In 2020, following the election of President Biden after four years of Trump, the EU member states breathed a sigh of relief when Biden declared that “America is back.” With this, Biden sought to clarify that the U.S. was returning to embrace the principles that had guided its foreign and security policy in the decades since the end of World War II— a return to the liberal order, the expansion of the circle of democracies, the importance of alliances, support for international institutions, and more. Trump’s return to the White House represents a paradigmatic shift in the U.S.’s conduct, and therefore also in transatlantic relations.
In fact, we are witnessing an “ideological” clash between two worldviews regarding the nature of international relations. While the EU seeks to preserve the liberal international order, which includes maintaining existing international institutions and the norms that guide international conduct, Trump sees himself as committed to nothing except the ambitious mission he set for himself— restoring America’s greatness. In his view, in order to achieve this goal, all means are legitimate, including the destruction of the existing order and, if necessary, the use of force, with all that entails.
In the world order that Trump will contribute to shaping— one based on a balance of power between great powers, military, economic, and technological strength, and a possible division into spheres of influence— EU member states (and the EU as an institution) find themselves at a disadvantage. Beyond disagreements over how to respond to Trump’s expected policies and everything he represents, technological and economic gaps reduce the EU’s bargaining power with the U.S. Added to this is Europe's dependence on American assistance for its security.
In this state of affairs, the EU will have to adjust to the new rules of the game that are currently being shaped. Therefore, in order to avoid Trump’s various threats (tariffs and reduced security support), the EU— which does not seek confrontation— will have to contribute its share in a way that satisfies at least some of the American president’s demands, a task that is not easy given the lack of unity among member states. This situation may play into Trump’s hands, as he will strive for the bilateralization of relations with those countries that agree to his terms.
In conclusion, a difficult transition period awaits the EU, which failed to take advantage of the wake-up call it received to properly prepare for the second Trump era.
In 2020, following the election of President Biden after four years of Trump, the EU member states breathed a sigh of relief when Biden declared that “America is back.” With this, Biden sought to clarify that the U.S. was returning to embrace the principles that had guided its foreign and security policy in the decades since the end of World War II— a return to the liberal order, the expansion of the circle of democracies, the importance of alliances, support for international institutions, and more. Trump’s return to the White House represents a paradigmatic shift in the U.S.’s conduct, and therefore also in transatlantic relations.
In fact, we are witnessing an “ideological” clash between two worldviews regarding the nature of international relations. While the EU seeks to preserve the liberal international order, which includes maintaining existing international institutions and the norms that guide international conduct, Trump sees himself as committed to nothing except the ambitious mission he set for himself— restoring America’s greatness. In his view, in order to achieve this goal, all means are legitimate, including the destruction of the existing order and, if necessary, the use of force, with all that entails.
In the world order that Trump will contribute to shaping— one based on a balance of power between great powers, military, economic, and technological strength, and a possible division into spheres of influence— EU member states (and the EU as an institution) find themselves at a disadvantage. Beyond disagreements over how to respond to Trump’s expected policies and everything he represents, technological and economic gaps reduce the EU’s bargaining power with the U.S. Added to this is Europe's dependence on American assistance for its security.
In this state of affairs, the EU will have to adjust to the new rules of the game that are currently being shaped. Therefore, in order to avoid Trump’s various threats (tariffs and reduced security support), the EU— which does not seek confrontation— will have to contribute its share in a way that satisfies at least some of the American president’s demands, a task that is not easy given the lack of unity among member states. This situation may play into Trump’s hands, as he will strive for the bilateralization of relations with those countries that agree to his terms.
In conclusion, a difficult transition period awaits the EU, which failed to take advantage of the wake-up call it received to properly prepare for the second Trump era.