At the beginning of the month, Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Duma—the lower house of parliament—aimed at canceling Russia’s accession to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment. Russia joined the convention in 1996, under the rule of Boris Yeltsin, when it sought to position itself as a Western country that valued liberal-democratic principles. Its accession authorized external inspectors to visit and report on conditions in prisons, detention camps, and psychiatric hospitals within its territory. In addition, being a signatory to the convention granted its citizens the right to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. The withdrawal from the convention is mostly formal, since Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe in 2022, following its invasion of Ukraine, had already rendered its signature on the convention largely symbolic. Oversight of institutions in its territory had already been closed off, and even before then was very limited: Of the 30 reports submitted over 27 years of monitoring, only four were published and officially addressed.
It should be noted that the decision to withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture precisely during the war with Ukraine is not coincidental. Russia still remains a signatory to a similar treaty, the UN Convention against Torture. In fact, the provisions of both conventions are very similar, raising the question of why Russia withdrew from one but not the other. The answer appears to be primarily political: Unlike the European convention, the UN convention falls under the supervision of the UN Committee against Torture, whose vice-chair is Prof. Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, a senior figure in the Russian judicial system. Tuzmukhamedov, along with other Russian officials at the UN, act as a buffer against demands from various civil bodies to take action against Russia regarding its use of torture. Thus, this step of withdrawing from the European convention underscores the declarative and political nature of the move.
This declaration constitutes another step in Russia’s policy of positioning itself as an alternative to the West, especially to Europe, which currently stands as Ukraine’s main ally. While the United States is drawing closer to Russia and granting legitimacy to Putin, reflected in the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska, Europe is intensifying its confrontational rhetoric toward Moscow. In particular, the recent violations of Polish airspace point to growing tension between European countries and Russia. “We do not trust Vladimir Putin’s good intentions . . . we believe Vladimir Putin is ready to also invade other countries,” said Polish President Karol Nawrocki on September 9. Similar remarks were made by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the end of August, stating that Germany is already in conflict with Russia and that Moscow is a destabilizing force in Europe. At the same time, the European Union’s military assistance to Ukraine has reached record levels this year, amounting to 25 billion euros at the beginning of September. Furthermore, Europe’s rearmament, increased defense budgets, and expanded security cooperation against the growing Russian threat make it Ukraine’s most significant ally. From this perspective, the withdrawal from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture constitutes another step in Russia’s ideological and political positioning against Europe.
On the practical level, Russia’s withdrawal from the convention effectively normalizes torture and constitutes an admission of guilt regarding its actions toward its own citizens and Ukrainian prisoners of war—both women and men. Over the past three and a half years since its invasion of Ukraine, testimonies have accumulated of severe torture in Russian prisons, including the use of starvation, rape, electric shocks, and prolonged psychological pressure. At times, the torture and its outcomes are filmed and published on the state’s official media channels. Additional testimonies have been carried by Ukrainian prisoners of war who returned to their homeland as part of prisoner exchanges, as well as through independent journalistic investigations. In addition, the release of Russian political prisoners in August 2024, and the publication of the autobiography of murdered opposition leader Alexei Navalny, reinforce the conclusion that the torture system is not only implemented by Russia’s security forces, but that its use has grown in recent years.
At the beginning of the month, Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Duma—the lower house of parliament—aimed at canceling Russia’s accession to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment. Russia joined the convention in 1996, under the rule of Boris Yeltsin, when it sought to position itself as a Western country that valued liberal-democratic principles. Its accession authorized external inspectors to visit and report on conditions in prisons, detention camps, and psychiatric hospitals within its territory. In addition, being a signatory to the convention granted its citizens the right to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. The withdrawal from the convention is mostly formal, since Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe in 2022, following its invasion of Ukraine, had already rendered its signature on the convention largely symbolic. Oversight of institutions in its territory had already been closed off, and even before then was very limited: Of the 30 reports submitted over 27 years of monitoring, only four were published and officially addressed.
It should be noted that the decision to withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture precisely during the war with Ukraine is not coincidental. Russia still remains a signatory to a similar treaty, the UN Convention against Torture. In fact, the provisions of both conventions are very similar, raising the question of why Russia withdrew from one but not the other. The answer appears to be primarily political: Unlike the European convention, the UN convention falls under the supervision of the UN Committee against Torture, whose vice-chair is Prof. Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, a senior figure in the Russian judicial system. Tuzmukhamedov, along with other Russian officials at the UN, act as a buffer against demands from various civil bodies to take action against Russia regarding its use of torture. Thus, this step of withdrawing from the European convention underscores the declarative and political nature of the move.
This declaration constitutes another step in Russia’s policy of positioning itself as an alternative to the West, especially to Europe, which currently stands as Ukraine’s main ally. While the United States is drawing closer to Russia and granting legitimacy to Putin, reflected in the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska, Europe is intensifying its confrontational rhetoric toward Moscow. In particular, the recent violations of Polish airspace point to growing tension between European countries and Russia. “We do not trust Vladimir Putin’s good intentions . . . we believe Vladimir Putin is ready to also invade other countries,” said Polish President Karol Nawrocki on September 9. Similar remarks were made by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the end of August, stating that Germany is already in conflict with Russia and that Moscow is a destabilizing force in Europe. At the same time, the European Union’s military assistance to Ukraine has reached record levels this year, amounting to 25 billion euros at the beginning of September. Furthermore, Europe’s rearmament, increased defense budgets, and expanded security cooperation against the growing Russian threat make it Ukraine’s most significant ally. From this perspective, the withdrawal from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture constitutes another step in Russia’s ideological and political positioning against Europe.
On the practical level, Russia’s withdrawal from the convention effectively normalizes torture and constitutes an admission of guilt regarding its actions toward its own citizens and Ukrainian prisoners of war—both women and men. Over the past three and a half years since its invasion of Ukraine, testimonies have accumulated of severe torture in Russian prisons, including the use of starvation, rape, electric shocks, and prolonged psychological pressure. At times, the torture and its outcomes are filmed and published on the state’s official media channels. Additional testimonies have been carried by Ukrainian prisoners of war who returned to their homeland as part of prisoner exchanges, as well as through independent journalistic investigations. In addition, the release of Russian political prisoners in August 2024, and the publication of the autobiography of murdered opposition leader Alexei Navalny, reinforce the conclusion that the torture system is not only implemented by Russia’s security forces, but that its use has grown in recent years.