A plan to create a rail connection between the Gulf states was approved as early as 2009 and has advanced sluggishly until now, while the target date for its implementation, 2018, has long since passed. However, recently momentum is again evident, and it appears that a railway connecting the six Gulf states is taking shape. New rail lines are being launched, tenders are being signed, and a new target date has been set for the launch of a Gulf railway network—2030. However, even behind the recent progress lies a more complex reality and challenges, foremost among them differing paces of progress from one country to another and a clear prioritization of national projects over regional integration.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia continue to lead the move, but each does so separately and out of a clearly competitive logic. The UAE is advancing Etihad Rail as the basis for becoming the Gulf’s central logistics hub, with connections to ports and to trade routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is investing in a broad independent rail network connecting the Gulf to the Red Sea and to new industrial centers, as part of implementing Vision 2030. In both cases, regional cooperation is presented as a goal, but execution rests first and foremost on national interests.
Against this backdrop, the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Qatar stands out; last month they declared the construction of a high-speed railway between the countries that will be completed in six years and will connect Riyadh and Doha in two hours. Also on the agenda is laying a track that will connect the existing infrastructure in the UAE to Oman, but no timetable has been provided for implementation. In 2026, work is expected to begin on the railway between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which is supposed to start operating in 2028. A rail line that will connect Bahrain to Saudi Arabia and from there to the shared network is expected to operate on the basis of the existing infrastructure of the King Fahd Causeway (which connects the countries).
The work is indeed progressing, and the political commitment to the Gulf Railway project appears today stronger than ever. But it still must overcome rivalries, reduce suspicion, and choose integration over competition. In a broader context, the rail momentum in the Gulf can be integrated within the IMEC initiative and connect regional railways to global trade corridors between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Israel has a clear interest in integrating into the transportation web being built in the Gulf, strengthening its economic and strategic standing, and becoming a relevant partner in shaping the trade routes of the 21st century—and not a spectator from the sidelines.
A plan to create a rail connection between the Gulf states was approved as early as 2009 and has advanced sluggishly until now, while the target date for its implementation, 2018, has long since passed. However, recently momentum is again evident, and it appears that a railway connecting the six Gulf states is taking shape. New rail lines are being launched, tenders are being signed, and a new target date has been set for the launch of a Gulf railway network—2030. However, even behind the recent progress lies a more complex reality and challenges, foremost among them differing paces of progress from one country to another and a clear prioritization of national projects over regional integration.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia continue to lead the move, but each does so separately and out of a clearly competitive logic. The UAE is advancing Etihad Rail as the basis for becoming the Gulf’s central logistics hub, with connections to ports and to trade routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is investing in a broad independent rail network connecting the Gulf to the Red Sea and to new industrial centers, as part of implementing Vision 2030. In both cases, regional cooperation is presented as a goal, but execution rests first and foremost on national interests.
Against this backdrop, the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Qatar stands out; last month they declared the construction of a high-speed railway between the countries that will be completed in six years and will connect Riyadh and Doha in two hours. Also on the agenda is laying a track that will connect the existing infrastructure in the UAE to Oman, but no timetable has been provided for implementation. In 2026, work is expected to begin on the railway between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which is supposed to start operating in 2028. A rail line that will connect Bahrain to Saudi Arabia and from there to the shared network is expected to operate on the basis of the existing infrastructure of the King Fahd Causeway (which connects the countries).
The work is indeed progressing, and the political commitment to the Gulf Railway project appears today stronger than ever. But it still must overcome rivalries, reduce suspicion, and choose integration over competition. In a broader context, the rail momentum in the Gulf can be integrated within the IMEC initiative and connect regional railways to global trade corridors between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Israel has a clear interest in integrating into the transportation web being built in the Gulf, strengthening its economic and strategic standing, and becoming a relevant partner in shaping the trade routes of the 21st century—and not a spectator from the sidelines.