Ofer Guterman

The radicalization of Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip is not a new phenomenon, but the process has accelerated and deepened dramatically since Hamas’ takeover of the territory in 2007. Under its rule, an extremist religious-nationalist ideology has been systematically embedded across all spheres of Gaza life—from education and religious institutions to welfare and the media—producing a profound “Hamasification” of public consciousness. The war that erupted on October 7 brought unprecedented ruin to the Gaza Strip, both physically and institutionally, posing a monumental reconstruction challenge, but also a rare historic opportunity. This memorandum argues that military disarmament and physical rehabilitation alone will not ensure long-term security and stability, and that a far deeper process of “de-Hamasifcation” is required: dismantling Hamas’ ideological and institutional hegemony and replacing it with a more moderate civic and normative infrastructure. The study presents a comparative analysis of Western and Arab deradicalization models and finds that Western approaches—such as those implemented in Germany and Japan—struggle to provide an adequate response to Gaza’s cultural and political context. Instead, we propose adopting operational principles drawn from contemporary Arab models, particularly the “civic-transformative” model applied in the Gulf states, which combines a firm crackdown on extremist actors with re-education toward religious tolerance and broad-based economic rehabilitation. The paper outlines an integrative strategy encompassing sustained security demilitarization, the mobilization of an Arab coalition to provide religious and political legitimacy, and the establishment of a credible political horizon as a counterweight to the ethos of “resistance.” Only the combination of these elements can generate a viable governing and ideological alternative to Hamas and lead to a more stable long-term security environment for the State of Israel.

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