Main Recommendations

Against the backdrop of Operation Roaring Lion, now at its height, it is proposed not to embark on a prolonged military campaign in Lebanon; to avoid, as much as possible, a broad and permanent IDF presence there; to minimize friction with the Lebanese Army during the war; and to work to create conditions that would enable a new security arrangement with Lebanon. This approach should be carried out while taking advantage of the current window of opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese Army in light of Hezbollah’s growing weakness, especially as Hezbollah’s conduct in the war runs completely counter to Lebanon’s national interest. At the core of this arrangement should be a framework for completing Hezbollah’s disarmament while simultaneously advancing reforms in the Lebanese Army and strengthening its capacity to cope with the complex and difficult challenges it faces.

Within this framework, it is recommended to:

1. Avoid, as much as possible during the current war, harming the Lebanese Army forces or attacking civilian infrastructure and civilians in Lebanon, since such actions would undermine the possibility of improving relations with the Lebanese leadership and would fuel greater opposition to Israel among the Lebanese public.
2. Work to improve the channels of communication between Israel and Lebanon at both the military and political levels.
3. Reject any extension of UNIFIL’s mandate, which expires at the end of 2026, and oppose the deployment of another international force in its place, except for an American force or American monitors.

More specifically, with regard to strengthening the Lebanese Army:

1. Encourage Western and moderate regional actors (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and, to a lesser extent, Qatar) to participate in efforts to improve the functioning of the Lebanese Army by conditioning financial and military assistance to assist in promoting reforms.
2. Maintain close dialogue with the United States regarding the steps required to strengthen the Lebanese Army and request that Washington serve as an active and central partner in advancing these measures and supervising their enforcement and implementation.
3. Propose steps that could be advanced by the United States in coordination with the Lebanese government to strengthen the Lebanese Army:
   • Undertake a broad reform of the Lebanese Army so that it focuses on border defense and the struggle against independent militias while relinquishing responsibility for internal security and civilian affairs.
   • In the manpower sector:
     • Raise the salaries of army personnel and improve service conditions while absolutely prohibiting additional outside employment and strictly enforcing this ban.
     • Introduce changes in recruitment and screening processes, including new enlistment criteria, in order to ensure a high-quality and loyal army while also purging from its ranks Hezbollah members or those who are affiliated with the organization.

• • • Oppose absolutely the absorption of intact Hezbollah units into the Lebanese Army and demand that any former Hezbollah members be integrated individually into the army and undergo careful screening under American supervision.

• • • Develop training tracks for soldiers and commanders with the assistance of Western actors, along the lines of the “Dayton Plan” for the Palestinians.

• • Mobilize broad assistance for the Lebanese Army, including funding, training soldiers, and the provision of equipment, intelligence, and combat capabilities. The transfer of weapons should be gradual and conditioned on the progress of reforms in the Lebanese Army and on improvements in its functioning. This process should also include a supervision mechanism and coordination with Israel to ensure that the equipment and weapons transferred do not pose a threat to it.

The Lebanese Army—Background

The Lebanese Army was established in 1945, following the end of the French Mandate and the granting of Lebanon’s independence, as an army based on compulsory service. About twenty years ago, conscription was abolished, and since then, the army has been based on volunteers. The Lebanese Army is considered one of the weakest in the world: in the Global Firepower (GFP) ranking, Lebanon is ranked 115 out of 145 countries. Since Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, efforts have been made to build up the army with the assistance of outside actors, mainly to make it an effective national force vis-à-vis the militias operating in the country; however, its capabilities have remained limited. Even so, the Lebanese Army enjoys broad public trust and cross-sectarian legitimacy in Lebanon; in a Gallup survey conducted in September 2023, 90% of respondents expressed trust in the army.

The Lebanese constitution defines the role of the army as an instrument for safeguarding sovereignty and maintaining public order, under the president in his capacity as commander-in-chief. The National Defense Law (No. 102 of 1983) anchors the army’s authority in three main areas: defending the state’s borders and sovereignty against external threats (primarily from Syria and Israel); maintaining internal security and public order, including combating organized crime, terrorism, espionage, and smuggling; and carrying out assistance and civilian support missions.

The Lebanese Army currently has more than 116,000 regular soldiers on its rolls, of whom about 65,000 are actually serving. In addition, there are about 50,000 serving in semi-military units, and another tens of thousands of reservists, although not all of them are active. The army has three branches. The land forces (about 95% of the force) are divided into five geographic commands. As part of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, an additional headquarters was established in Tyre after 2006, responsible for the area south of the Litani River. The air force is small and outdated, while the naval branch relies mainly on patrol and support vessels suited for coastal defense, patrols, and anti-smuggling operations.

The Lebanese Army Since the Ceasefire

At the beginning of 2025, Lebanon’s new leadership declared its intention to make the Lebanese Army the country’s sole military force and, in that context, to work toward dismantling the armed militias, primarily Hezbollah, in accordance with the November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel. In September 2025, the army commander, Rodolphe Haykal, presented the government with a multi-stage plan, “Shield of the Homeland,” most of which remained classified. Its core element was a framework for weapons collection divided into five geographic areas: south of the Litani River; between the Litani and the Awali; Beirut and its environs; the Beqaa and the eastern border; and the rest of the country.

The first stage—from the Litani River to the border with Israel—was scheduled for implementation by the end of 2025, during which the Lebanese Army worked to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure and collect weapons in the area. According to Lebanese Army reports (which were also conveyed to the five-party committee overseeing implementation of the ceasefire, including representatives of the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon, and UNIFIL), by December 2025, hundreds of thousands of weapons had been confiscated; hundreds of Hezbollah facilities, weapons depots, bunkers, and headquarters had been dismantled; and dozens of tunnels, underground facilities, and concealed warehouses had been destroyed.

During the fighting in the current Operation Roaring Lion, it became clear that Hezbollah’s capabilities south of the Litani had not, in fact, been dismantled, despite the impression the organization had sought to create. The Lebanese Army acted sluggishly, preferred to avoid confrontations with Hezbollah, and, in some cases, even operated in coordination with the organization. Lebanese Army personnel refrained from entering private property, claiming that they were not legally authorized to do so. Over the past year, Israel also complained that intelligence information it had provided to the five-party enforcement committee had been passed on to Hezbollah, apparently through the Lebanese Army.

In addition, Israel claimed that Hezbollah had continued to violate the agreement and that its operatives remained active on the ground and were redeploying in southern Lebanon. Against this backdrop, the IDF exercised the freedom of action granted to it under the ceasefire agreement and acted against Hezbollah’s attempts to preserve its presence in southern Lebanon. Israeli officials further argued that the pace of Hezbollah’s rehabilitation was faster than the damage being inflicted on the organization by the IDF and by the Lebanese Army’s limited and slow activity. At the same time, Israel was preparing for the possibility of a broader military move, a course of action that became feasible after Hezbollah’s fateful decision to join the war alongside Iran on March 2.

On the eve of the current war, Israeli military activity and American pressure on the Lebanese government pushed the Lebanese Army to demonstrate greater effectiveness in operations to search private property for Hezbollah’s weapons, in coordination with the five-party oversight mechanism, although without the hoped-for results. For example, on December 12, 2025, the Lebanese Army arrived with UNIFIL at a house in the town of Yanouh following information that weapons were hidden there. It encountered resistance from the villagers and ultimately claimed that it found nothing. In another case, on December 17, 2025, Lebanese Army soldiers reached a wooded area near the town of Touline and discovered a tunnel leading to an underground room, but no weapons were found there.

Nevertheless, at the Lebanese government meeting on January 8, 2026, convened to assess the Lebanese Army’s achievements in the first stage, the commander reported that the army had effectively established control south of the Litani River. He stated that its activity had focused on expanding its presence there in order to prevent armed groups (Hezbollah was not mentioned explicitly) from rebuilding their capabilities, and that the disarmament plan had reached an advanced stage, and the army would continue with the dismantling of the remaining tunnels and weapons stockpiles. This statement, along with the Lebanese leadership’s responses to it, reflected an effort to project satisfaction with the Lebanese Army’s achievements, especially ahead of the commander’s visit to the United States on February 4–6. At the same time, they did not conceal the fact that the Lebanese Army had failed in its mission of preventing Hezbollah’s military presence in this area. Nevertheless, at the government meeting held on February 6, it was agreed to begin the second stage of weapons collection in the area from the Litani River to the Awali River, over a period of four to eight months.

Against the backdrop of the difficulties involved in disarming Hezbollah, from August 2025 onward, the Lebanese Army also sought to demonstrate progress in implementing the state leadership’s vision by advancing the collection of weapons from armed Palestinian actors in the refugee camps, following an understanding reached with Abu Mazen during his visit to Lebanon in May 2025. The army first operated in the Palestinian refugee camps near Tyre and in the Sidon area, then in Tripoli and the north, and only later in the Beirut area. However, the disarmament of the Palestinian camps was very partial. It was carried out only in some of the camps and mainly involved the collection of light and medium weapons, and only from Fatah personnel. The other Palestinian organizations, including Hamas and the leftist Palestinian factions, did not surrender their weapons.

Weakness of the Lebanese Army

The weakness of the Lebanese Army stems from Lebanon’s political system—a consensual order based on the distribution of power among the sects—as well as from the country’s demographic composition, the persistence of militias, and Lebanon’s overall fragility, including the severe economic crisis it has faced since 2019. The president serves as commander-in-chief of the army, but the Lebanese Army is subject to government decisions and is directly overseen by the minister of defense. At the same time, the army bears a heavy burden of responsibilities for both internal and external security, as well as assistance to civilians, which is not suited to its structure or capabilities. The main weaknesses are:

1. Difficulty in recruiting high-quality manpower, mainly because of the low pay. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), Lebanon was required to deploy 15,000 soldiers south of the Litani, in parallel with the deployment of 15,000 UNIFIL troops. In practice, however, only about 5,000–9,000 soldiers were deployed. Even following the ceasefire agreement of November 2024, the Lebanese Army has struggled to expand recruitment, and today only 9,000–10,000 soldiers are deployed in southern Lebanon. Lebanon’s prime minister was even recently quoted as saying that in order to implement the second stage of the Lebanese Army’s weapons-collection plan, the state would need to recruit about 10,000 additional soldiers. It should be emphasized that the average salary of a soldier is lower than that of a Hezbollah operative, which encourages the phenomenon of secondary employment. Many soldiers hold an additional job, and the phenomenon of “dual loyalty” is well known, with some serving simultaneously in the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah.
2. The large proportion of the Shiite population in the army. Although precise data are lacking, Shiites are estimated to constitute about 40% of Lebanon’s population. Their representation in the Lebanese Army in proportion to their share of the population is important for the army’s legitimacy among the sect. The transition to a volunteer army in 2007 increased the proportion of Shiites in the ranks, in part because military service offered a path to social mobility, especially given that Shiites generally have fewer economic opportunities than Christians. In the last parliamentary elections in May 2022, the majority of the Shiite population supported the “Shiite duo”—Amal and Hezbollah—and this is likely also reflected among Shiite soldiers. It is estimated that Shiites currently make up between 30% and 40% of the army. At the same time, it should not be assumed that all Shiite soldiers support or identify with Hezbollah.
3. Shortage of equipment and weapons, and dependence on external assistance. The Lebanese Army has outdated equipment and weapons of limited quantity and quality, and its capabilities are extremely limited, even in comparison with the weakened Hezbollah after the Swords of Iron war. Lebanon’s deep economic crisis led to a significant reduction in the army’s budget, and the army has long required external assistance. Although there is concern that weapons leaking from the Lebanese Army could reach Hezbollah, the army has received aid from Western countries, even if limited in quality and quantity, and it is armed mainly with Western weapons. The United States is the principal donor to the Lebanese Army and has supplied it with light and medium weapons since 2005, as part of a graduated assistance package totaling $1.2 billion up to the war in 2023–2024. Since 2022, Qatar has helped finance the salaries of Lebanese Army soldiers and has contributed to its ongoing operations. Assistance from Qatar and from Western countries expanded following the ceasefire of November 2024.

Total support for the Lebanese Army during 2025 is estimated at about $500–$600 million, most of it from the United States. This included the transfer of weapons and military equipment, including armored vehicles, anti-tank systems, demolition equipment, and communications systems. Despite the Lebanese Army’s Western orientation, it cannot be ruled out that, after confiscating weapons from Hezbollah, the army may in the future also use Iranian-made weapons, including advanced anti-tank weapons and rockets, as well as Syrian weapons smuggled into Lebanon after the collapse of the Assad regime. Recently, Qatar announced the transfer of 162 vehicles to the Lebanese Army, and an international conference to formulate an additional assistance plan in Paris is now planned for April 2026, after having been postponed due to the renewal of the war.

The Relationship Between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah

The weakness of the Lebanese Army is especially evident in comparison with Hezbollah, which portrays itself as the defender of the Lebanese state. Although Hezbollah established its position partly at the expense of the Lebanese Army, it also maintained varying degrees of cooperation with it. One early indication of such cooperation after the Second Lebanon War (2006) was the Lebanese Army’s attack in August 2010 on an IDF force operating in Odaisseh, in the enclave north of the fence. Over time, this cooperation developed into direct operational coordination, including joint fighting against jihadist operatives. One notable example was the battle for the border town Arsal in August 2017, after it had been under the control of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS for three years. The Lebanese Army and Hezbollah worked in parallel to retake the area. The officer commanding the Lebanese side was Major General Abbas Ibrahim, then head of the General Security Directorate. A Shiite figure who promoted cooperation with Hezbollah, he is today considered one of the most powerful figures in both the Shiite community and Lebanon more broadly. Some have identified him as a possible successor to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

Hezbollah’s accelerated buildup after the Second Lebanon War created a new balance of power between it and the Lebanese Army. The organization became an independent military force, the strongest in the country, controlling the Shiite arena and key strategic assets. This reality was given official expression in the Doha Agreement, which reflected Hezbollah’s victory over the Lebanese Army in the clashes of May 2008, after Hezbollah opposed government decisions that it viewed as undermining its autonomy.

Over the years, Hezbollah placed its members in public positions, within the Lebanese Army, and in other security agencies, while also exerting influence over both the military and civilian judicial systems. Thus, for example, Hezbollah was accused of obstructing the investigation into the shooting death of an Irish UNIFIL soldier in December 2022. Although, under international pressure, the organization was forced to hand over the shooter, he was released only five months after being imprisoned. An even more serious case was the obstruction of the investigation into the explosion at the port of Beirut in August 2020, which killed about 218 people and injured roughly 7,000 others.

The Lebanese Army denies ties with Hezbollah, but cooperation between some of its personnel and the organization is still evident today, at the individual level. Hilal Khashan, a professor at the American University of Beirut, recently claimed in an interview with Janoubia that army personnel leak information to Hezbollah. For example, it has been reported that Lieutenant Colonel Suhail Harb, a Shiite officer from southern Lebanon who was appointed in December 2020 as head of military intelligence in Southern Command and serves as a member of the five-party enforcement committee, was responsible for leaking classified information from the committee to Hezbollah, including information that enabled the evacuation of weapons depots before the Lebanese Army arrived.

Israeli Considerations

Although Hezbollah’s residual capabilities still exceed those of the Lebanese Army for the time being, its weakness after the Swords of Iron war—together with changes in Lebanon’s political system, Assad’s disappearance, the difficulties facing Iran, the severe damage inflicted on Hezbollah by the IDF’s current operations, and the growing recognition that the organization acts in complete contradiction to Lebanon’s national interest—creates an opportunity to alter the balance of power between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army.

Israel and Lebanon’s current leadership share an interest in the disappearance of Hezbollah as a strong, independent militia serving Iran. The likelihood of advancing this objective will apparently increase following Operation Roaring Lion. So far, the Lebanese government has demonstrated determination to act against Hezbollah and Iran, including during the current war, when it adopted a series of decisions aimed at limiting their activity on Lebanese territory following Hezbollah’s entry into the war in Iran’s service.

However, despite the dramatic and unprecedented nature of these decisions—including a prohibition on Hezbollah’s military activity without government approval and concrete steps to restrict the Iranian presence in Lebanon—serious questions remain regarding the Lebanese Army’s ability to help implement them and to become, in the near future, the country’s sole strong military force. In practice, following IDF activity during Operation Roaring Lion, the Lebanese Army was forced to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon. On the one hand, this underscores its weakness; on the other, it reflects its lack of interest in friction with the IDF.

Both Israel and Lebanon have different approaches regarding the presence of an international force along their shared border. Lebanon, aware of the Lebanese Army’s weaknesses vis-à-vis both the IDF and Hezbollah, is concerned by UNIFIL’s expected departure when its mandate expires at the end of 2026. Israel, by contrast, has had negative experiences with international forces deployed along its borders, which have not contributed to its security and have at times even limited the IDF’s freedom of action. Accordingly, Israel has no interest in the deployment of another international force, as reflected in ideas recently raised on the Lebanese side regarding the establishment of a force to replace UNIFIL. This initiative is supported mainly by France, which is seeking to enlist additional European actors because of its desire to preserve a military presence of its own in Lebanon while exploiting Lebanese concern over UNIFIL’s disappearance.

Accordingly, Israel has an interest in promoting an effort to transform the Lebanese Army and strengthen its military capabilities as the executive arm of the Lebanese government so that it can disarm Hezbollah and assert control over Lebanese territory in coordination with the IDF. At the same time, it is important for Israel to preserve influence, through the United States, over the type of equipment and weapons transferred to the Lebanese Army in order to maintain Israel’s military superiority and prevent the transfer of systems that could threaten its security.

A central challenge from Israel’s perspective is the possibility of integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese Army, both in terms of personnel and military capabilities. This idea had already been raised, even before Operation Roaring Lion, by senior Hezbollah officials, who view it as an undesirable but possible scenario if they are forced to yield to mounting internal and external pressure. Hezbollah leaders have said they would be willing to discuss this with the Lebanese leadership as part of contacts to formulate a “joint strategic defense plan,” but only after Israel fulfills all its commitments: withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, an end to military activity, the release of prisoners, and reconstruction of the war damage.

Israel’s interest in reducing the share and influence of former Hezbollah members and their supporters within the ranks of a renewed Lebanese Army is clear. At the same time, it appears unlikely that their integration can be prevented entirely if the army’s legitimacy among the Shiite population is to be preserved, especially since these individuals are likely to constitute an important recruitment pool because of their training and experience.

Possible Models for Hezbollah’s Integration Into the Lebanese Army

1. Individual recruitment of Shiite operatives only. Under this model, Hezbollah operatives would be integrated into the Lebanese Army only as individuals within existing army units, similar to the current situation in which there is nothing to prevent Hezbollah operatives—especially those with experience in weapons and combat—from volunteering for service in the army. In a renewed Lebanese Army, however, such recruitment would require a screening and oversight mechanism to ensure that these individuals have severed their ties with Hezbollah and are not cooperating with it. From Israel’s perspective, this is the preferred model.
2. Recruitment of entire Hezbollah formations as organic units within the Lebanese Army. For this model, complete Hezbollah formations would be incorporated into the Lebanese Army under the command of officers not affiliated with the organization or of officers from other religious sects. If these units were deployed in the same areas in which they had previously operated, they would enjoy the advantages of familiarity with the terrain and the ability to operate among the local population. At the same time, integrating entire formations would create significant risks because of the likelihood that their identification with and loyalty to Hezbollah would remain intact. There is also concern that these personnel would place loyalty to the organization and the sect above loyalty to the state. This model entails substantial risks and, from Israel’s perspective, is undesirable.
3. Integration of Hezbollah formations as independent units within the army, similar to the Iraqi model. This is the option Hezbollah appears willing to consider in the context of discussions over a “joint strategic defense plan”: the integration of complete Hezbollah units, together with their equipment and commanders, into the Lebanese Army. Ostensibly, this would be an “economical” option for the Lebanese Army since it would not need to equip or train these units. For Israel, however, this is the most dangerous model and one that must be firmly opposed because Hezbollah personnel would almost certainly continue to operate according to the ideology of “resistance” while benefiting from the legitimacy conferred by the Lebanese Army.

In formulating policy toward the Lebanese Army, it must be taken into account that enabling it to cope effectively with Hezbollah will require a long-term, gradual, and multilayered process. At the same time, Israel should emphasize the convergence of interests between itself and the current Lebanese leadership with regard to strengthening the Lebanese Army and shifting the balance of power between it and Hezbollah as part of a future arrangement between the two states.

Because Israel’s ability to influence the process of strengthening the Lebanese Army is highly limited, the United States will have a central role to play. Israel should therefore insist on preserving the US role as: the leader of the five-party enforcement committee or any alternative mechanism established at the end of the current campaign; a supporting and assisting actor in the buildup of the Lebanese Army; a channel for conveying Israeli proposals and demands regarding changes and reforms in the army; the body supervising the implementation of those reforms; and a mediator between Israel and the Lebanese leadership as long as no direct dialogue exists between them.

Recommendations for Israeli Policy

With respect to Operation Roaring Lion: Given the high probability that Israel will continue to weaken Hezbollah, alongside the expected deterioration in Iran’s condition as the organization’s principal patron—while recognizing that the outcome of the war remains uncertain—Israel should avoid becoming mired in a prolonged military campaign or being drawn into a broad and permanent IDF presence in Lebanon. Instead, it should seek to create the conditions for a new security arrangement with Lebanon, centered on agreement over the completion of Hezbollah’s disarmament in parallel with reforms in and strengthening of the Lebanese Army, so that it can cope with the difficult challenge posed by Hezbollah.

Because of the importance of strengthening the standing of Lebanon’s current leadership as a future partner, with the Lebanese Army acting on its behalf and in its service, it is recommended to:

1. Avoid, as much as possible, harming Lebanese Army forces as well as UNIFIL, and avoid damage to Lebanese civilian infrastructure and civilians, since such harm could produce the opposite of the desired effect by fueling opposition to Israel.
2. Work to improve channels of communication between Israel and Lebanon at both the military and political levels. With the Lebanese leadership, Israel should also examine the possibility of advancing the legislative changes required with respect to the army’s status and roles.
3. Reject any extension of UNIFIL’s presence and insist that its mission end at the close of 2026, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2790 (August 2025), while opposing French and Lebanese efforts to establish another international force in its place. At the same time, Israel should be prepared to examine the possible deployment of an American force or the presence of American monitors attached to Lebanese Army units.

More concretely, with regard to strengthening the Lebanese Army:

• Encourage Western and moderate regional actors—especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and, to a lesser extent, Qatar—to participate in efforts to improve the Lebanese Army, advance reforms within it, and provide it with funding and equipment.
• Maintain close dialogue with the United States in order to ensure its commitment to strengthening the Lebanese Army and securing its agreement to play a central role in advancing the required measures and supervising their implementation. In this context, active US participation in the international conference on strengthening the Lebanese Army, which France is planning to convene in Paris this coming April, is important.
• Propose a series of measures to be advanced by the United States in coordination with the Lebanese government to strengthen the Lebanese Army:
  • Broad institutional reform—The Lebanese Army should be restructured to focus on border defense and the struggle against independent militias, while relinquishing responsibility for internal security to other security bodies and withdrawing from civilian functions.
  • Manpower
    • Raise soldiers’ salaries urgently and improve service conditions while absolutely prohibiting outside employment and strictly enforcing the army’s directives on this issue.
    • Introduce far-reaching changes in recruitment and screening procedures, including new enlistment criteria, to ensure a high-quality and loyal force, while at the same time removing Hezbollah personnel and collaborators from the army’s ranks.
    • Firmly oppose the incorporation of intact Hezbollah formations into the Lebanese Army. Former Hezbollah personnel who are accepted as individuals into the army should undergo intrusive screening, preferably under American supervision, and continued monitoring should ensure that they have genuinely severed their ties with the organization.

1. 1. • Develop training tracks for soldiers and commanders with the assistance of Western actors, along the lines of the Dayton Plan for training the Palestinian security services.

• • Mobilize broad support for the Lebanese Army, including funding, training, and the provision of equipment, intelligence, and combat capabilities that will enable it to cope with the challenges before it: preventing Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon, completing Hezbollah’s disarmament, dismantling other militias, including the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, and monitoring smuggling at the international crossings. Weapons transfers should be gradual and conditioned on progress in reform and improvements in the army’s performance. This process should also include a supervision mechanism and coordination with Israel to ensure that the equipment and weapons transferred to the Lebanese Army do not pose a threat to it.