The Turkish decision to limit the export of 54 products to Israel, including cement and steel, has consequences mainly for the construction sector in Israel. There’s a fear, however, that Turkey will take additional measures against Israel (in the context of the transit of goods—particularly oil on its way to Israel—as well as restrictions on the use of its airspace), and that other countries will join an economic boycott of Israel and then the consequences will be much more extensive.
Although the Turks have justified the move by saying that Israel does not allow Turkey to airdrop aid into Gaza, in practice Turkey transfers a lot of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Most commentators therefore explain the Turkish step as a result of internal pressures by the Turkish public to limit trade between the countries (in 2023, the volume of mutual trade between the countries reached $5.7 billion, of which $4.3 billion are Turkish exports to Israel). These pressures have been expressed on social media, in demonstrations, and among some Turkish political parties as they prepared for the local elections held at the end of March.
Although the explanation of internal pressures is convincing in many ways, the timing of the step after the local elections already took place raises a few doubts. Undoubtedly, the announcement of the restrictions wasn’t a spontaneous step and was preceded by discussions on the Turkish side regarding the legal and economic implications of the violation of the trade agreements between the countries and the violation of contracts with Israeli importers. It’s possible that these discussions have only come to a decision now, which would explain the timing. An explanation that should be of greater concern to the decision makers in Jerusalem is that the Turks took this unprecedented step in relations between the countries because they estimate that given Israel’s weakness and the strengthening of international criticism, particularly at the White House, for failing to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, it’s possible to pass such a decision, which would have previously been seen as a defiant step outside of Israel as well. An even more worrying explanation is that Turkey may be deliberately trying to contribute to the weakening of Israel in preparation for the expansion of the war to also a direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.
Be that as it may, the Turkish step, although it received headlines, has become another one of the many challenges that Israel currently faces. If Turkey had hoped that this step would cause the Israeli side to be more attentive to the Turkish ambition to play a more extensive role in the political dialogue related to ending the war in Gaza and the period after, it’s doubtful that this will happen. The Turkish step only increases Jerusalem’s mistrust toward it, and it will have a negative effect on the relations between the countries for years to come.
The Turkish decision to limit the export of 54 products to Israel, including cement and steel, has consequences mainly for the construction sector in Israel. There’s a fear, however, that Turkey will take additional measures against Israel (in the context of the transit of goods—particularly oil on its way to Israel—as well as restrictions on the use of its airspace), and that other countries will join an economic boycott of Israel and then the consequences will be much more extensive.
Although the Turks have justified the move by saying that Israel does not allow Turkey to airdrop aid into Gaza, in practice Turkey transfers a lot of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Most commentators therefore explain the Turkish step as a result of internal pressures by the Turkish public to limit trade between the countries (in 2023, the volume of mutual trade between the countries reached $5.7 billion, of which $4.3 billion are Turkish exports to Israel). These pressures have been expressed on social media, in demonstrations, and among some Turkish political parties as they prepared for the local elections held at the end of March.
Although the explanation of internal pressures is convincing in many ways, the timing of the step after the local elections already took place raises a few doubts. Undoubtedly, the announcement of the restrictions wasn’t a spontaneous step and was preceded by discussions on the Turkish side regarding the legal and economic implications of the violation of the trade agreements between the countries and the violation of contracts with Israeli importers. It’s possible that these discussions have only come to a decision now, which would explain the timing. An explanation that should be of greater concern to the decision makers in Jerusalem is that the Turks took this unprecedented step in relations between the countries because they estimate that given Israel’s weakness and the strengthening of international criticism, particularly at the White House, for failing to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, it’s possible to pass such a decision, which would have previously been seen as a defiant step outside of Israel as well. An even more worrying explanation is that Turkey may be deliberately trying to contribute to the weakening of Israel in preparation for the expansion of the war to also a direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.
Be that as it may, the Turkish step, although it received headlines, has become another one of the many challenges that Israel currently faces. If Turkey had hoped that this step would cause the Israeli side to be more attentive to the Turkish ambition to play a more extensive role in the political dialogue related to ending the war in Gaza and the period after, it’s doubtful that this will happen. The Turkish step only increases Jerusalem’s mistrust toward it, and it will have a negative effect on the relations between the countries for years to come.