Even more than 70 days after the outbreak of fighting in Gaza, senior Iranian officials continue to express confidence in the victory of Hamas and the Palestinians. While Iranian diplomatic efforts continue to try to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza in order to reduce the price that Israel exacts from Hamas and Hezbollah, senior government officials in Tehran declare that Israel is suffering defeat in the campaign. Hossein Salami, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, stated that the United States and Israel would lose the war. The spokesman for the Revolutionary Guards, Ramazan Sharif, said that Israel is unable to prevail over Hamas, and therefore it strives for a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahian also claimed that Israel has not achieved its goals, writing on his X account that even 70 days after the start of the fighting, Hamas was not destroyed, the resistance was not disarmed, and the Israeli hostages were not released in the fighting.
Although the propaganda motives underlying these statements cannot be ignored, it seems that they largely reflect the assessment in Tehran that Israel will not succeed in realizing the goals of the war, primarily the defeat of Hamas. Furthermore, at this stage there is no evidence of a thought process or reassessment in Tehran regarding the need to prepare for scenarios that could endanger vital Iranian interests in the region the day after the war. Even in the media associated with more moderate circles in the Islamic Republic, there are no voices calling for a reexamination of Iran's policy regarding the possible defeat of Hamas or a change in the regional balance of power.
As long as there is no change in its assessment of the situation, Tehran is not required to reexamine its refraining thus far from realizing its threats to expand the campaign to additional arenas and involve its regional partners, led by Hezbollah, in an all-out confrontation with Israel. Alongside this, the assessment in Iran reflects the gap between the expectation in Israel for a significant image of achievement in the current combat and the way reality is perceived in the eyes of the pro-Iranian axis. In Tehran's view, the balance of combat does not at this stage pose a significant threat to the ability to preserve its interests and those of the “axis of resistance.” In its view, an Israeli failure to neutralize Hamas’s governmental and military capabilities is a reasonable scenario that may allow Tehran to secure its influence even at the end of the campaign. For Israel, this means that the ground operation is not enough, and already now it is important to examine how a new strategic reality is designed, one that will provide Iran with far fewer opportunities to consolidate its influence near our borders.
Even more than 70 days after the outbreak of fighting in Gaza, senior Iranian officials continue to express confidence in the victory of Hamas and the Palestinians. While Iranian diplomatic efforts continue to try to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza in order to reduce the price that Israel exacts from Hamas and Hezbollah, senior government officials in Tehran declare that Israel is suffering defeat in the campaign. Hossein Salami, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, stated that the United States and Israel would lose the war. The spokesman for the Revolutionary Guards, Ramazan Sharif, said that Israel is unable to prevail over Hamas, and therefore it strives for a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahian also claimed that Israel has not achieved its goals, writing on his X account that even 70 days after the start of the fighting, Hamas was not destroyed, the resistance was not disarmed, and the Israeli hostages were not released in the fighting.
Although the propaganda motives underlying these statements cannot be ignored, it seems that they largely reflect the assessment in Tehran that Israel will not succeed in realizing the goals of the war, primarily the defeat of Hamas. Furthermore, at this stage there is no evidence of a thought process or reassessment in Tehran regarding the need to prepare for scenarios that could endanger vital Iranian interests in the region the day after the war. Even in the media associated with more moderate circles in the Islamic Republic, there are no voices calling for a reexamination of Iran's policy regarding the possible defeat of Hamas or a change in the regional balance of power.
As long as there is no change in its assessment of the situation, Tehran is not required to reexamine its refraining thus far from realizing its threats to expand the campaign to additional arenas and involve its regional partners, led by Hezbollah, in an all-out confrontation with Israel. Alongside this, the assessment in Iran reflects the gap between the expectation in Israel for a significant image of achievement in the current combat and the way reality is perceived in the eyes of the pro-Iranian axis. In Tehran's view, the balance of combat does not at this stage pose a significant threat to the ability to preserve its interests and those of the “axis of resistance.” In its view, an Israeli failure to neutralize Hamas’s governmental and military capabilities is a reasonable scenario that may allow Tehran to secure its influence even at the end of the campaign. For Israel, this means that the ground operation is not enough, and already now it is important to examine how a new strategic reality is designed, one that will provide Iran with far fewer opportunities to consolidate its influence near our borders.