Publications

prospective iran-p5+1 meeting: is this really progress? last week iran submitted a “package of proposals for comprehensive and constructive negotiations” to representatives of the p5+1 states: us, russia, britain, france, china, and germany. this iranian proposal came in response to requests on the part of the p5+1 to conduct negotiations on the nuclear issue, yet it lacked a key ingredient: namely, any reference to iran’s nuclear program. it raised instead a wide spectrum of regional and global challenges, which according to one commentary from the gulf actually strengthens suspicions not only that iran strives to regional prominence but that it indeed has a hand in many of the region’s problems. nevertheless, the six powers, with the urging of the eu’s javier solana, agreed to enter negotiations with iran on this basis, and solana quickly arranged a date: october 1. while officially the meeting is to be between solana and iran’s saeed jalili, it is reported that there will be representatives present from each of the p5+1 states, with william burns representing the us. last week iran submitted a "package of proposals for comprehensive and constructive negotiations" to representatives of the p5+1 states: us, russia, britain, france, china, and germany. this iranian proposal came in response to requests on the part of the p5+1 to conduct negotiations on the nuclear issue, yet it lacked a key ingredient: namely, any reference to iran's nuclear program. it raised instead a wide spectrum of regional and global challenges, which according to one commentary from the gulf actually strengthens suspicions not only that iran strives to regional prominence but that it indeed has a hand in many of the region's problems. nevertheless, the six powers, with the urging of the eu's javier solana, agreed to enter negotiations with iran on this basis, and solana quickly arranged a date: october 1. while officially the meeting is to be between solana and iran's saeed jalili, it is reported that there will be representatives present from each of the p5+1 states, with william burns representing the us. this is not the bilateral us-iranian dialogue that president obama offered and anticipated, and with iran avoiding mention of the nuclear issue in its proposal, it is certainly not the breakthrough that the west has been waiting for. in fact, the initial reaction to the iranian proposal on the part of some us and european officials was to dismiss it entirely, on the grounds that it was irrelevant. still, the question remains whether the idea of a meeting on the basis of iran's proposal can nevertheless be considered a possible constructive first step. on the basis of what we know so far, the prospects are far from encouraging. from the standpoint of the negotiations dynamic, there are a number of problems that relate to the perceived international resolve of the group of states facing iran. the p5+1 have not only given up on their precondition of iran ceasing uranium enrichment activities, but they are now agreeing to enter dialogue with an essential iranian "no" as far as even discussing the nuclear issue in the talks themselves. against this background, us assurances conveyed by the state department spokesman that it will not allow the nuclear issue to be absent from the talks, regardless of what iran has proposed, sound weak and ineffective. this leaves iran with the upper hand as far as agenda-setting. an additional problem is that the six powers themselves are certainly not on the same page as far as their positions on iran's nuclear program – they have different ideas about the character of this program, its implications, iran's intentions, and the best way forward. thus, even if the us succeeds in forcing the nuclear issue onto the agenda, this will be a dialogue in which iran – as a single and determined actor – has an inherent structural advantage over the other side, which lacks unity. in this sense, a us-iranian dialogue would make much more sense. and regarding us resolve, at precisely the same time that the us gave its consent to talks with iran, it gave in to north korea as well and agreed to direct bilateral talks. this is a concession not likely to go unnoticed in iran. moreover, these developments are taking place in the direct wake of some very serious issues raised by the iaea with regard to iran's intentions in the nuclear realm. putting aside the issue of media reports about a classified annex on iran that the iaea director general refuses to make public that contains even more incriminating evidence regarding iran's military intentions – what came out in the public report was explicit enough to arouse concern in iran. elbaradei said that the iaea had reached a deadlock with iran; that iran continued to enrich uranium in direct violation of un security council resolutions, and that it was not cooperating on the outstanding questions over research into the military aspects of its nuclear program. therefore, while iran was expected in any case to present its proposal for negotiations before the late september deadline set by obama, the specific date chosen was most likely fine-tuned for last week in order to deflect attention away from the iaea and its reports. a close look at us statements reveals that the meeting is not referred to as the first meeting of negotiations, rather as a test of iranian intentions. even though various iranian officials have clarified over and over again for at least a year that they consider the nuclear file closed, the idea is to see whether iran will finally agree to discuss the nuclear issue or not. if the thinking in the us is indeed to create some "moment of truth" for testing iran, this is also a problematic strategy. indeed, every previous "moment of truth" for testing iran's intentions over the past six or seven years has ended in failure.[1] each such moment has been transformed by iran into a further step in its overall strategy of stalling, injecting just enough cooperation at strategic junctures in order to ward off the harshest measures, and ultimately playing for time in order to push its nuclear program forward to its goal. placing the dynamic in iran's court – which some commentators consider to be a clever strategy – has never proven itself. rather, it plays right into iran's hand, because it enables iran to keep the ball in its court for as long as possible; the other side is rendered helpless unless it fixes a clear deadline for moving forward, which it is usually reluctant to do. again, iran gains valuable time. finding the "smoking gun" and testing iran's intentions have been at the heart of international efforts to confront iran on the nuclear issue, but they have proven to be highly elusive goals. it's high time for the international community to recognize that there is already enough incriminating evidence of where iran is going in the nuclear realm, and that its intentions are clear. now is the time for the west, and the us in particular, to take the lead in setting the agenda on iran, because the moment of truth they are waiting for will never arrive – at least not before it is too late. [1] see emily b. landau, "us engagement with iran: the moment of truth in the nuclear crisis?" tel aviv notes, no. 173, june 6, 2006.