The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran is seen by the Iranian leadership not only as a serious violation of the Islamic Republic’s sovereignty but also as a personal blow to the leader of Iran himself, since Haniyeh was his guest at the inauguration ceremony of the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
From the statements by Iranian senior officials, including Khamenei himself, it’s clear that Iran isn’t ready to ignore this assassination and intends to respond strongly to Israel, which it perceives as responsible for the assassination of the chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau. And as it proved on the night of April 14, Iran is willing to use its capabilities in the field of missiles and UAVs as a response to its security challenges, and it’s likely that Iran will consider using these capabilities again this time, as regime spokespersons have mentioned possibly targeting military bases in the Haifa and Tel Aviv areas. Moreover, the fact that the April attack “broke the psychological barrier” in Iran in terms of directly attacking Israel could lead to another attack from Iran itself.
Unlike the events of April 14, the other Axis members, primarily Hezbollah, also intend to severely attack Israel this time in revenge for assassinating Fuad Shukr in Beirut and attacking the Hodeidah Port in Yemen. It’s possible that Iran and Hezbollah will combine their responses.
Either way, it seems that after the elimination of Haniyeh, Iran is preparing for another round of violence against Israel, with the understanding that this event will exact a heavy price from Israel. However, despite the recent escalation, it’s doubtful if Iran will expand the campaign against Israel and get caught up in a regional war. However, it’s clear that another round—and certainly if Iran seeks to expand the arsenal of targets in Israel—significantly increases the chance of a direct conflict between Israel and Iran, especially when there is no “closure mechanism” that can force a calm between the two countries.
The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran is seen by the Iranian leadership not only as a serious violation of the Islamic Republic’s sovereignty but also as a personal blow to the leader of Iran himself, since Haniyeh was his guest at the inauguration ceremony of the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
From the statements by Iranian senior officials, including Khamenei himself, it’s clear that Iran isn’t ready to ignore this assassination and intends to respond strongly to Israel, which it perceives as responsible for the assassination of the chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau. And as it proved on the night of April 14, Iran is willing to use its capabilities in the field of missiles and UAVs as a response to its security challenges, and it’s likely that Iran will consider using these capabilities again this time, as regime spokespersons have mentioned possibly targeting military bases in the Haifa and Tel Aviv areas. Moreover, the fact that the April attack “broke the psychological barrier” in Iran in terms of directly attacking Israel could lead to another attack from Iran itself.
Unlike the events of April 14, the other Axis members, primarily Hezbollah, also intend to severely attack Israel this time in revenge for assassinating Fuad Shukr in Beirut and attacking the Hodeidah Port in Yemen. It’s possible that Iran and Hezbollah will combine their responses.
Either way, it seems that after the elimination of Haniyeh, Iran is preparing for another round of violence against Israel, with the understanding that this event will exact a heavy price from Israel. However, despite the recent escalation, it’s doubtful if Iran will expand the campaign against Israel and get caught up in a regional war. However, it’s clear that another round—and certainly if Iran seeks to expand the arsenal of targets in Israel—significantly increases the chance of a direct conflict between Israel and Iran, especially when there is no “closure mechanism” that can force a calm between the two countries.