Last night, Hezbollah opened a front in support of Iran from Lebanon, following lengthy deliberations and ambiguous statements in recent days. The organization’s leadership faced a fateful dilemma, torn between its commitment to Iran—which has pressed for assistance—and its role as the leading proxy of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” on one hand, and the severe constraints it currently faces on the other. These constraints include its military weakness following ongoing IDF strikes; growing internal criticism and calls for disarmament; warnings from the Lebanese leadership not to involve Lebanon in a war that is not its own; and threats from the United States and Israel regarding the severe consequences Hezbollah would face should it join Iran. The assassination of Iranian leader Khamenei—designated by Hezbollah as a “red line”—appears to have triggered the organization’s limited launch of rockets and UAVs toward Israel early on March 2, as well as calls for revenge at mourning rallies and pro-Iran demonstrations attended by tens of thousands of Shiites in Lebanon.
From Israel’s perspective, Hezbollah’s overnight attack provides an opportunity for the IDF to execute plans prepared in advance. A broad new round of fighting against Hezbollah will further degrade its residual and newly rebuilt capabilities (restored since the ceasefire), as well as its leadership, while the IDF maintains full control over the border area and Lebanese airspace. Following the attack, the IDF quickly responded with a series of strikes across wide areas in Lebanon, and the chief of staff announced the launch of a campaign that will last many days. Evacuation orders were issued for more than 50 Shiite villages, and strikes in Dahieh reportedly eliminated senior members of the organization, including Mohammad Raad, Hezbollah’s senior political leader who led the “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc in the Lebanese parliament and served as the organization’s liaison to Lebanon’s president, with additional targeted killings reportedly forthcoming.
At this early stage, it’s difficult to assess the scope and duration of the fighting in Lebanon, although an IDF ground maneuver appears likely. Concurrently, reports are increasing that elements of the new Syrian regime and its supporters may attack Hezbollah from Syria, seeking retribution for the organization’s role in fighting against them on behalf of Assad’s regime. Regardless, even in a scenario of prolonged fighting with Iran, the IDF still has the capacity to strike Hezbollah simultaneously and inflict severe damage on the organization. Ultimately, this campaign is likely to result in new rules of engagement (whether de facto or through an arrangement) that will make Hezbollah’s recovery even more difficult.
Last night, Hezbollah opened a front in support of Iran from Lebanon, following lengthy deliberations and ambiguous statements in recent days. The organization’s leadership faced a fateful dilemma, torn between its commitment to Iran—which has pressed for assistance—and its role as the leading proxy of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” on one hand, and the severe constraints it currently faces on the other. These constraints include its military weakness following ongoing IDF strikes; growing internal criticism and calls for disarmament; warnings from the Lebanese leadership not to involve Lebanon in a war that is not its own; and threats from the United States and Israel regarding the severe consequences Hezbollah would face should it join Iran. The assassination of Iranian leader Khamenei—designated by Hezbollah as a “red line”—appears to have triggered the organization’s limited launch of rockets and UAVs toward Israel early on March 2, as well as calls for revenge at mourning rallies and pro-Iran demonstrations attended by tens of thousands of Shiites in Lebanon.
From Israel’s perspective, Hezbollah’s overnight attack provides an opportunity for the IDF to execute plans prepared in advance. A broad new round of fighting against Hezbollah will further degrade its residual and newly rebuilt capabilities (restored since the ceasefire), as well as its leadership, while the IDF maintains full control over the border area and Lebanese airspace. Following the attack, the IDF quickly responded with a series of strikes across wide areas in Lebanon, and the chief of staff announced the launch of a campaign that will last many days. Evacuation orders were issued for more than 50 Shiite villages, and strikes in Dahieh reportedly eliminated senior members of the organization, including Mohammad Raad, Hezbollah’s senior political leader who led the “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc in the Lebanese parliament and served as the organization’s liaison to Lebanon’s president, with additional targeted killings reportedly forthcoming.
At this early stage, it’s difficult to assess the scope and duration of the fighting in Lebanon, although an IDF ground maneuver appears likely. Concurrently, reports are increasing that elements of the new Syrian regime and its supporters may attack Hezbollah from Syria, seeking retribution for the organization’s role in fighting against them on behalf of Assad’s regime. Regardless, even in a scenario of prolonged fighting with Iran, the IDF still has the capacity to strike Hezbollah simultaneously and inflict severe damage on the organization. Ultimately, this campaign is likely to result in new rules of engagement (whether de facto or through an arrangement) that will make Hezbollah’s recovery even more difficult.