There are important aspects in the American plan that appears to have brought an end to the intense phase of the war that began on October 7, 2023. Yet in the process led by the Trump administration, Qatar has been assigned a central role.
The fact that Hamas remains, in practice, the sovereign — though battered and weaker than before — over roughly half of the Gaza Strip, means that alongside it stands Qatar, with its considerable economic and political power and its influence in the United States. For years, Qatar and Hamas have fed off one another in a mutually reinforcing relationship.
Over the past two years, Qatar has acted according to a clear interest — ensuring that Hamas remains in power at the end of the war. Otherwise, it would lose a critical means of influence in the Palestinian and regional arenas, as well as its ability to curry favor with the United States in ways that benefit its own security and status.
Qatar operates in a constant tension between its desire to maintain loyalty to its patron, the United States, and its wish to be perceived as standing by the Palestinians. It supported both the “New York Declaration” and Trump’s “20 Points Plan,” which call for Hamas’s disarmament. Behind this pragmatism lies the need to align with U.S. policy — and perhaps an understanding that it will be difficult to implement Phase B of the plan, allowing Doha to pay only lip service on the matter. It is even possible that Hamas was given assurances regarding an end to the war and perhaps its continued survival.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — the countries Israel had hoped would become the main forces rebuilding Gaza at Qatar’s expense — are hesitant to take on a major role, conditioning their assistance on the end of Hamas rule and its disarmament. The result is an increased likelihood that Qatari aid, ostensibly provided without preconditions, will once again find its way to Hamas. Qatari involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction will enhance its political influence in the postwar period — ultimately strengthening not only Doha’s status but also Hamas itself.
Qatar’s influence also derives from its close ties with the United States, particularly from Washington’s insistence over the past two years on involving it in negotiations — and now, on making it an integral part of Gaza’s reconstruction.
Not only does Hamas remain a direct “address” for Qatari influence, but relations between Doha and Washington are stronger than ever. In the eyes of the United States, Qatar has proven itself a reliable partner and exerted effective pressure on Hamas to accept the proposed framework. This explains Israel’s difficulty in countering Qatar’s influence — such an effort would be seen as a blow to American interests and to the prospects for peace.
There are important aspects in the American plan that appears to have brought an end to the intense phase of the war that began on October 7, 2023. Yet in the process led by the Trump administration, Qatar has been assigned a central role.
The fact that Hamas remains, in practice, the sovereign — though battered and weaker than before — over roughly half of the Gaza Strip, means that alongside it stands Qatar, with its considerable economic and political power and its influence in the United States. For years, Qatar and Hamas have fed off one another in a mutually reinforcing relationship.
Over the past two years, Qatar has acted according to a clear interest — ensuring that Hamas remains in power at the end of the war. Otherwise, it would lose a critical means of influence in the Palestinian and regional arenas, as well as its ability to curry favor with the United States in ways that benefit its own security and status.
Qatar operates in a constant tension between its desire to maintain loyalty to its patron, the United States, and its wish to be perceived as standing by the Palestinians. It supported both the “New York Declaration” and Trump’s “20 Points Plan,” which call for Hamas’s disarmament. Behind this pragmatism lies the need to align with U.S. policy — and perhaps an understanding that it will be difficult to implement Phase B of the plan, allowing Doha to pay only lip service on the matter. It is even possible that Hamas was given assurances regarding an end to the war and perhaps its continued survival.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — the countries Israel had hoped would become the main forces rebuilding Gaza at Qatar’s expense — are hesitant to take on a major role, conditioning their assistance on the end of Hamas rule and its disarmament. The result is an increased likelihood that Qatari aid, ostensibly provided without preconditions, will once again find its way to Hamas. Qatari involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction will enhance its political influence in the postwar period — ultimately strengthening not only Doha’s status but also Hamas itself.
Qatar’s influence also derives from its close ties with the United States, particularly from Washington’s insistence over the past two years on involving it in negotiations — and now, on making it an integral part of Gaza’s reconstruction.
Not only does Hamas remain a direct “address” for Qatari influence, but relations between Doha and Washington are stronger than ever. In the eyes of the United States, Qatar has proven itself a reliable partner and exerted effective pressure on Hamas to accept the proposed framework. This explains Israel’s difficulty in countering Qatar’s influence — such an effort would be seen as a blow to American interests and to the prospects for peace.