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The Increase and Development of Hezbollah’s Use of Drones Against Israel

Since the beginning of the Swords of Iron operation, Hezbollah has deployed a variety of drones, also known as UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), for gathering intelligence and attacking Israel. Recently, it has also increased the use of explosive drones in almost daily attacks. This is in addition to ongoing barrages of rockets and anti-tank missiles and the use of various types of rotary drones. While the IDF manages to intercept a large portion of the drones targeting Israel, many drones, mostly launched from Lebanon, have caused property damage and casualties. Notably, drones have struck the Northern Command base in Safed, the village of Arab al-Aramshe, and Metula. In addition to drones launched directly from Lebanon, Iranian proxies from other parts of the Middle East are also targeting Israel with explosive drones, which for now have been intercepted more successfully. The most prominent drones used by Hezbollah are the Iranian-made Ababil and the Shahed drones, each with several models. Typically, these drones have wingspans of about 2 to 3.5 meters and are guided to their targets by remote human control or GPS-guided automatic navigation. They can carry tens of kilograms of explosives and generally crash into their targets.

In addition to these suicide drones, Hezbollah documentation from May 16 indicates that the organization used a missile-carrying drone for the first time against Israel,  in an attack near Metula. In a video that quickly went viral, the drone is seen firing missiles at vehicles and other targets, recording the moment of impact before subsequently crashing in the area. The missiles fired from the drone are old Soviet-made S5 missiles, which are not guided. Their length, a little over a meter, requires a relatively large platform and does not allow them to be carried by small UAVS or rotary drones. It is believed to be an Iranian HESA Ababil drone, which has several models that can be launched from a truck-mounted launcher without needing a runway. The wingspan of the commonly used Ababil 2 model is approximately 3.25 meters. Although this marks Hezbollah’s initial use of a missile-armed drone, it is not surprising as there is evidence that the organization has used this mode of operation since 2014 during the Syrian civil war.

⭕️بالفيديو | مشاهد من عملية إستهداف المقاومة الإسلامية حب الله موقع المطلة التابع لجيش العدو الإسرائيلي بمسيّرة هجوميّة مسلّحة بصواريخ S5
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طردوهم من جنوب لبنان وهم لا يملكون

الا الاسلحة الخفيفة والمتوسطة وبعض من الثقيل الذي لا يذكر مثل رشاش العيار ١٤ و١٢ ونص
وغيرها… pic.twitter.com/oB5HZ3g4GD

— saif aqeel (@aqeel50980s) May 16, 2024

Documentation of the missile-carrying UAV attack, May 16, 2024

Another indication of the escalation in the drone war is the organization’s successful strike of the large observation balloon Tal Shamayim (Sky Dew) near the Golani Junction with an explosive drone on May 15. This attack reflects an improvement in accuracy and the ability to evade Israel’s air defense. The balloon’s system, a product of Israeli–American cooperation, is considered one of the largest of its kind in the world. The IDF spokesperson acknowledged that the drone hit the balloon, which was on the ground as part of its operational reception process, and claimed that the hit did not impair the IDF’s ability to build an aerial picture. In the same statement, the IDF spokesperson also mentioned that the Air Force intercepts drones launched not only from Lebanon but also from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen every few days. A Hezbollah video released shortly after the balloon strike also shows a long and successful intelligence surveillance of its operation.

The Erosion of Israeli Superiority—A Continuous and Not Surprising Process

Hezbollah’s use of drones should not surprise Israel. Already in the first decade of the 2000s, Israel’s advantage in UAVs operations began to erode. For example, during the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah used three Ababil drones, which were intercepted by the Israeli Air Force. Since then, partly due to global changes in the proliferation of armed drones and their extensive use in various conflicts worldwide, it has become clear that most Western countries do not anticipate the modern battlefield. The technological advantage is no longer reserved solely for advanced nations with significant military power. Over the years, Hezbollah has occasionally deployed drones against Israeli targets, with the launch of three reconnaissance UAVs toward the Israeli gas rig Karish in July 2022 (intercepted by the Barak 1 system on Navy ships and F-16 aircraft of the Air Force) serving as an example of numerous penetration attempts. Hezbollah’s Secretary-General has often boasted about the organization’s use of drones and its self-production capabilities developed with Iranian assistance.

Another indication of the erosion of Israeli superiority relative to Hezbollah is the organization’s successful attempts to down Israeli drones, including Zik and Kochav, demonstrating its air defense capabilities and significant potential to disrupt the IDF’s aerial freedom of action in Lebanon.

It appears that preparations to address the challenge have been insufficient and the changing nature of the aerial threat has not been fully understood or adequately addressed in the IDF’s force buildup. This, combined with Israel’s ineffective policy and weak responses toward the use of small rotary drones by terrorist organizations, has allowed Hamas, for example, to have freedom of action with these tools along the Gaza–Israel border even before October 7. Currently, the IDF counters the drone threat mainly with traditional air defense systems, fighter jets, and warships, all armed with missiles, along with various electronic warfare systems. However, missile use is extremely expensive and may also be inadequate against large groups of drones or during a combined attack by drone groups alongside other explosive aerial means. An example of such a combined attack was the extensive Iranian aerial attack on Israel on the night of April 13–14, which included hundreds of missiles and various types of drones, requiring regional and international cooperation alongside significant IDF efforts to counter it.

19 Mai 2024

L'organisation terroriste Hezbollah publie un document dans lequel elle montre un drone de l'organisation traversant le territoire israélien et survolant la base stratégique d'Ilanya, et montrant une photo du système Tal Shamayim, un jour avant que les drones… pic.twitter.com/FWWGXpQj1Y

— SPREX64 (@SPREX64) May 20, 2024

Alleged documentation of the attack on the "Tal Shmayim" balloon as published by Hezbollah, May 2024 

Preparations and Response—A Challenge and an Opportunity

Media reports indicate that the Israeli defense establishment has been making accelerated procurement attempts, totaling hundreds of millions of shekels to acquire C-UAV (counter UAV) systems to defend against explosive drones and suicide drones. According to one report, the primary aim of the procurement is for systems that can block or disrupt frequencies on which drones and UAVs operate, alongside various types of cannons. This is in parallel to the anticipated delivery of the Iron Beam laser interception system by Rafael to the IDF, which should be operational by the end of 2025. However, the question arises whether the IDF is also preparing for future threats, such as those that may arise in future arenas or laboratories, in addition to the current threats they face.

Looking ahead, based on developments such as the war between Russia and Ukraine, the IDF should prepare to deal with large quantities of FPV drones and other types of explosive drones, which are currently considered the leading means of attacking targets on both warring sides. Additionally, the IDF should be prepared to counter drones and UAVs that are guided by AI-based systems and rely on image recognition for navigation in order to overcome GPS jamming and other types of electronic warfare, as demonstrated in the Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities or against Russian robotic mini-tanks. Although this concept is currently only being presented in experiments by highly advanced nations, it is worthwhile to learn and prepare also for the threat posed by autonomous swarms.

While these challenges are significant in terms of technology, budget, and operations, developing responses to this issue may also present an immense opportunity for Israel as the demand for advanced response means is growing beyond its borders. The international interest in this field is increasing given the understanding of the growing unmanned threat on the future battlefields of our generation. Furthermore, it is crucial to prepare with more foresight—suiting the day when Israel is interested, like any other country—in safe civilian and commercial operation of drones and UAVs in routine and emergency situations, while also protecting against their use in crime and terrorism.