Yoram Schweitzer

Over the past five years, Iran’s activity in the arena of international terrorism has significantly intensified, spreading across vast geographic regions and incorporating criminal organizations in the execution of terrorist operations. Although most Iranian terrorism attempts have been thwarted, there is no guarantee that this success will persist in the future. It is therefore necessary to examine the characteristics of Iran’s use of terrorism in order to improve the chances of countering it. This memorandum examines Iran’s policy regarding its use of terrorism in the international arena over the past five years, the trends that have characterized it, and its modes of operation-placing these elements within the broader historical context of Iran’s employment of terrorism. An analysis of Iran’s terrorism policy reveals a troubling trend, illustrating that Iran remains committed to employing international terrorism and is even amplifying its efforts in this regard, demonstrating a willingness to risk friction with numerous states in order to pursue its policy. This trend requires close attention, both in its own right and because it signals Iran’s growing audacity and confidence in violating international norms and the sovereignty of states-behaviors that may also manifest in other contexts.

In light of the delayed Iranian response to the assassination of Haniyeh, it is possible that Iran is planning to exact a price from Israel in the international arena. How should we prepare for the challenge?

Will the “war of attrition,” which has continued already for half a year on Israel’s northern border, expand into a full-scale war?

Casualties, tens of thousands of evacuees, and serious property damage – since October 8, in parallel to the war in Gaza, there has been ongoing fighting along the northern border. The fighting has been at high intensity, but has remained under the threshold of an all-out war. Despite the heavy price exacted of Hezbollah so far, an end to the organization’s belligerence does not appear on the horizon. How should Israel act?

Joining both Israel’s internal crisis and Hezbollah’s increasing provocations along the northern border, there are calls in Lebanon to engage in negotiations with Israel over the land border between the two countries. How should Israel approach this dilemma? How should it work to strengthen its deterrence against the Shiite organization, but not be dragged into a war it does not want?

2022 marked 40 years since Hezbollah’s establishment and 30 years since Nasrallah became the leader of the organization. Over the years Hezbollah has developed from a classic terrorist organization into a multifaceted and multi-identity organization that is a military force with conventional capabilities and the spearhead of the Shiite “axis of resistance.” Throughout these years, and especially since the Second Lebanon War (2006), the organization has gained military strength but refrained from exercising its offensive capabilities against Israel; its activity is driven by the goal of maintaining and consolidating its balance of deterrence with Israel, in the interest of avoiding deterioration into another full-scale war. This article examines the elements that have shaped the “deterrence equation” between Hezbollah and Israel, which combines kinetic military activity and cognitive warfare, its gradual development over the course of the 40 years of conflict, and the nature of the current balance of deterrence; this is the background to assess how Israel might best deal with the challenge posed by the organization. The article contends that the balance of deterrence is rooted in Hezbollah’s origins and evolution and constitutes a central component of the organization’s current strategy. However, given Nasrallah’s tendency to take risks and the changing regional reality, this does not guarantee the prevention of a future large-scale conflict between the organization and the IDF, which could develop into a multi-arena war.