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The IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Corridor) is one of the most prominent geoeconomic initiatives announced in the past decade. Its goal is to connect India with Europe via a trade route bypassing the Suez Canal, passing through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and reaching Israel, ending at ports in southern Europe, primarily in Greece and Italy. The initiative encompasses physical infrastructure—railways, roads, sea and land ports—as well as components of communication, energy transfer, and information. The IMEC Corridor was announced in September 2023 on the sidelines of the G20 Summit held in New Delhi and is a product of American–Indian–Gulf–European cooperation intended to serve as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but the two states’ attitudes toward the project differ in accordance with their particular strategic, economic, and political outlooks.

Diverse Gulf Perspectives

For Saudi Arabia, the IMEC Corridor is viewed as an integral part of the Saudi Vision 2030, which aims to diversify the economy and reduce dependence on oil. Riyadh aspires to become a regional and international transportation and logistics hub, and the corridor is expected to serve as a connecting link between Asia and Europe. However, Saudi Arabia is proceeding cautiously. On one hand, it has a deep interest in joining the project—it would enable the Kingdom to strengthen ties with India, leverage infrastructure it is developing in the kingdom’s northwest (especially around the NEOM project), and solidify its position as a bridge between East and West. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia wishes to maintain a vital relationship with China, its principal oil buyer. Strong support for the IMEC project, which is identified with Washington, could therefore be perceived in Beijing as a confrontational move—something Saudi Arabia, which seeks to benefit from both poles of the China–US rivalry, is trying to avoid.

In addition, Saudi Arabia faces internal infrastructure constraints. Most of the railway lines and ports relevant to the IMEC project are still in the planning or construction phases and not yet ready for immediate implementation. A well-connected logistics infrastructure that would enable rapid transport of goods from the Gulf to the Mediterranean is still lacking. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s contribution to the corridor is expected to be slow and gradual, aligned with the progress of infrastructure development on its territory. Another layer influencing the Saudi position is political. Israel’s involvement in the corridor – a necessary link between Jordan and the Mediterranean—presents diplomatic challenges. Saudi Arabia finds it difficult to operate openly in regional cooperation frameworks that include Israel. As long as the normalization issue with Israel remains unresolved, Saudi involvement in the project will remain limited. In other words, Saudi Arabia views the corridor as a long-term potential, requiring preliminary political conditions that have yet to mature.

In contrast, for Abu Dhabi, IMEC is not a future concept but a practical initiative in the present. The UAE has for years positioned itself as a global transportation and logistics hub, and it possesses advanced infrastructure that can immediately integrate into the project. Dubai’s airport, the Jebel Ali Port, the national railway—Etihad Rail—and the DP World corporation all provide the UAE with a built-in advantage in developing and leading the corridor. Moreover, the UAE has deep economic ties with India, including a free trade agreement, joint investments, and a strong Indian presence in the population and business sectors. Therefore, for Abu Dhabi, the corridor is not just a logistics opportunity—it is an anchor in existing economic relations with India and Europe.

Politically as well, the UAE is more flexible. It established relations with Israel as early as 2020 under the Abraham Accords and sees no problem in infrastructural-commercial cooperation with Israel. The UAE even views this as a way to deepen its ties with Washington and European capitals, while balancing relations with Beijing, with which it continues to maintain close ties. The UAE’s pragmatic approach allows it to manage deep relations with both China and the West simultaneously.

The difference in the two states’ approaches is also reflected at the institutional level. In the UAE, discussions are already underway about establishing advisory and infrastructural bodies to promote the project on the ground, while in Saudi Arabia the emphasis is still on strategic coordination. While the UAE seeks to lead the actual integration of IMEC components, Saudi Arabia aspires to shape the broader framework by setting the rules of the game, determining which states are involved, and defining the corridor’s regional rationale. Riyadh wants to be the hub with which everyone must coordinate. The UAE, in contrast, sees itself as a global service provider, and therefore focuses on swift, efficient, and effective action, even within a less ambitious geopolitical framework.

The Turkish Factor

Turkey, which is not included in the IMEC initiative, views it negatively. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented on the matter after the project’s announcement in September 2023, stating that there would be “no corridor without Turkey” and that “the most convenient route for east–west transportation is through Turkey.” In practice, three countries involved in the initiative have complex or even adversarial relations with Turkey—India, Israel, and Greece. Turkey is instead promoting the “Development Road” via Iraq—a transport route of railways and highways from the port of al-Faw in Basra province to Turkey, from where goods can be transported to Europe. This is a more limited project compared to IMEC and connects to existing infrastructure, including the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Qatar and the UAE are important partners for Turkey in this Development Road project and are expected to contribute to its funding.

Another option for Turkey is promoting infrastructure projects through Syria. Ideas such as a gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey and Turkish plans to restore the Hejaz railway reflect Ankara’s desire to leverage the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime to establish routes from the Gulf to Syria and from there to Europe via Turkey. In the Syrian context, a Turkish–Saudi alignment of interests is also possible in promoting Syria as a preferred transportation corridor in order to ensure the investments necessary for its rehabilitation and stability. The United States, which expressed support for stabilizing the Assad regime through President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria, may also be more open to incorporating Syria in east–west transport connectivity.

The Israeli Perspective

From Israel’s point of view, this is a historic opportunity. The IMEC initiative combines geography with strategy: Geography places Israel at the center, and the strategic dimension will allow Israel to enhance its importance to India, the Gulf, Europe, and the United States. Furthermore, this initiative represents a significant economic lever: transforming Israel into a land transportation hub may bring revenues, infrastructure, and foreign investment, as well as strengthen the transportation network in Israel’s north. A railway connection from Jordan through Beit She’an to the Haifa Port will serve as the IMEC corridor’s axis in the region. The Haifa Port, acquired in 2022 by an Indian corporation, also reflects the strengthening ties between the countries involved in the initiative.

However, alongside the opportunities, there are also challenges. Participation in such a project requires Israel to ensure a secure and  stable environment. An attack by a hostile actor on Israeli infrastructure that is part of an international corridor could deter investors and harm Israel’s credibility as a transit route. At the regional level, Israel’s involvement in the IMEC corridor may either accelerate or hinder normalization with Saudi Arabia. If Riyadh becomes convinced that the economic and infrastructural benefits justify political openness, it may use the project as a channel for normalization. Conversely, it might try to bypass Israel through more expensive and longer routes—a move that would undermine the original objectives of the project.

The promotion of land corridors—which are inherently limited in transport volume compared to maritime routes—need not be a zero-sum game. At face value, several land routes from the Arabian Gulf via Syria, Israel, and Egypt to Europe are possible. Although regional states may attempt to thwart one another’s plans to become transportation and energy hubs, the existence of multiple points of regional instability means some redundancy in land routes may provide a backup in case of temporary disruption and is therefore a shared interest.