Amid internal debates in Tehran about how to respond to Israel following the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh, Hassan Nasrallah, and Abbas Nilforoushan, Iran has decided to retaliate. The decision goes beyond simply meeting the “deterrence threshold” set on April 14 after the assassination of Hassan Mahdavi, an event that coincided with Iran’s “breaking the fear barrier” concerning a direct response against Israel—something it had previously avoided. Tehran’s leadership seems to recognize that not responding would damage Iran’s standing within the axis and weaken its deterrence capability against Israel more than the risks of retaliation itself.
However, Tehran still hopes it can prevent an Israeli response, which could escalate into a broader regional conflict that it wishes to avoid. To this end, Iran has framed the missile attacks on Israel as acts of “self-defense” aimed only at military targets. At the same time, Iran has underscored its readiness to immediately respond to any Israeli attack on its territory. Tehran is also calling on the international community to prevent Israel from retaliating while warning that it will not hesitate to target its neighbors if they participate, directly or indirectly, in any such attack. Notably, since Iran’s strike on Israel, discussions have merged in Iran about its nuclear capabilities and whether changes to its nuclear strategy are necessary in response to these recent developments.
At the same time, Tehran is working to maintain the unity of the axis of resistance, fearing that the severe blow to Hezbollah could undermine the cohesion of the axis and even jeopardize the entire proxy project. To this end, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has made a quick visit to Lebanon and Syria, aiming to preserve coordination ahead of a possible Israeli attack and ceasefire negotiations, while the commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qa’ani, reportedly arrived in Lebanon to assist with Hezbollah’s recovery efforts.
In conclusion, while Tehran continues to seek ways to prevent an Israeli strike, it understands that it should prepare militarily for the likelihood that such a strike will occur. Therefore, relevant forces in Iran are on high alert. Regardless of the outcome of the current confrontation with Israel, the significant weakening of Hezbollah’s capabilities will likely force Tehran to reconsider its national security strategy and take steps to “compensate” for the severe damage to its deterrence in the region.
Amid internal debates in Tehran about how to respond to Israel following the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh, Hassan Nasrallah, and Abbas Nilforoushan, Iran has decided to retaliate. The decision goes beyond simply meeting the “deterrence threshold” set on April 14 after the assassination of Hassan Mahdavi, an event that coincided with Iran’s “breaking the fear barrier” concerning a direct response against Israel—something it had previously avoided. Tehran’s leadership seems to recognize that not responding would damage Iran’s standing within the axis and weaken its deterrence capability against Israel more than the risks of retaliation itself.
However, Tehran still hopes it can prevent an Israeli response, which could escalate into a broader regional conflict that it wishes to avoid. To this end, Iran has framed the missile attacks on Israel as acts of “self-defense” aimed only at military targets. At the same time, Iran has underscored its readiness to immediately respond to any Israeli attack on its territory. Tehran is also calling on the international community to prevent Israel from retaliating while warning that it will not hesitate to target its neighbors if they participate, directly or indirectly, in any such attack. Notably, since Iran’s strike on Israel, discussions have merged in Iran about its nuclear capabilities and whether changes to its nuclear strategy are necessary in response to these recent developments.
At the same time, Tehran is working to maintain the unity of the axis of resistance, fearing that the severe blow to Hezbollah could undermine the cohesion of the axis and even jeopardize the entire proxy project. To this end, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has made a quick visit to Lebanon and Syria, aiming to preserve coordination ahead of a possible Israeli attack and ceasefire negotiations, while the commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qa’ani, reportedly arrived in Lebanon to assist with Hezbollah’s recovery efforts.
In conclusion, while Tehran continues to seek ways to prevent an Israeli strike, it understands that it should prepare militarily for the likelihood that such a strike will occur. Therefore, relevant forces in Iran are on high alert. Regardless of the outcome of the current confrontation with Israel, the significant weakening of Hezbollah’s capabilities will likely force Tehran to reconsider its national security strategy and take steps to “compensate” for the severe damage to its deterrence in the region.