I would like to put in order what seems to be contradictory: an unnecessary delay and frankly, for the first time in a month, an Israeli initiative that might lead us to the end of the war.
The hostage deal
Hamas has apparently agreed to the offer. In practice, this is a fundamentally different proposal than the one Israel agreed to. There are two main points of contention: The end of the war and the identity of the prisoners who had been sentenced to life but who will be released as part of the deal. On the first issue, Israel finds the mediators’ proposal acceptable because the phrase “ceasing the war” is not mentioned. The phrase in the proposal “cessation of activity” is vague, and it allows flexibility for renewing the war in the future, should Israel choose. The catch is in the second issue, which doesn’t allow Israel to accept the deal. Israel will waive the right of veto on the decision about the Palestinian prisoners to be released—this is a fundamental matter.
From the publication of the outline of the deal, in the first stage of the deal, Israel will release 50 prisoners—of which 30 have been sentenced to life—in exchange for the release of each kidnapped Israeli female soldier. That is, in total, at the end of the first stage, Israel will release 150 prisoners that were sentenced to life, according to Hamas’s demand, while Israel isn’t allowed to interfere in this. If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to completely end the war.
The operation in Rafah
The operation in Rafah has four objectives:
- Increasing operational pressure on Hamas to improve the chances of a better deal;
- Blocking the border between Egypt and Rafah to prevent future smuggling of weapons to Hamas;
- Taking control of the Rafah crossing as an expression of Hamas’s loss of sovereignty;
- Dismantling the four battalions of the Rafah Brigade: Taking out operatives and commanders, as well as neutralizing the underground tunnels.
In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. Despite the debate about the effectiveness of military pressure in influencing the release of hostages, which has not been achieved so far, it’s clear that the absence of operational pressure does not improve our situation toward a deal. The border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance. This is because even after their dismantling and after Hamas’s destruction in Rafah, if we don’t decide on the governing authority that will replace the IDF there, we should expect to be disappointed again after our withdrawal and after Hamas regains control. The complete conquest of Rafah does not guarantee total victory. Creating excessive expectations about it is not helpful.
Recommendations
- Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages. And what will happen next? Will we never operate in Gaza? Should we leave Hamas intact and contain its power-building? In my opinion, after October 7, no!
- The operation in Rafah has only just begun, and it’s not advisable to declare its scope. This is a developing operation, and it’s forbidden to provide the enemy with certainty. The IDF has started the operation and will continue as long as necessary to achieve the aforementioned objectives according to the order of priority.
I would like to put in order what seems to be contradictory: an unnecessary delay and frankly, for the first time in a month, an Israeli initiative that might lead us to the end of the war.
The hostage deal
Hamas has apparently agreed to the offer. In practice, this is a fundamentally different proposal than the one Israel agreed to. There are two main points of contention: The end of the war and the identity of the prisoners who had been sentenced to life but who will be released as part of the deal. On the first issue, Israel finds the mediators’ proposal acceptable because the phrase “ceasing the war” is not mentioned. The phrase in the proposal “cessation of activity” is vague, and it allows flexibility for renewing the war in the future, should Israel choose. The catch is in the second issue, which doesn’t allow Israel to accept the deal. Israel will waive the right of veto on the decision about the Palestinian prisoners to be released—this is a fundamental matter.
From the publication of the outline of the deal, in the first stage of the deal, Israel will release 50 prisoners—of which 30 have been sentenced to life—in exchange for the release of each kidnapped Israeli female soldier. That is, in total, at the end of the first stage, Israel will release 150 prisoners that were sentenced to life, according to Hamas’s demand, while Israel isn’t allowed to interfere in this. If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to completely end the war.
The operation in Rafah
The operation in Rafah has four objectives:
In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. Despite the debate about the effectiveness of military pressure in influencing the release of hostages, which has not been achieved so far, it’s clear that the absence of operational pressure does not improve our situation toward a deal. The border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance. This is because even after their dismantling and after Hamas’s destruction in Rafah, if we don’t decide on the governing authority that will replace the IDF there, we should expect to be disappointed again after our withdrawal and after Hamas regains control. The complete conquest of Rafah does not guarantee total victory. Creating excessive expectations about it is not helpful.
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