According to Lebanese publications, it is estimated that about one million people in Lebanon have left their homes since the outbreak of Operation Roaring Lion. In practice, every fifth resident has been displaced. Most are from southern villages who left after the IDF spokesperson issued evacuation warnings ahead of strikes on Hezbollah strongholds, while others are residents of Beirut’s southern suburb, Dahiyeh, and the Bekaa.
The Lebanese government has established reception centers for the displaced in government schools, but the number of available spaces is limited relative to the demand. Many families are forced to live in temporary structures and tents in public parks or along roadsides. Moreover, Christian and Druze residents sometimes prevent the entry of displaced members of the Shiite community from entering their neighborhoods, fearing that this could lead to Shiite takeovers of buildings and public areas and could invite Israeli Air Force strikes on Hezbollah operatives hiding among the displaced.
Particularly sharp criticism from Beirut’s Christian residents has been directed at a plan by the Lebanese government, in cooperation with an association called Farah al-Ataa (“The Joy of Giving”), which is affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement party of Gebran Bassil, to establish a reception center for displaced persons in the Karantina neighborhood adjacent to Beirut’s port. Residents of the nearby Achrafieh neighborhood argue that this center will disrupt the continuity of Beirut’s Christian neighborhoods northward toward Jounieh. Beyond this, among Christian residents who oppose Hezbollah—and specifically its decision to involve Lebanon in a war that is not related to it—there is growing resentment and opposition to the provocative actions by Hezbollah and Amal members who conduct motorized vehicle patrols through the neighborhoods while playing anthems and chanting slogans in support of Hezbollah and the Shiites. These provocations are increasing sectarian tensions in Beirut and, on more than one occasion, led to clashes requiring intervention by the army and security forces.
The statement by Israel’s Minister of Defense that the residents of the Shiite villages in the south will not be allowed to return to their homes until Hezbollah is completely disarmed, and that the villages will be destroyed in a manner similar to the Gaza model, only heightens the concerns of the Christian, Sunni, and Druze residents that the Shiites may remain among them for a much longer time than initially expected—a development that could intensify inter-sectarian friction and outbreaks of violence in Lebanon.
According to Lebanese publications, it is estimated that about one million people in Lebanon have left their homes since the outbreak of Operation Roaring Lion. In practice, every fifth resident has been displaced. Most are from southern villages who left after the IDF spokesperson issued evacuation warnings ahead of strikes on Hezbollah strongholds, while others are residents of Beirut’s southern suburb, Dahiyeh, and the Bekaa.
The Lebanese government has established reception centers for the displaced in government schools, but the number of available spaces is limited relative to the demand. Many families are forced to live in temporary structures and tents in public parks or along roadsides. Moreover, Christian and Druze residents sometimes prevent the entry of displaced members of the Shiite community from entering their neighborhoods, fearing that this could lead to Shiite takeovers of buildings and public areas and could invite Israeli Air Force strikes on Hezbollah operatives hiding among the displaced.
Particularly sharp criticism from Beirut’s Christian residents has been directed at a plan by the Lebanese government, in cooperation with an association called Farah al-Ataa (“The Joy of Giving”), which is affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement party of Gebran Bassil, to establish a reception center for displaced persons in the Karantina neighborhood adjacent to Beirut’s port. Residents of the nearby Achrafieh neighborhood argue that this center will disrupt the continuity of Beirut’s Christian neighborhoods northward toward Jounieh. Beyond this, among Christian residents who oppose Hezbollah—and specifically its decision to involve Lebanon in a war that is not related to it—there is growing resentment and opposition to the provocative actions by Hezbollah and Amal members who conduct motorized vehicle patrols through the neighborhoods while playing anthems and chanting slogans in support of Hezbollah and the Shiites. These provocations are increasing sectarian tensions in Beirut and, on more than one occasion, led to clashes requiring intervention by the army and security forces.
The statement by Israel’s Minister of Defense that the residents of the Shiite villages in the south will not be allowed to return to their homes until Hezbollah is completely disarmed, and that the villages will be destroyed in a manner similar to the Gaza model, only heightens the concerns of the Christian, Sunni, and Druze residents that the Shiites may remain among them for a much longer time than initially expected—a development that could intensify inter-sectarian friction and outbreaks of violence in Lebanon.