Publications

Key Findings:

Key Findings:

• Growing support for establishing a state commission of investigation appointed by the president of the Supreme Court—64% expresses support for this option, compared to 58% in the previous month. Opposition to establishing any kind of commission remains marginal, at only 2%.
• Increased trust in the IDF’s ability to investigate and learn from the events of October 7—After a decline in February compared to January, this month saw an increase in public trust in the army’s ability to conduct internal investigations and draw lessons. A total of 43% expresses a high degree of trust in the army’s ability to conduct investigations and learn from its actions, up from 35% in February. Still, a majority of 52% expresses a low level of trust in the IDF’s ability to investigate and learn from the events of October 7.

Key Findings:

• The majority of the public believes that political considerations motivated the Prime Minister to renew the fighting in Gaza—54% of the population believes that mainly political considerations underpin the decision to return to fighting. Another 40% believes that mainly security considerations have motivated the prime minister. The gaps between the sectors are sharp: 87% of the Arab public believes that these are mainly political considerations, compared to 46% of the Jewish public.
• The public is divided on the question of support for returning to fighting in Gaza—29% supports a targeted air attack, and 28% also supports a return to ground fighting; that is, about 57% of the population supports in some way the renewal of fighting. In contrast, 37% of the public opposes the continuation of the fighting at this stage. This opposition is particularly pronounced among the Arab public (at 86%, compared to 25.5% among Jews).
• The majority of the public believes that the resumption of fighting reduces the chances of the hostages being returned—52% believes this, compared to only 29% who believe that the fighting will increase the chances of their return, and 13% who think that it has no effect at all.
• Some 61% of the public thinks that the government is not doing everything in its power to return the hostages—This figure is particularly pronounced among the Arab public (92%), but a majority of the Jewish public (54%) also shares this feeling. At the same time, 32% believes the opposite (39% among Jews and only 5% among Arabs).
• Some 46.5%of the public is not interested in Israeli settlement or control in Gaza—When asked what the reality in Gaza should be the day after the war, 45.5% thinks that control of the Gaza Strip should be transferred to an international entity and another 11% believes that control should be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. Another 23% supports the return of Jewish settlement to Gaza, and 14% believes in prolonged Israeli military rule in the Strip.
• The public is divided on the IDF’s ability to achieve its combat objectives in Gaza—48% of the public believes that the objectives will be achieved in full or to a large extent—with a significant difference between Jews and Arabs (55% of the Jewish population and 17.5% of the Arab population).
• Some 62% of the population thinks that the IDF will win the war in Gaza—a continuation of the upward trend compared to 59% in February and 55% in January, but still lower than December (65%). Broken down by sector, 71% of Jews and 25% of Arabs believe that the IDF will win the war in Gaza. The proportion of those who believe that the IDF will probably or certainly not win is 29% (23% of Jews and 54% of Arabs).

Key Findings:

• Increase in public confidence in the ability to ensure the security of northern communities—45% of the population believes that the current security situation allows the return of most residents to their communities—a significant increase compared to only 34% in February. The increase is particularly noticeable among the Jewish population, where 49% believes that return is now possible, compared to only 32% in February. In contrast, among the Arab population, there was a decrease in the sense of security, with 31% believing that return is now possible, compared to 45% in February and 50% in January. At the same time, the rate of those who believe that return is not possible fell from 48% in February to 47% in March. This decrease mainly reflects a change among the Jewish public (from 52% to 45%), while among the Arabs there was actually an increase (from 34% to 58%).

Key Findings:

• Some 57% of Israelis support separation from the Palestinians or a two-state solution—33% of the public believes that separation from the Palestinians is the desired solution to the conflict. Support is high among Jews at 39% but very low among the Arab public at only 8.5%. Another 24% of the public supports a two-state solution for two peoples, with support for this option being very high among the Arab public at 60%. An additional 24% of respondents support the full annexation of the territories without granting Palestinian residents civil rights. Support is particularly high among the Jewish public (29%), but almost non-existent among Arabs (2.5%). A one-state binational solution receives only minimal support—4% of the public, with 16% support among Arabs and 1% among Jews.
• In a separate question regarding the possibility of a “one-state” solution—only 9% of the total population expresses support for a one-state solution with equal civil rights for the Palestinians—mainly among Arabs at 33% and very few among Jews at 3%. Another 31% of the public supports a one-state solution on the condition that the Palestinians are not given full civil rights—mainly among the Jewish population at 37%, compared to only 9% among Arabs. However, 45% of the public overwhelmingly opposes the one-state solution (42% among the Jewish public and 42% among the Arab public). An additional 15% of the public responded that they do not know their position on the issue.

Key Findings:

• The public is divided on the commitment of the US President to Israel's security—33% of respondents believe that President Trump is very committed to protecting Israel’s security interests, while 42% believe that he supports Israel only when it serves his personal interests, and 18% see him as unpredictable and cannot be trusted on security matters.

The motivation for encouraging reserve service among the Jewish population remains stable—59% of respondents indicate that they would encourage a family member who already served in the combat reserves during the war to report for reserve duty again—a slight increase compared to the figures from February (54% percent) and December (56%). The rate of those opposed to encouraging additional service stands at 28%, also a relatively stable figure.

• Granting a broad exemption to the ultra-Orthodox from service in the IDF could harm motivation for combat service—Again this month, 67% of the Jewish population estimates that such an exemption would harm motivation for combat service to a great extent or to some extent (44% believes that the harm would be particularly serious). In contrast, only 11% claims that the exemption would not harm at all and an additional 19% thinks that such an exemption would harm to a small extent.
• The majority of the public believes that it is inappropriate for one to refuse to participate in combat for fear of harming the hostages—60% of the total population expresses this position. About a quarter (25.5%) believes that it is appropriate to refuse to operate if there is a fear of harming hostages—a minority position, but significant.
• Controversy surrounding the decision to dismiss two reservists who refused to participate in the fighting in Gaza—55% supports the decision (33% strongly supports and 22% somewhat supports), compared to 34% opposing it (21% somewhat opposes it and 13% very much opposes it).