Abu Dhabi has agreed to send, or finance, military forces as part of an emerging international coalition, but its participation in reconstruction depends on a fundamental change in Gaza’s situation—namely, the complete dismantling of Hamas and comprehensive reform of the Palestinian Authority, starting with a leadership change. Unlike Riyadh, it is open to direct cooperation with Israel but demands a renewed Palestinian framework to ensure efficient management and oversight of aid funds.
Qatar, in contrast, continues to combine mediation with humanitarian assistance, emphasizing the need for immediate reconstruction of infrastructure with almost no preconditions, clearly seeking to preserve its influence in Gaza by maintaining Hamas’s power. Likely under Arab and American pressure, it has recently adopted a somewhat more moderate stance toward calls for Hamas’s disarmament and even joined Arab–Western appeals for a new governing authority in Gaza.
The fact that the Saudi and Emirati leaders were absent from the Sharm el-Sheikh summit seems to reflect their dissatisfaction with the emerging framework—and even more so with the prominence given to Qatar and Turkey. All three countries support Gaza’s reconstruction in principle but differ on the preconditions they set for it. Behind these positions lie broader interests: strengthening their regional status, advancing economic and security goals, and maintaining credibility within the Arab public opinion.
What unites them all, however, is skepticism regarding the feasibility of implementing the ambitious plan. Moreover, given the economic pressures caused by falling oil prices, financial commitments in other arenas (Syria, Lebanon), and the absence of a clear political horizon, their investments are likely to remain, for now, mostly on paper.
The Gulf states view the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as part of a broad regional initiative aimed at reshaping the Palestinian arena and advancing an American-led political process. However, their positions differ significantly from one another.
Saudi Arabia is pursuing a cautious and conditional diplomatic approach. It seeks to form an Arab–international coalition to oversee reconstruction but is clear that it will not provide substantial funding without the transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority or another internationally legitimate body. The kingdom insists on the demilitarization of Gaza and the disarmament of Hamas to prevent renewed conflict and the loss of investment, while avoiding direct cooperation with Israel.
The United Arab Emirates, by contrast, is currently the most active humanitarian player in Gaza, aspiring to be the leading actor in the “day after” the war. Reports suggest that Abu Dhabi has agreed to send, or finance, military forces as part of an emerging international coalition, but its participation in reconstruction depends on a fundamental change in Gaza’s situation—namely, the complete dismantling of Hamas and comprehensive reform of the Palestinian Authority, starting with a leadership change. Unlike Riyadh, it is open to direct cooperation with Israel but demands a renewed Palestinian framework to ensure efficient management and oversight of aid funds.
Qatar, in contrast, continues to combine mediation with humanitarian assistance, emphasizing the need for immediate reconstruction of infrastructure with almost no preconditions, clearly seeking to preserve its influence in Gaza by maintaining Hamas’s power. Likely under Arab and American pressure, it has recently adopted a somewhat more moderate stance toward calls for Hamas’s disarmament and even joined Arab–Western appeals for a new governing authority in Gaza.
The fact that the Saudi and Emirati leaders were absent from the Sharm el-Sheikh summit seems to reflect their dissatisfaction with the emerging framework—and even more so with the prominence given to Qatar and Turkey. All three countries support Gaza’s reconstruction in principle but differ on the preconditions they set for it. Behind these positions lie broader interests: strengthening their regional status, advancing economic and security goals, and maintaining credibility within the Arab public opinion.
What unites them all, however, is skepticism regarding the feasibility of implementing the ambitious plan. Moreover, given the economic pressures caused by falling oil prices, financial commitments in other arenas (Syria, Lebanon), and the absence of a clear political horizon, their investments are likely to remain, for now, mostly on paper.