Since the start of the Swords of Iron campaign, Iran has faced consecutive setbacks in Syria. The series of attacks targeting both its people and interests in the Syrian arena, starting with the assassination of Sayyed Razi Mousavi, who was responsible for transferring weapons to Hezbollah, has posed a significant challenge to Iran’s operations in Syria. However, Iran has responded to these actions in a measured and limited manner, likely out of concern within its leadership about getting entangled in the war if it carries out an overly harsh and direct response.
Nevertheless, recent events in Syria, particularly in Damascus, have been overshadowed by the assassination of General Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1, 2024, in the apartment adjacent to the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital. In many ways, Zahedi’s assassination is not just another attack on Iranian presence but rather a significant and almost unprecedented event in the campaign against Iran. Given Zahedi’s high rank, his connections to the Iranian leadership, and the location of the assassination near or within Iranian “territory,” Iran cannot simply ignore this incident. It’s unlikely to revert to its previous pattern of reaction.
The assassination of Zahedi further complicates the dilemma facing the Iranian leadership, as it remains apprehensive about being drawn into the “turmoil” of the war. Therefore, Iran’s leadership must carefully consider and implement a response that deters any party from carrying out similar attacks in Syria or elsewhere in the future, without directly involving Iran in the campaign. Iran fears taking any action that could escalate the war, potentially endangering its strategic assets in the Middle East, primarily Hezbollah, and even leading to a direct conflict with the United States. Simultaneously, a passive response would also expose its weakness.
Operationally, Iran, which hesitates to deploy militias in response to attacks targeting it, will need to consider whether it is appropriate to incorporate its proxies, led by Hezbollah, in its retaliatory action, in addition to the potential direct response from Iran itself. Supposedly, involving these proxies could enhance Iran’s response, but it could also put them at risk of a backlash that could escalate the conflict on the northern front.
Be that as it may, it is likely that Zahedi’s elimination will force Iran’s leadership to reconsider its involvement in Syria. The Syrian arena is strategically important to Iran for various reasons, but the series of actions against the Iranian presence, particularly the threat to key figures who are responsible for Iran’s foothold in Syria, inevitably undermines Tehran’s control over the situation in Syria and may raise doubts about its effectiveness.
The bottom line is that the elimination of Zahedi is not just another event in the campaign against Iran’s presence in Syria. Consequently, and especially given the statements issued by the Iranian leadership following the assassination, Iran, which is not hesitant to respond and also faces limitations in the Syrian context (as well as ongoing failures in carrying out attacks outside of Iran), will need to consider an innovative response that allows it to rebuild its deterrence in the northern arena without being dragged into a war. In many ways, we are not at the end of this event but rather at the beginning, and the nature of Iran’s response will directly impact the likelihood of expanding the campaign.
Since the start of the Swords of Iron campaign, Iran has faced consecutive setbacks in Syria. The series of attacks targeting both its people and interests in the Syrian arena, starting with the assassination of Sayyed Razi Mousavi, who was responsible for transferring weapons to Hezbollah, has posed a significant challenge to Iran’s operations in Syria. However, Iran has responded to these actions in a measured and limited manner, likely out of concern within its leadership about getting entangled in the war if it carries out an overly harsh and direct response.
Nevertheless, recent events in Syria, particularly in Damascus, have been overshadowed by the assassination of General Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1, 2024, in the apartment adjacent to the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital. In many ways, Zahedi’s assassination is not just another attack on Iranian presence but rather a significant and almost unprecedented event in the campaign against Iran. Given Zahedi’s high rank, his connections to the Iranian leadership, and the location of the assassination near or within Iranian “territory,” Iran cannot simply ignore this incident. It’s unlikely to revert to its previous pattern of reaction.
The assassination of Zahedi further complicates the dilemma facing the Iranian leadership, as it remains apprehensive about being drawn into the “turmoil” of the war. Therefore, Iran’s leadership must carefully consider and implement a response that deters any party from carrying out similar attacks in Syria or elsewhere in the future, without directly involving Iran in the campaign. Iran fears taking any action that could escalate the war, potentially endangering its strategic assets in the Middle East, primarily Hezbollah, and even leading to a direct conflict with the United States. Simultaneously, a passive response would also expose its weakness.
Operationally, Iran, which hesitates to deploy militias in response to attacks targeting it, will need to consider whether it is appropriate to incorporate its proxies, led by Hezbollah, in its retaliatory action, in addition to the potential direct response from Iran itself. Supposedly, involving these proxies could enhance Iran’s response, but it could also put them at risk of a backlash that could escalate the conflict on the northern front.
Be that as it may, it is likely that Zahedi’s elimination will force Iran’s leadership to reconsider its involvement in Syria. The Syrian arena is strategically important to Iran for various reasons, but the series of actions against the Iranian presence, particularly the threat to key figures who are responsible for Iran’s foothold in Syria, inevitably undermines Tehran’s control over the situation in Syria and may raise doubts about its effectiveness.
The bottom line is that the elimination of Zahedi is not just another event in the campaign against Iran’s presence in Syria. Consequently, and especially given the statements issued by the Iranian leadership following the assassination, Iran, which is not hesitant to respond and also faces limitations in the Syrian context (as well as ongoing failures in carrying out attacks outside of Iran), will need to consider an innovative response that allows it to rebuild its deterrence in the northern arena without being dragged into a war. In many ways, we are not at the end of this event but rather at the beginning, and the nature of Iran’s response will directly impact the likelihood of expanding the campaign.