Publications

This paper examines NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy in the wake of Moscow’s use of force in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. NATO’s ability to conduct an effective deterrence strategy has faced serious challenges as a result of both divisions over the role of tactical nuclear weapons and incoherence regarding policy toward Ukraine. This essay argues that Russia’s violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the increased emphasis it has placed on its strategic nuclear weapons, and its direct challenges to the resolve of the Alliance all demand that NATO be ready to respond forcefully to protect member states that are most vulnerable to attack, with particular emphasis on Poland and the Baltic states. However, amid a renewed rise in tensions between NATO and Russia over Ukraine, missile defense, and the threat to the Baltic states, the Alliance must also do its utmost to avoid an unintended nuclear escalation. In view of NATO’s conventional superiority over Russia, the Alliance can afford to minimize the role of its nuclear weapons. The NATO summit in the summer of 2016 is an opportunity for the Alliance to declare its resolve to protect vulnerable member states while also placing a greater emphasis on conventional resources in its deterrence doctrine.