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Home Publications INSS Insight Mohammed bin Salman as Crown Prince: Ramifications for Riyadh and Beyond

Mohammed bin Salman as Crown Prince: Ramifications for Riyadh and Beyond

INSS Insight No. 946, June 29, 2017

עברית
Yoel Guzansky
Deputy Crown Prince, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud participates in the Counter-ISIL Ministerial Joint Ministerial Plenary Session, at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. on July 21, 2016.

Mohammed bin Salman, recently named as Saudi crown prince, enjoys a reformist image, and because of his young age has the potential to rule the kingdom for decades. His official appointment lifts the fog from the question of succession and can contribute to a more energetic and active image of Saudi Arabia, even if it lends some uncertainty as to the kingdom’s policy and ability to meet the challenges ahead. So far bin Salman’s appointment has been accepted without public protest. But opposition could emerge from within the royal household itself – those who are unhappy with his meteoric rise, qualifications, and management style. This is therefore a charged time, testing the kingdom’s ability to manage the necessary generational transition from the sons of Ibn Saud to his grandsons, at a time that the kingdom also faces both domestic and external challenges.


As in a predictable screenplay, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman named his son Mohammed crown prince, replacing Mohammed bin Nayef, who was also stripped from his role as interior minister. This is a part of an overhaul intended to promote princes of the younger generation allied with Mohammed bin Salman and strengthen his branch within the royal dynasty. Bin Salman, whose path to the crown is now clear once his father no longer sits on the throne, will keep his position as defense minister and, due to his ailing father, de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. He benefits from a reformist image, and because of his young age has the potential to rule the kingdom for decades. His official appointment as crown prince lifts the fog from the question of succession and can contribute to a more energetic and active image of Saudi Arabia, even if it lends some uncertainty as to the kingdom’s policy and ability to meet the challenges ahead.

The Rise to Power

The appointment of the 31-year-old bin Salman was received by an overwhelming vote of confidence – 31 out of 34 – from the Allegiance Council, indicative of his broad though not absolute support. The Council, founded about a decade ago and charged with approving succession issues, consists of all living offspring of the kingdom’s founder, Ibn Saud. The move, now completed, began in 2015 when the king appointed bin Salman deputy crown prince, defense minister, and head of the Economic and Development Council. Since then, bin Salman, with his father’s help, has bolstered his status and accrued experience. In a kingdom where half of the population is under the age of 25, he enjoys – to the extent it is possible to estimate in an absolute monarchy – the support of the younger generation eager for change in the social order, both because of his age and because of his ambitious plans for changing the nation. Bin Salman was in charge of relations with the Obama administration (which, according to reports, preferred the more experienced and level-headed Mohammed bin Nayef) and is now responsible for cultivating ties with the Trump administration.

On bin Salman’s road to the top, he has gained authority and, predictably, enemies. In 2015, senior Saudi princes made a rare public appeal for change, expressing lack of confidence in the prince and his father. Western intelligence organizations also expressed concern about his policy, which replaced Saudi Arabia’s longstanding approach of restraint and caution, noting the dangers it presents to both regional and domestic political stability. The closed ranks of the senior princes had for many years been a source of the kingdom’s power, and now the regime was becoming a one-man show.

External and Domestic Challenges

Saudi Arabia’s political stability bears pan-Arab ramifications, particularly while the Arab world continues to weather the difficult regional times. To signal a smooth regime transition, the House of Saud made sure to document bin Nayef expressing loyalty to bin Salman, with the new heir apparent kissing the hand of the deposed crown prince as a sign of respect and appreciation. Bin Nayef, who seems not to have fully recovered from al-Qaeda’s attempt on his life in 2009, understands that despite the appreciation and support he received, opposing the current move would harm him and possibly also the stability of the royal household. The strength of the House of Saud has always stemmed from the princes’ understanding that regime continuity and stability are paramount. However, the New York Times reported that after being deposed, bin Nayef and his close family where put under palace arrest – suggesting the transition wasn't so smooth – apparently due to bin Salman’s wish to keep him isolated while he consolidates power.

Promoting the Vision 2030 economic plan is both a national and a personal challenge for bin Salman, who wants to stride rapidly toward a post-oil era. At the moment, however, the public, used to the abundance generated by oil, is frustrated by the increasing cost of living and reduced subsidies. The kingdom’s citizens feel entitled to benefits and arrangements derived from oil profits; this has been the foundation of the social order and civilian loyalty to the royal household. Yet while the public is asked to tighten its belt, bin Salman purchased a yacht at the cost of $500 million, a move that ignited a short-lived protest in the social media. Bin Salman might also encounter enemies from within the royal household who have not accepted his appointment, and from the conservative religious establishment, as bin Salman, in his attempt to promote social reforms, is challenging this group.

Another challenge relates to Saudi Arabia’s military involvement in Yemen. The military campaign led by the kingdom has hit a dead end, far from having achieved any of its stated objectives. The Houthis and their ally, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his loyalists continue to hold most of northern Yemen and the capital, Sana’a, and routinely fire rockets and missiles at Saudi territory. At the same time, international criticism of Saudi Arabia’s management of the war is rising, as the fighting has worsened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and caused extensive harm to civilians.

Bin Salman’s appointment comes at a time of high tension between Tehran and Riyadh, caused to a great extent by his hawkish position and outspoken rhetoric on Iran. It seems that improved relations between Saudi Arabia and the US administration and the rigid US stance on Iran encourage bin Salman to taken even more strident tones about Iran. The heir apparent recently rejected any possibility of dialogue with Iran, noting that Saudi Arabia would fight it within Iran itself, a hint to support for regime change in Tehran. For its part, Iran accuses Saudi Arabia of standing behind the June attack on the parliament in Tehran, even though the Islamic State assumed responsibility for the act. Moreover, Saudi Arabia reported that it has seized three members of the Revolutionary Guards who were allegedly planning an attack in the kingdom and is holding them hostage. In response to bin Salman’s appointment, several media outlets, identified with the Iranian regime, called the change of personnel in Saudi Arabia “a soft coup” and “a political earthquake,” and warned of a possible escalation in the conflict between the countries.

Possible Ramifications

The extent to which Mohammed bin Nayef was a moderating influence on bin Salman is unclear, and he in any case has been gradually stripped of authority. As crown prince, bin Salman will enjoy legitimacy for his more hawkish policy, including on Iran, although this posture might jeopardize the kingdom’s interests. The fact that Mohammed bin Salman has a hawkish view on Iran is not unusual in the Saudi royal household, but it seems that he is willing to take greater risks aimed at challenging the Islamic Republic, thus increasing the possibility of pushing the crisis to a breaking point. As for Israel, while bin Salman reportedly does not rule out normal relations with Israel in the future, expectations among many in Israel that the kingdom will start to normalize relations with Israel before there is real progress in the political process do not match the current Saudi position.

So far bin Salman’s appointment to heir apparent has been accepted without public protest. But opposition could emerge from within the royal household itself – those who are unhappy with his meteoric rise, qualifications, and management style. This is therefore a charged time, testing the kingdom’s ability to manage the necessary generational transition from the sons of Ibn Saud to his grandsons while the kingdom also faces both domestic and external challenges. The crisis with Qatar and the war in Yemen have weakened Saudi Arabia’s set of alliances, and key allies, such as Pakistan, are trying to maintain neutrality. So far, Qatar is resisting the pressure, partly due to help from Iran and Turkey, which might result in bin Salman – who initiated the boycott and pressure on Qatar – held responsible, should it fail.

Although over the years vital decisions in Saudi Arabia have been made after consultations and with a desire to achieve consensus among the senior princes, the king has the final word, and therefore who he is matters a great deal. The assessment was that bin Salman would inherit the crown from his father, bypassing bin Nayef, though to this end it seems that he had to score some achievements, first and foremost in the field of the necessary economic reforms and on the question of the kingdom’s involvement in Yemen. Therefore, and despite his early appointment, the burden of proof is still his. Thus, the final words of bin Nayef, the deposed crown prince, to his replacement still reverberate: “I will rest now. May God help you.”

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series INSS Insight
TopicsSaudi Arabia and the Gulf States
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