What has changed this year in the Iranian arena? In the regional arena, the war in Gaza has provided Iran with the first opportunity to effectively realize—even if partially—the concept of the “convergence of arenas” with Israel. This involved coordinating and synchronizing Iran’s partners and proxies in the Palestinian arena, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, who operate within the framework of the “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States. They have stated that they will not stop until the fighting in Gaza ceases. At the same time, Iran took advantage of the war to deepen its regional involvement, to hinder the normalization process between Israel and the Arab countries, and increase military, political and economic pressure on Israel.
The attack, attributed to Israel, on a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, which resulted in the killing of the commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Zahedi (also known as Hasan Mahdavi), dramatically escalated tensions between Iran and Israel. The Iranian missile and UAV attack on Israel on the night of April 14 marked a new phase in the strategic conflict between the two countries. In an attempt to restore deterrence and establish a new equation with Israel, Iran’s leadership chose to abandon the policy of “strategic patience” in response to Israel’s countermeasures, even if entailed the risk of serious escalation.
Meanwhile, Iran used the war and the breakdown of the unofficial understandings with Washington to partially freeze the high enrichment as a means of advancing its position on the nuclear threshold. Iran also could potentially take actions aimed at expediting their acquisition of nuclear weapons, given a strategic decision by the leadership in Tehran. These developments are concerning, especially considering the increasing references to nuclear weapons by officials in Iran.
Given these circumstances, what needs to change? In the regional arena, Israel should strive to end the war in Gaza while attempting to achieve its main goals. These include neutralizing the governmental and military capabilities of Hamas and establishing a regional framework that weakens the pro-Iranian axis and limits its destabilizing influence in the region. This could be achieved by forming an alternative governing body to Hamas in Gaza, renewing contacts for normalization with Saudi Arabia, and seeking broad understandings with the United States, including the possibility of a defense agreement similar to the one sought by Saudi Arabia.
The regional and international coalition that participated in intercepting launches from Iran toward Israel demonstrates the potential of establishing a regional alliance against Iran the day after the war in Gaza. Achieving the goals of the Gaza war and establishing a new regional framework through the Israeli–Arab normalization process may help restrict Iran’s influence and prevent the further strengthening of the pro-Iranian axis in the region. Creating such a stable reality would be a strong and strategic response to Iran’s ongoing attempts to destabilize the region and jeopardize Israel’s national security.
In the nuclear realm, it’s crucial to promptly work toward a viable alternative to the 2015 nuclear agreement, preferably led by the United States. This alternative should aim to restrict Iran’s nuclear capabilities, particularly in the enrichment field. Simultaneously, in the absence of a settlement, a strategy should be developed to deter Iran from advancing operations, such as enriching uranium to 90%, which could pave the way for producing a nuclear warhead.
What has changed this year in the Iranian arena? In the regional arena, the war in Gaza has provided Iran with the first opportunity to effectively realize—even if partially—the concept of the “convergence of arenas” with Israel. This involved coordinating and synchronizing Iran’s partners and proxies in the Palestinian arena, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, who operate within the framework of the “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States. They have stated that they will not stop until the fighting in Gaza ceases. At the same time, Iran took advantage of the war to deepen its regional involvement, to hinder the normalization process between Israel and the Arab countries, and increase military, political and economic pressure on Israel.
The attack, attributed to Israel, on a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, which resulted in the killing of the commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Zahedi (also known as Hasan Mahdavi), dramatically escalated tensions between Iran and Israel. The Iranian missile and UAV attack on Israel on the night of April 14 marked a new phase in the strategic conflict between the two countries. In an attempt to restore deterrence and establish a new equation with Israel, Iran’s leadership chose to abandon the policy of “strategic patience” in response to Israel’s countermeasures, even if entailed the risk of serious escalation.
Meanwhile, Iran used the war and the breakdown of the unofficial understandings with Washington to partially freeze the high enrichment as a means of advancing its position on the nuclear threshold. Iran also could potentially take actions aimed at expediting their acquisition of nuclear weapons, given a strategic decision by the leadership in Tehran. These developments are concerning, especially considering the increasing references to nuclear weapons by officials in Iran.
Given these circumstances, what needs to change? In the regional arena, Israel should strive to end the war in Gaza while attempting to achieve its main goals. These include neutralizing the governmental and military capabilities of Hamas and establishing a regional framework that weakens the pro-Iranian axis and limits its destabilizing influence in the region. This could be achieved by forming an alternative governing body to Hamas in Gaza, renewing contacts for normalization with Saudi Arabia, and seeking broad understandings with the United States, including the possibility of a defense agreement similar to the one sought by Saudi Arabia.
The regional and international coalition that participated in intercepting launches from Iran toward Israel demonstrates the potential of establishing a regional alliance against Iran the day after the war in Gaza. Achieving the goals of the Gaza war and establishing a new regional framework through the Israeli–Arab normalization process may help restrict Iran’s influence and prevent the further strengthening of the pro-Iranian axis in the region. Creating such a stable reality would be a strong and strategic response to Iran’s ongoing attempts to destabilize the region and jeopardize Israel’s national security.
In the nuclear realm, it’s crucial to promptly work toward a viable alternative to the 2015 nuclear agreement, preferably led by the United States. This alternative should aim to restrict Iran’s nuclear capabilities, particularly in the enrichment field. Simultaneously, in the absence of a settlement, a strategy should be developed to deter Iran from advancing operations, such as enriching uranium to 90%, which could pave the way for producing a nuclear warhead.