Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, is increasing its direct involvement in the Palestinian issue. This week, Indonesia began airdropping humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip with Israel’s approval. It was also recently reported that Jakarta agreed to receive wounded Palestinians from the Gaza Strip for treatment. Are these steps purely humanitarian, or do they carry a political dimension?
Against the backdrop of expectations for expanding the circle of normalization at the end of the war, Indonesia’s name arises. Between Jerusalem and Jakarta, there are indirect links in tourism, trade, and technology, yet Indonesia’s official position remains aligned with the Muslim consensus, following the line of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (based in Jeddah), and it sets progress on the Palestinian issue as a precondition for normalization.
Saudi Arabia is a key state in this context. The kingdom plays a central role in shaping the Islamic consensus on the issue and holds diplomatic and economic influence over Indonesia. If, at the end of the war, Riyadh takes steps toward normalization with Israel, this may pave the way for Indonesia to follow suit while giving Jakarta greater ability to withstand criticism within the Islamic world. A Saudi precedent could provide Indonesia and other countries with a kind of certificate of approval.
Israeli–Saudi normalization would also pressure Jakarta to reconsider its position. Riyadh could use its ties with Jakarta to soften Muslim attitudes toward Israel, such as through international Islamic forums or by promoting Saudi-led civil-economic initiatives that also include Israel.
The opposite scenario is also possible, in which Jakarta acts before Riyadh. Prior to the war, it was reported that understandings had been reached regarding Indonesia’s potential participation in the Abraham Accords. But since then, massive demonstrations against Israel have been held in Jakarta, where they have expressed unequivocal support for the Palestinians. The war’s end, combined with a political horizon on the Palestinian issue, could make it easier for Indonesia to normalize relations with Israel before or in parallel with Saudi Arabia.
What else could influence Jakarta’s position? The United States. Indonesia is expected to request international concessions in exchange for normalization with Israel, such as support for its membership in the OECD, security assistance, and economic aid from the United States. Normalization of Israel’s relations with the largest Muslim country in the world is possible and may even benefit the Saudi kingdom by granting strong Islamic legitimacy to any of its moves toward Israel.
Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, is increasing its direct involvement in the Palestinian issue. This week, Indonesia began airdropping humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip with Israel’s approval. It was also recently reported that Jakarta agreed to receive wounded Palestinians from the Gaza Strip for treatment. Are these steps purely humanitarian, or do they carry a political dimension?
Against the backdrop of expectations for expanding the circle of normalization at the end of the war, Indonesia’s name arises. Between Jerusalem and Jakarta, there are indirect links in tourism, trade, and technology, yet Indonesia’s official position remains aligned with the Muslim consensus, following the line of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (based in Jeddah), and it sets progress on the Palestinian issue as a precondition for normalization.
Saudi Arabia is a key state in this context. The kingdom plays a central role in shaping the Islamic consensus on the issue and holds diplomatic and economic influence over Indonesia. If, at the end of the war, Riyadh takes steps toward normalization with Israel, this may pave the way for Indonesia to follow suit while giving Jakarta greater ability to withstand criticism within the Islamic world. A Saudi precedent could provide Indonesia and other countries with a kind of certificate of approval.
Israeli–Saudi normalization would also pressure Jakarta to reconsider its position. Riyadh could use its ties with Jakarta to soften Muslim attitudes toward Israel, such as through international Islamic forums or by promoting Saudi-led civil-economic initiatives that also include Israel.
The opposite scenario is also possible, in which Jakarta acts before Riyadh. Prior to the war, it was reported that understandings had been reached regarding Indonesia’s potential participation in the Abraham Accords. But since then, massive demonstrations against Israel have been held in Jakarta, where they have expressed unequivocal support for the Palestinians. The war’s end, combined with a political horizon on the Palestinian issue, could make it easier for Indonesia to normalize relations with Israel before or in parallel with Saudi Arabia.
What else could influence Jakarta’s position? The United States. Indonesia is expected to request international concessions in exchange for normalization with Israel, such as support for its membership in the OECD, security assistance, and economic aid from the United States. Normalization of Israel’s relations with the largest Muslim country in the world is possible and may even benefit the Saudi kingdom by granting strong Islamic legitimacy to any of its moves toward Israel.