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The anthrax attack, caused the death of five civilians, prompted widespread hysteria, and disrupted daily life in the United States. Despite unprecedented investigative efforts and the propagation of various theories about who might be responsible for the attack, it remained an unsolved mystery. In the last few weeks there was a significant turning point in the investigation, when it came to light that authorities had identified a new suspect and there was an intention to press charges. However, further developments became moot once the suspect, a scientist at a US army laboratory that engages in developing solutions to biological weapons, committed suicide.

While the media has focused on the suspect and the attempt to understand what underlay his alleged decision to carry out a biological attack, the new developments in the episode have underscored the need to reexamine accepted premises regarding the threat of biological weapons in general and biological terrorism in particular.

One of the central myths connected to biological terror is the idea of “the biology student,” whereby any biology student with certain basic equipment that can be bought relatively easily and inexpensively can produce effective biological weapons. However, both reality and experience gained to date indicate that the picture is far more complex, and the most recent incident provides the strongest evidence thus far. The suspect in this case was an expert on the subject who even won an award for his part in developing a vaccination against anthrax. At this stage it is not known whether he intended to cause the greatest number of casualties possible or to inflict limited damage. But the bottom line – notwithstanding the vast amount of the suspect's knowledge and the use of a quality biological substance – is that in practice, the attack caused a very small number of casualties. These results echo the experience of previous events. At the same time, one should not underestimate the collateral effects of the anthrax attack, including heightened anxiety in the United States, disruption of daily life, and the costs involved in cleansing the affected areas.

Another important point relates to the perpetrator’s profile. The great concern over biological terror is that it will be carried out by an international terror organization, such as al-Qaeda, or a state actor; since the resources available to such actors are greater than those available to others, such as local groups or individuals, their capacity to upgrade the potential into more potent biological capabilities is far greater. Indeed in the case of the anthrax envelopes, there was concern that a country or terror organization was behind the attack, partly because a considerable amount of know how and special equipment were required to produce biological substances of the particular quality used, and also due to its proximity to the September 11 attacks.

According to details unearthed by the authorities, however, the anthrax attack in fact joins the limited number of cases in which use was made of biological substances for hostile intent by private individuals or local groups but not for international terror. The motive for the attack is not clear and in light of the death of the solitary suspect, it is possible that it may never be known. Among the possibilities raised are the desire to test in real life conditions the vaccination he helped develop; the wish to profit from the rise in vaccination sales; and an attempt to raise awareness of the danger of biological terror. One way or another, the anthrax attack does not deviate from the historical pattern of biological substances used for hostile purposes. In practice, there is no solid evidence of the current use of biological substances for international terror, although there is evidence that points to interest and even involvement of organizations such as al-Qaeda in this area.

According to estimates, since the anthrax attack the United States has invested over $50 billion in protection against the biological threat. Beyond the finances themselves, one of the side effects of this investment is that today, a considerable number of companies and institutions, including academic institutions, are involved in research and development regarding protection against this threat. This often involves working with and storing dangerous substances, including anthrax. Hence, for example, the significant increase in the number of laboratories licensed to engage in highly dangerous biological elements (BSL4). This situation involves several potential dangers, including loss or theft of biological substances by hostile elements – local or international. In addition, there is also the danger of a terrorist working from the inside. There may be various reasons for using the substance. It could be a wish to raise awareness, a wish to gain glory/money, or because of personal grudges against certain people or society at large. The large number of people and institutions engaged in the field of dangerous substances creates a paradoxical situation in which there is a tangible danger of a threat from the inside – intentional or otherwise – and not of an external threat.

Examination of accumulated experience over the years including the anthrax attack indicates that at this stage, biological substances are not the form of weaponry most favored by terror organizations. The lack of experience with these substances, the technical complexity involved (principally, in development and manufacture of a quality substance and its deployment in the field), and the concern over an extreme and wide ranging response of those targeted explain the limited phenomenon. On the other hand, the anthrax attack is another incident of the use of biological substances for limited local purposes. Consequently, one should question whether the fact that the US – like other countries – has invested enormous amounts in research and development to find a solution to the biological threat posed by international terror organizations is justified. In addition, the question arises whether there is any danger that widening the circle of those involved in the field will increase the actual use of biological substances for hostile purposes.

While different conclusions were drawn regarding the anthrax envelopes, largely given their origin vis-à-vis the degree of danger of the biological threat, recent developments support the argument that there is a tendency to err with regard to the biological threat, specifically on the side of severity. Based on what is currently known about the anthrax attack, a more accurate view of biological threats in general and biological terror in particular should relate to a threat with the potential to cause considerable damage (particularly if this entails use of infectious disease substances – in contrast with the anthrax episode), even though the likelihood of this possible occurrence is relatively low.