The two severe terrorist attacks in Jerusalem in less than a day are not only the product of the reality of the terrorist system besetting Israel for the past ten months, and not only a reflection of the reality of life and the complex security reality in East Jerusalem. The two attacks are, inter alia, the product of a consistent, systematic, and ongoing cognitive system that operates from two centers external to the Jerusalem system, and converge into feeding the ethos of the Palestinian armed resistance.
One of them is Hamas, which is working vigorously to bolster the infrastructure in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Recognizing the area’s explosive potential, especially at the Temple Mount, it seeks a deterioration in the security situation and hopes to ignite the area.
The second is the cognition regarding the struggle that develops and intensifies every day in the violent skirmishes between the Israeli security forces and the Palestinians in the Palestinian cities, led by Jenin, which has once again established its position as the capital of Palestinian terrorism. The cognition underlying the struggle feeds the ethos of the Palestinian armed resistance and becomes the most significant seed of inspiration for many young Palestinians, who are not necessarily associated with Palestinian terrorist organizations, to stand up and take action. The two attacks in Jerusalem are a striking example of this pattern of action.
The Palestinian youth, whether associated with the terrorist organizations or not – and are adopted by terrorist organization after the fact – are wrapped in the cognition of the intifada. They are not ready to accept the existing reality and their rejection is for the purpose of changing the existing situation, which they conceptualize as occupation. In their view, the current reality is effected by two elements: Israel and the Palestinian Authority cooperating with Israel. Accordingly, not only is the "Israeli occupation" rejected, but so too the Palestinian Authority, seen as acting in collaboration with Israel.
Even if the representatives of the young Palestinian generation do not know what kind of reality they seek to fashion, there is a broad and solid agreement among them regarding the unwillingness to accept the existing reality, and conviction that the only way to change it is through armed struggle. So far, and despite very broad public support among the Palestinians for the armed struggle, the Palestinian street, including the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, have not yet massively mobilized for the struggle, and therefore in Israel this terrorist system is not defined as an intifada. However, at this time there are two issues that have the potential to unify the ranks on the Palestinian side to the point of mobilizing the Palestinian masses for the armed struggle: one is the Temple Mount and the other is the security prisoners.
Israel should consider its steps carefully when coming to change the existing status quo in both issues, and always remember that the majority of the Palestinian public, like the absolute majority of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, is not an active participant in the terrorist system, and it is important to keep them out of the campaign. Any change in policy must be part of a much broader context and not a Pavlovian reaction when the blood boils. Composure, a clear strategic purpose, and strategic discipline should stand at the foundation of policy change and the design of a different policy. At the same time, it is important to understand the weight of cognition in this campaign and alongside kinetic and other efforts such as sealing houses and denying rights, one must also think and act in the dimension of cognition and create patterns of action that will influence the cognition of the Palestinian public and the perpetrators of terrorism. Focusing on the physical and kinetic dimension without paying attention and lending effort to the cognitive dimension, which essentially distinguishes between the broad population that is not involved in the terrorist system and the perpetrators of terrorism, will disable every policy and move, and harm its effectiveness.
The two severe terrorist attacks in Jerusalem in less than a day are not only the product of the reality of the terrorist system besetting Israel for the past ten months, and not only a reflection of the reality of life and the complex security reality in East Jerusalem. The two attacks are, inter alia, the product of a consistent, systematic, and ongoing cognitive system that operates from two centers external to the Jerusalem system, and converge into feeding the ethos of the Palestinian armed resistance.
One of them is Hamas, which is working vigorously to bolster the infrastructure in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Recognizing the area’s explosive potential, especially at the Temple Mount, it seeks a deterioration in the security situation and hopes to ignite the area.
The second is the cognition regarding the struggle that develops and intensifies every day in the violent skirmishes between the Israeli security forces and the Palestinians in the Palestinian cities, led by Jenin, which has once again established its position as the capital of Palestinian terrorism. The cognition underlying the struggle feeds the ethos of the Palestinian armed resistance and becomes the most significant seed of inspiration for many young Palestinians, who are not necessarily associated with Palestinian terrorist organizations, to stand up and take action. The two attacks in Jerusalem are a striking example of this pattern of action.
The Palestinian youth, whether associated with the terrorist organizations or not – and are adopted by terrorist organization after the fact – are wrapped in the cognition of the intifada. They are not ready to accept the existing reality and their rejection is for the purpose of changing the existing situation, which they conceptualize as occupation. In their view, the current reality is effected by two elements: Israel and the Palestinian Authority cooperating with Israel. Accordingly, not only is the "Israeli occupation" rejected, but so too the Palestinian Authority, seen as acting in collaboration with Israel.
Even if the representatives of the young Palestinian generation do not know what kind of reality they seek to fashion, there is a broad and solid agreement among them regarding the unwillingness to accept the existing reality, and conviction that the only way to change it is through armed struggle. So far, and despite very broad public support among the Palestinians for the armed struggle, the Palestinian street, including the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, have not yet massively mobilized for the struggle, and therefore in Israel this terrorist system is not defined as an intifada. However, at this time there are two issues that have the potential to unify the ranks on the Palestinian side to the point of mobilizing the Palestinian masses for the armed struggle: one is the Temple Mount and the other is the security prisoners.
Israel should consider its steps carefully when coming to change the existing status quo in both issues, and always remember that the majority of the Palestinian public, like the absolute majority of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, is not an active participant in the terrorist system, and it is important to keep them out of the campaign. Any change in policy must be part of a much broader context and not a Pavlovian reaction when the blood boils. Composure, a clear strategic purpose, and strategic discipline should stand at the foundation of policy change and the design of a different policy. At the same time, it is important to understand the weight of cognition in this campaign and alongside kinetic and other efforts such as sealing houses and denying rights, one must also think and act in the dimension of cognition and create patterns of action that will influence the cognition of the Palestinian public and the perpetrators of terrorism. Focusing on the physical and kinetic dimension without paying attention and lending effort to the cognitive dimension, which essentially distinguishes between the broad population that is not involved in the terrorist system and the perpetrators of terrorism, will disable every policy and move, and harm its effectiveness.