The 12-day war between Israel and Iran marked a formative moment for the Arab states, given that Iran has long constituted a threat to many of them. The war caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure and further reduced its ability to operate its regional proxies. However, these outcomes were achieved by Israel and the United States, which successfully delivered effective military blows to Iran in a short time frame—a feat the Arab states have failed to do for decades.
This gap underscores the strategic weakness of the Arab states and their continued dependence on external powers for defense. Moreover, Arab responses to the war were limited to calls for de-escalation and attempts at mediation. In the absence of independent initiative or meaningful influence on the course of events, the Arab world remains a marginal player—both politically and militarily. This outcome may encourage Iran to pursue future asymmetric retaliatory actions against the Arab states, driven by a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis Israel and a recognition of Arab weakness.
Israel’s military success, which bolstered its image of strength, sheds light on the deep disparities between it and the Arab states, many of which suffer from dysfunctional governance and significant military weakness. Even Israel’s potential partners, particularly the Gulf states, are viewing these developments with suspicion. Although they see Israel as a strategic partner against Iran, they also fear the strengthening of Israel’s growing sense of capability and its willingness to act unilaterally with little regard for Arab interests.
The chain of events has not altered the desire of the Arab states to continue their détente with Tehran—a policy aimed at softening tensions and reducing the risk of being drawn into conflict. From the Arab perspective, the story is far from over. They believe that another confrontation with Iran is only a matter of time and thus prefer to maintain a neutral stance.
Ultimately, the war between Israel and Iran exposed the weakness and irrelevance of the Arab states in shaping the regional order. It was non-Arab forces that brought about—even if temporarily—an improvement in their strategic position vis-à-vis Iran. For Arab states to regain a leading role, they must abandon their passivity and be willing to take responsibility for regional stability. As long as they fail to do so, they will remain easy targets for external aggression.
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran marked a formative moment for the Arab states, given that Iran has long constituted a threat to many of them. The war caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure and further reduced its ability to operate its regional proxies. However, these outcomes were achieved by Israel and the United States, which successfully delivered effective military blows to Iran in a short time frame—a feat the Arab states have failed to do for decades.
This gap underscores the strategic weakness of the Arab states and their continued dependence on external powers for defense. Moreover, Arab responses to the war were limited to calls for de-escalation and attempts at mediation. In the absence of independent initiative or meaningful influence on the course of events, the Arab world remains a marginal player—both politically and militarily. This outcome may encourage Iran to pursue future asymmetric retaliatory actions against the Arab states, driven by a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis Israel and a recognition of Arab weakness.
Israel’s military success, which bolstered its image of strength, sheds light on the deep disparities between it and the Arab states, many of which suffer from dysfunctional governance and significant military weakness. Even Israel’s potential partners, particularly the Gulf states, are viewing these developments with suspicion. Although they see Israel as a strategic partner against Iran, they also fear the strengthening of Israel’s growing sense of capability and its willingness to act unilaterally with little regard for Arab interests.
The chain of events has not altered the desire of the Arab states to continue their détente with Tehran—a policy aimed at softening tensions and reducing the risk of being drawn into conflict. From the Arab perspective, the story is far from over. They believe that another confrontation with Iran is only a matter of time and thus prefer to maintain a neutral stance.
Ultimately, the war between Israel and Iran exposed the weakness and irrelevance of the Arab states in shaping the regional order. It was non-Arab forces that brought about—even if temporarily—an improvement in their strategic position vis-à-vis Iran. For Arab states to regain a leading role, they must abandon their passivity and be willing to take responsibility for regional stability. As long as they fail to do so, they will remain easy targets for external aggression.