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The possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine and a subsequent descent into war continues to be the focus of the international agenda. Notwithstanding the growing concentration of forces on the Russian border with Ukraine and repeated warnings from senior United States officials of an approaching invasion, even now it is not clear in the West if Russian President Vladimir Putin indeed intends to launch a military move, or if he wants to leverage the military buildup to force the West to accept his demands, above all to stop the spread of NATO eastward and receive a commitment that Ukraine will not be recruited into the alliance. In any case, most estimates of the preferred date for starting the campaign, if such a decision is taken, are no earlier than February 20 – the end of the Winter Olympics in China.

To the United States and the other NATO countries it is clear that neither the threat nor even an actual invasion is the Russian President’s goal, but rather a means for achieving strategic objectives. These, like other crises previously initiated by Russia, reflect Putin’s perception that he has been charged with the task of restoring former glory and rehabilitating Russia’s position as a great power, which it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Joining this is Putin’s understanding that the United States, together with NATO, exploited Russia’s weakness in the 1990s in order to expand eastward at the expense of Russia’s interests, while posing an ever-growing threat to its security.

So far it seems that as Putin sees it, the US administration regards Russia as a matter of concern that is not at the top of its priorities and therefore there is no obligation to consider its demands, certainly not in the way that the United States acts toward what it regards as its number one threat – China. Putin wants to change this equation. The question is, will he succeed, or has he climbed up too high a tree from which it will be hard to get down. Even if that was not his original plan, he may assess that he has no choice but to promote the military option, particularly out of fear that avoidance will look like weakness, leading to stronger pressure on Russia.

The US administration and its allies are continuing to pursue a policy with two main thrusts: continuation of efforts to promote diplomatic solutions to the crisis with Russia (including during the visit of French President Emanuel Macron to Moscow, and also during the visit to Russia of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz) and warnings about punitive measures to be taken, together with ongoing military preparations in Eastern Europe. The administration announced that some 8,000 American troops have been placed on alert in view of the possibility that they will be sent at short notice to Eastern Europe in order to join a special NATO “response force,” and President Biden has approved sending another 3,000 soldiers to Eastern Europe.

In parallel, the United States and other countries are supplying Ukraine with weapons, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. President Biden holds regular consultations with European leaders, and recently also hosted the German Chancellor in the White House. At the moment, the most probable scenario is that if Russia launches a military campaign against Ukraine, the main response by the West will be significant expansion of the economic sanctions. In addition, President Biden has again threatened that in such an event, the Nord Stream 2 gas deal between Russia and Germany will not be implemented. At the same time, military aid to Ukraine will continue, but without actual military involvement (Ukraine is not a NATO member), accompanied by broader military preparations by NATO in order to defend its member states in the Baltic.

For President Biden, the crisis is a significant test of his leadership, and it appears that the administration sees it as an opportunity to improve the US status in view of the sharp criticism of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is clear to the administration that the manner of handling the crisis with Russia will also impact on its rivalry with China and on the shape of the world order in the coming years. Indeed, contrary to Biden’s image as a weak president and possibly contrary to what was expected by Putin, his stance against Russia has hitherto been characterized by determination, while adhering to the intention of the NATO alliance not to change the military arrangement in Eastern Europe and to defend member states, including taking practical steps on the ground if necessary.

Moreover, it appears that the administration has internalized the lessons of its conduct during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and is being meticulous about an orderly process of decision making over the crisis with Russia. There is an emphasis on full coordination with its NATO allies, combined with an effort to prevent Putin from achieving his aim of driving a wedge between Europe and the United States. In this context, President Biden is striving to show that there are no gaps between himself and the German Chancellor. However, Germany is a special case, and it sometimes looks as if it is not on board with the messages coming from Washington and the other allies in Europe. Hence Germany’s “special way” of managing its relations with Russia – the result of a complex history and geographical proximity. Herein derives what is depicted as a cautious and hesitant approach by the Chancellor, who has so far refused to make a clear statement about the fate of the Nord Stream 2 project if Russia invades Ukraine, and has also avoided sending defensive weapons to Ukraine – and thereby strengthening the image of Germany as deviating from the Western consensus.

Nevertheless, there is an impression that the crisis has breathed new life into NATO, which was heavily criticized during the Trump presidency, demonstrating once again to European countries that they not only have to find ways of reducing their dependence on energy from Russia but must also take more meaningful steps to strengthen their military capabilities. President Biden is indeed working to find an alternative for the energy issue, including with Qatar, which was declared, during the recent visit of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Khalifa al-Thani in Washington, to be “a major non-NATO ally.”

It is still too early to estimate the full global significance of the Ukrainian crisis, particularly if it develops into a military conflict. The Middle East is also following the actions of the United States, in an attempt to understand whether President Biden’s policy reflects weakness or readiness to stand up to President Putin, and how far the impression he creates will affect the conduct of America’s rivals in the region, against the background of the targeted killing of the head of ISIS in Syria. Even if the current tendency in the region is to present the administration as weak against its rivals, so far it seems that in the face of a challenge with strategic significance for the US, the administration is showing determination not to yield to Russian pressure and manipulation.

The crisis between the West and Russia requires the Israeli government to formulate an immediate policy for the dilemma – which Israel also faced when it was required to define its position after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 – of choosing between the desire to maintain good relations with Russia and the need to take account of American interests. Naturally Israel is trying to walk the tightrope and as far as possible avoid taking any position over the crisis in Eastern Europe, while not choosing a side. However, even so, and certainly if military hostilities break out and decisions are made to extend the diplomatic and economic sanctions on Russia, Israeli policy must not conflict with that of the US administration. The determined stand of the United States and the West against Russian threats, and their success in any military conflict, are clearly in Israel’s interest.

The bottom line is that the conflict between the West and Russia cannot be resolved, and the pressures applied by Russia will probably continue, even if there is no actual military engagement. This is a crisis of an “ideological” nature, replete with tensions between the principles that guide Western countries (such as territorial integrity, sovereignty, honoring of treaties) and Russia’s ambitions to preserve and expand its areas of influence (even at the cost of military escalation). Presumably the West’s efforts will focus on conflict management, with an attempt to prevent any uncontrolled flare-up, and all this without renouncing its principles. The West still has much room to maneuver and make concessions to Russia on security aspects without interfering with the security of NATO members. Will Putin be satisfied with that? At this stage, nobody knows.