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As expected, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was reelected Egyptian president in late March 2018, this time, with 97.08 percent of the vote. Only 41.05 percent of eligible voters voted in these elections, compared with 47.5 percent in the 2014 elections and 51.85 percent in the 2012 elections, although the elections continued for three days and despite threats (later proven empty) to fine any eligible voter who did not exercise his right to vote 500 Egyptian pounds ($28, one sixth of the average monthly wage in Egypt). This means that of the 59.07 million eligible voters, 37.08 million did not vote for the incumbent president. The number of invalid ballots was the highest in Egyptian history (approximately 7 percent, more than 1.7 million votes), and most young Egyptians stayed away from the ballot boxes. The losing candidate, Moussa Mostafa Moussa, declared his support for el-Sisi before joining the race, and his candidacy was perceived as an attempt to create the appearance of a contested election. More significant candidates were disqualified or arrested, or they decided on their own to withdraw their candidacy.

More than affording an electoral mandate, the recent presidential elections highlighted the incumbent president's challenge of legitimacy. The primary goal – a high percentage of voter turnout, especially among the young generation - was not achieved, and the campaign to support his candidacy proved of limited effectiveness. The two main promises on which el-Sisi based the legitimacy of his rule during his first term – restoring security stability and achieving economic prosperity – have not yet been fulfilled completely, and the credibility of these promises has eroded to a considerable extent. The "positive" legitimacy that rested on the hope of an improvement in people's lives in Egypt has gradually given way to "negative" legitimacy that depends on the absence of an attractive alternative, the fear of decline into anarchy (as in Syria, Libya, and Yemen), and fear of persecution among opposition groups.

The challenged legitimacy of the Egyptian regime, as revealed in the election campaign, is reflected in two spheres. The first is the exacerbation of the internal splits within the ruling military establishment. The second is growing alienation between the ruling establishment and the general Egyptian public and civilian elements. The undermining of legitimacy is an issue that Egypt’s president will have to deal with as he embarks on his second term, and it mandates appropriate preparation as well by decision makers in the international community and Israel.

Undermining of the Regime's Pillars of Legitimacy

Until recently, the united support among the Egyptian security agencies for the regime was one of the sources of the regime's power. In the months preceding the elections, however, signs of disagreements appeared among these agencies. The first of these were the dismissals of Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mahmoud Hegazy in October 2017 and Egyptian General Intelligence Director Khaled Fawzy in January 2018, following reports that hundreds of general intelligence personnel had been fired since 2013 and replaced by associates of el-Sisi in Egyptian army intelligence (among them Abbas Kamel, his chief of staff, who replaced Fawzy). Furthermore, two former Egyptian defense establishment figures - former Egyptian Air Force Commander and former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, and former Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Sami Anan - challenged el-Sisi and sought to declare their candidacy for the presidency. According to various assessments, their candidacy reflected erosion in the president's military support base.

The alternative presented by Shafik and Anan was not merely a matter of the persons concerned; it also involved substance. It was designed to alleviate the growing civil alienation toward the military establishment that has led Egypt since July 2013. Many of the civilian forces that supported el-Sisi’s overthrow of President Morsi are dissatisfied with the regime's autocratic practices, which have marginalized the influence of non-military groups and left them outside the decision making circles. In announcing his candidacy, Anan promised to scale back the centralized function of the army in management of state affairs and to introduce greater pluralism and involvement of the civilian sector.

El-Sisi took rapid action to thwart the efforts to provide a political alternative to his rule liable to divide the army, with the elections then became a quasi-referendum on his continued rule. Public figures who called for boycotting "elections" of this type were described by the regime as "enemies of Egypt," and participation in the elections was described as a "response to their plots."

As part of the lessons from the presidential elections and looking ahead to the Egyptian parliamentary elections scheduled for 2020, el-Sisi is founding a party to provide him with a more solid political and civilian support base. This is designed to help him bring about a constitutional change removing the two-term limit for a president in Egypt and extending each term from four years to six. The Egyptian parliament currently has 596 members, most of them independent. The rest are divided into 19 political parties, most of which have fewer than five seats in parliament. As a result, the Egyptian political system is dispersed and divided, while the Support Egypt ("Da'm Misr") coalition of 370 members of parliament is supporting the president. Negotiations recently began to institutionalize this coalition as a political party, but it is doubtful whether this measure will reinforce the regime's legitimacy if it is not accompanied by greater freedom of organization for competing political party forces.

Implications for the International Community and Israel

The precarious state of the regime's legitimacy is not an exclusively Egyptian problem; it is cause for regional and international concern. It will detract from the regime's ability to carry out the next stages of the economic reform sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is likely to contain new painful measures, including the reduction of subsidies and higher prices for goods and services. It will also complicate efforts to obtain the cooperation in the war against terrorism by the local civilian population in the Sinai Peninsula. In the medium and long terms, the worsening of internal friction in the Egyptian Armed Forces and tension between the ruling establishment and civilian forces are also liable to draw Egypt into another political whirlwind that may jeopardize the country's stability.

It is therefore incumbent on Egypt's friends, particularly the United States and the European Union, to urge the newly reelected Egyptian president to shape a new and more democratic and inclusive social contract during his second term. This contract should include a courageous campaign against corruption, combating economic monopolies, opening the political arena to diverse forces, increasing freedom of expression in the media, and bolstering the feeling of partnership on the part of Egyptians in designing their country's present and future.

The legitimacy challenge also affects Egypt's relations with Israel. The Egyptian regime needs broad public legitimacy in order to incur political risks, such as controversial decisions in favor of bilateral or regional cooperation with Israel. In addition, a regime with unsteady legitimacy might be tempted to adopt a populist anti-Israel line in order to strengthen its public standing. Moreover, such a regime will find it more difficult to serve as a balanced and effective mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, while exerting pressure on the leaderships of Fatah and Hamas to make concessions and compromises.

At the same time, the political situation in Egypt also provides an opportunity for increasing bilateral cooperation with Israel in areas contributing to the regime's legitimacy: the economy, security, energy, water, agriculture, and tourism. A survey conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in late 2017 found that 29 percent of Egyptians supported cooperation with Israel even without renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, while this proportion is likely to increase with progress in the political process with the Palestinians. The fact that no large scale public protest took place in response to the signing of the natural gas agreement between the countries in February 2018 is an encouraging sign that the Egyptian public is ready for progress in relations with Israel on matters of common interest.

Finally, it is best for Israel to ensure that cooperation with the regime does not reinforce its prevailing image among Egyptian opposition circles as an "ally of the tyrant." For this purpose, Israel should strive as much as possible to conduct a dialogue with peace-seeking actors outside the ruling elites as well, and should express its desire, including through messages in Arabic on the social networks, to promote good neighborly relations across the Egyptian political and civilian spectrum.