Over the past two weeks, a dramatic strategic shift has taken place in southern Yemen: The Southern Transitional Council (STC), with full backing from the UAE, has rapidly taken control of Aden, the resource-rich Hadramawt Governorate, and key central government institutions. Yemen’s recognized government fled to Riyadh, and the flag of South Yemen was once again raised over government buildings in Aden. In effect, Yemen has ceased to exist as a unified state and has become two de facto entities: a Houthi north and a pro-Emirati south.
The move underscores the failure of the framework built since 2015: a weak, fragmented, and externally dependent pro-Saudi coalition. For the Houthis, this is an immediate advantage—their rivals are mired in internal struggles and don’t present a unified front. But in the medium term, a new threat has also appeared: a disciplined, organized southern force with an economic and military backbone, controlling coastlines, ports, and smuggling routes to the Houthis—an issue of considerable importance in itself. This is the first time a player has emerged that isn’t merely “anti-Houthi” but one with real governing and military capabilities.
The event also exposes the depth of the gap between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While Riyadh continues to adhere, at least declaratively, to Yemen’s territorial integrity, Abu Dhabi has patiently built an alternative southern entity. The result: Saudi Arabia has been pushed out of the south, while the UAE is shaping a new reality along the southern border of the Arabian Peninsula.
And what about Israel? In the immediate term, the Houthi threat won’t disappear. Yemen’s fragmentation makes it even easier for the Houthis to entrench themselves in the north and maintain governing continuity. At the same time, however, a strategic window of opportunity has opened: a stable southern entity, backed by the UAE, controlling the important port of Aden, located near the Bab al-Mandab, and limiting Iranian influence in a maritime arena critical to Israel. Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, the leader of the STC, has previously hinted at the possibility of joining the Abraham Accords in the future.
That said, Israel must not be mistaken: The south isn’t pro-Israeli; rather, it’s pro-Emirati. The potential lies not in embracing Israel but in careful management through Abu Dhabi, with sensitivity to the competition between it and Saudi Arabia. South Yemen isn’t merely a local story; it’s a new layer in the regional struggle over the Red Sea, and it also holds opportunities—if managed correctly.
Over the past two weeks, a dramatic strategic shift has taken place in southern Yemen: The Southern Transitional Council (STC), with full backing from the UAE, has rapidly taken control of Aden, the resource-rich Hadramawt Governorate, and key central government institutions. Yemen’s recognized government fled to Riyadh, and the flag of South Yemen was once again raised over government buildings in Aden. In effect, Yemen has ceased to exist as a unified state and has become two de facto entities: a Houthi north and a pro-Emirati south.
The move underscores the failure of the framework built since 2015: a weak, fragmented, and externally dependent pro-Saudi coalition. For the Houthis, this is an immediate advantage—their rivals are mired in internal struggles and don’t present a unified front. But in the medium term, a new threat has also appeared: a disciplined, organized southern force with an economic and military backbone, controlling coastlines, ports, and smuggling routes to the Houthis—an issue of considerable importance in itself. This is the first time a player has emerged that isn’t merely “anti-Houthi” but one with real governing and military capabilities.
The event also exposes the depth of the gap between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While Riyadh continues to adhere, at least declaratively, to Yemen’s territorial integrity, Abu Dhabi has patiently built an alternative southern entity. The result: Saudi Arabia has been pushed out of the south, while the UAE is shaping a new reality along the southern border of the Arabian Peninsula.
And what about Israel? In the immediate term, the Houthi threat won’t disappear. Yemen’s fragmentation makes it even easier for the Houthis to entrench themselves in the north and maintain governing continuity. At the same time, however, a strategic window of opportunity has opened: a stable southern entity, backed by the UAE, controlling the important port of Aden, located near the Bab al-Mandab, and limiting Iranian influence in a maritime arena critical to Israel. Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, the leader of the STC, has previously hinted at the possibility of joining the Abraham Accords in the future.
That said, Israel must not be mistaken: The south isn’t pro-Israeli; rather, it’s pro-Emirati. The potential lies not in embracing Israel but in careful management through Abu Dhabi, with sensitivity to the competition between it and Saudi Arabia. South Yemen isn’t merely a local story; it’s a new layer in the regional struggle over the Red Sea, and it also holds opportunities—if managed correctly.